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Abstract 
As digital data-collection has increased in scale and number, it becomes an 
important type of resource serving a wide community of researchers. 
Cross-institutional data-sharing and collaboration introduce a suitable approach 
to facilitate those research institutions that are suffering the lack of data and 
related IT infrastructures.  
Grid computing has become a widely adopted approach to enable 
cross-institutional resource-sharing and collaboration.  It integrates a 
distributed and heterogeneous collection of locally managed users and 
resources.  This project proposes a distributed data warehouse system, which 
uses Grid technology to enable data-access and integration, and collaborative 
operations across multi-distributed institutions in the context of HV/AIDS 
research. 
This study is based on wider research into OGSA-based Grid services 
architecture, comprising a data-analysis system which utilizes a data warehouse, 
data marts, and near-line operational database that are hosted by distributed 
institutions. Within this framework, specific patterns for collaboration, 
interoperability, resource virtualization and security are included.  
The heterogeneous and dynamic nature of the Grid environment introduces a 
number of security challenges. This study also concerns a set of particular 
security aspects, including PKI-based authentication, single sign-on, dynamic 
delegation, and attribute-based authorization. These mechanisms, as supported 
by the Globus Toolkit’s Grid Security Infrastructure, are used to enable 
interoperability and establish trust relationship between various security 
mechanisms and policies within different institutions; manage credentials; and 
ensure secure interactions. 
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Chapter 1.  
Introduction 
Digital data is now fundamental to all branches of science and engineering.  It 
plays a major role in medical research and diagnosis, and supports business and 
governmental decision-making processes.  
Individual collections of data typically specialise in holding information of 
interest to particular communities.  This information is held in databases, that 
is, structured documents in structured assemblies of binary files.  In an 
increasing number of scientific disciplines, large data-collections are emerging 
as important resources serving a wide community of researchers.  The 
communities of researchers that need to access and analyze this data are often 
owned by multiple institutions and geographically distributed, as are the 
computing and storage resources that these communities rely upon to store and 
analyze their data.  
Grid Computing (Foster & Kesselman, 1998) has emerged as a new field, using 
multiple distributed resources to cooperatively work on a single application, as 
there is a need for coordinate resource-sharing and problem-solving across 
multiple institutions, both scientific and commercial.  Applications in this 
context include distributed computing for computationally demanding data 
analysis (pooling of compute power and storage), the federation of diverse 
distributed datasets, collaborative visualization of large scientific datasets 
(pooling of expertise), and coupling of scientific instruments with remote 
computers and archives.  Both science and industry can benefit from Grids at 
present.  
In South Africa, there is an urgent need, for example, to establish 
well-structured data and corresponding IT infrastructure (e.g., network and 
programs) in order to facilitate data-based analysis in HIV/AIDS research areas.  
In other words, it is necessary that the established resources (e.g., data, 
computing facilities, and the Internet) can be used efficiently and effectively to 
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promote cooperation between HIV research institutions.  Grid Computing is a 
suitable approach to realize these considerations.  
This chapter, firstly, explores the HIV/AIDS research problem-context in South 
Africa as an example of more general problems in which Grid Computing can 
be applied. The difficulties and challenges implicit in this particular 
problem-context make it a pertinent example.  The research objectives, 
methodology and the layout of this dissertation are described subsequently, 
based on this problem-context.  
1.1. Problem-Context 
In South Africa, some HIV/AIDS research institutions suffer from a lack of 
digital-data storage resources, data-management infrastructure, connectivity 
infrastructure and corresponding data-intensive analysis facilities to perform 
valid HIV/AIDS-specific research tasks.  HIV/AIDS patients’ data is mostly 
owned privately by medical institutions, such as hospitals and clinics.  This 
data is primarily used for recording patients’ personal and diagnostic 
information and treatment histories, rather than for supporting 
HIV/AIDS-specific data analysis.  On the other hand, some research 
institutions have already established their own data storage resources (such as 
databases, data warehouses and data marts) to aggregate patients’ demographic 
data, and have data-based analysis facilities to support their research.  
However, this data can, typically, only be used for their own purposes.  
Cross-institutional resource-sharing and systems-integration is an economical 
way to provide high-performance computing to those institutions that lack 
resources like server clusters, high-performance networks, huge data storage 
resources or expensive analysis (data-mining) applications.  Collaborative 
HIV/AIDS research would obviously benefit from this approach, particularly in 
developing countries.  Ideally, this should enable data-sharing and facilitate 
cooperation across multiple, disparate systems across research institutions, by 
integrating existing standards and technologies and compensating for lack of 
resources and infrastructure.  Given the pandemic nature of HIV/AIDS, it is 
imperative to build HIV/AIDS data storage-resources (e.g. to store patients’ 
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demographic data) and corresponding analysis services for access by all who 
require such information.  This dissertation examines how Grid Computing 
and Data Warehousing can be utilised to provide interoperable collaboration 
among research institutions and how secure access to “mined” information can 
be provided.  
To this end, data collection, data analysis and data-sharing are three key initial 
steps towards collaborative HIV/AIDS research.  They are elaborated below. 
 Data-Collection 
Data-collection in this problem-context implies collecting data from distributed 
data-providers.  It is used for building data storage resources on HIV/AIDS 
patients (e.g. to allow for demographics-based analysis).  This digital data is 
typically stored in on-line operational databases that are owned by medical 
institutions, such as hospitals or clinics, to support their day-to-day business 
processing.  The data is normally includes a patient’s personal information 
(such as name, ID number, contact information, diagnosis, treatments, etc.), and 
is frequently changed/edited.  
However, a researcher might be interested in testing hypotheses and examining 
trends in order to derive patterns from the statistical manipulation of this data.  
For example, a researcher might need to gather as much as possible valid 
HIV/AIDS patients’ data to test whether the number of HIV positive patients in 
the Eastern Cape Province in South Africa has changed significantly since 2004, 
or to establish what the average age of HIV-positive patients in the Eastern 
Cape is.  Access to such information (and the means for processing the data 
and making it available) is crucial to HIV/AIDS research.  Obviously, the 
volume of data collected and processing-accuracy of the information produced 
affects the analysis results directly.  Data-collection typically involves the 
collecting of the required data from multiple, disparate, physically-distributed 
data-providers.  The data in different institutions may be used for different 
purposes, may be managed by a variety of management systems, and may be in 
a range of possible formats.   
 4 
Various permutations for data-collection are possible.  In the HIV/AIDS 
demographics-based research, only the data relevant to demographics research 
need be extracted, according to the requirements of the HIV/AIDS data analysis 
(the relevant fact tables and dimension tables, in data warehousing parlance).  
For example, HIV/AIDS patients’ names and ID would be relatively 
unnecessary in this analysis, but patients’ age, treatment, diagnostic 
information, etc., would be important.  Moreover, personal names and IDs may 
lead to ethical and privacy violations.  The extracted data needs to be 
transformed and loaded to appropriate destination storages; extract, transform 
and load are typical data warehousing procedures.  
In the problem-context under discussion, such data-collections would be 
performed periodically.  The collected data would only be updated when the 
original data is changed.    
 Data Analysis 
In this scenario, assume HIV/AIDS research mainly concerns analyses based on 
HIV/AIDS patients’ demographic data.  Patients’ data is collected from 
medical institutions through data-collection processes and becomes part of a 
research institution’s data storage.  This provides the fundamental data to 
perform analysis tasks.  Basically, the purposes of data analysis are: to identify 
trends, collections/groupings and anomalies, to test theories and to derive 
patterns.  The development of specific data-analysis services’ is based on 
researchers’ requirements.  Typically, these are information-mining procedures 
(programmatic functions) which may be called to interpret and satisfy a user’s 
query. Various considerations emanate from this situation: resource-location, 
resource-management, execution-management, security, etc. 
 Data-sharing 
Data-sharing is, obviously, an important capability to achieve collaborative 
HIV/AIDS research.  It implies access to, and integration of, data from 
multiple data storage resources hosted by physically distributed institutions.  
Data-collection can involve preparing the HIV/AIDS patients’ demographic 
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data, to varying degrees.  Each research institution could, for instance, build its 
own aggregated data and data-analysis services.  The collected data contents 
would most likely be different because of different research interests or 
directions.  One institution may wish to perform a specific analysis task, but 
the required data is only available at another institution.   
Data-sharing across multiple institutions provides a way to supply data to the 
analysis process with no need to collect new data, which may be 
time-consuming and costly.  However, if institution A should need data from 
institutions B and C to complete its analysis, institution A should have the 
ability to locate and then access the data at institutions B and C.  On the other 
hand, institutions B and C should be able to publish their data in order to notify 
other institutions which data storage resources are accessible.  The data from 
institutions B and C may be managed by different data-management systems in 
different formats, so the retrieved data must be transformed into a unified 
format and integrated into a single data set which can be interpreted by 
institution A’s analysis process.  The variety of data formats, models or 
schemas used by different institutions could create an interoperability issue.   
Thus, while data-sharing is crucial to support cross-institutional collaborative 
operations, it needs to be highly managed. Security issues, such as 
authentication and authorization, must also be handled effectively.  
In brief, the collaborative HIV/AIDS research scenario discussed above is 
intended to introduce a feasible way to facilitate such research.  Multiple 
(HIV/AIDS research) institutions can share their data and participate in 
collaborative operations.  The ultimate goal is building data-intensive analysis 
capabilities, based on aggregated (HIV/AIDS patients’ demographic) data from 
multiple distributed institutions.  Data from all involved institutions is 
integrated as a virtual data pool; similarly information-mining applications can 
constitute a virtual processing pool.  Furthermore, the sharing relationship can 
be initiated among certain parties, accommodating new participants 
dynamically.  Thus, the nature and composition of the virtual organization will 
vary over time.  Obviously, the sharing relationship, therefore, has to be highly 
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controlled.  The interoperability and security issues must be handled 
pre-emptively, for example.  
1.2. Problem Statement 
Based on requirements exemplified by the HIV/AIDS collaborative research 
problem-context, can a secure distributed data warehouse system be proposed 
for providing the key capabilities required by such a scenario using the Grid 
paradigm?  Can such a system a (Grid) system provide the required 
infrastructure and capabilities for data-sharing and data-based collaborative 
operations such as managed data-analysis methods executed over managed 
distributed resources?  
A Grid system typically involves a complex environment comprising 
heterogeneous resources, dynamic administration mechanisms, and various 
security policies within different institutions.  Due to the nature of the Grid 
environment, a proposed Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system needs 
to address wide-ranging problems, including: interoperability, resource 
virtualization, scalability, and security.  This is the focus of this research. 
1.3. Research Objectives 
The first objective is to provide justification for using OGSA-based Grid 
architecture and distributed data warehouse resources as the point-of-departure 
for this system.  OGSA (Foster, Kesselman, Nick & Tuecke, 2002) stands for 
“Open Grid Services Architecture” which is a widely adopted Grid architecture 
for developing a Grid system.  This objective contains two sub-objectives: the 
first is exploring all the essential capabilities specified in OGSA; the second is 
deriving (two) models from the defined capabilities for data-collection, 
data-access and integration.  
The second objective is to examine particular relevant security concepts, 
including authentication, single sign-on, dynamic delegation and authorization 
for the proposed system.  One sub-objective here, is to define a security model 
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that integrates all the identified components necessary to provide the overall 
required protection for the proposed system.  
1.4. Methodology 
The methodology to be employed is primarily based on literature survey and 
theoretical argument.  The literature study is divided into two parts: the first is 
a broad study of current Grid technology, including the concept, the essential 
Grid architecture, and Grid evolution.  This study intends to give a 
comprehensive understanding of the Grid paradigm and related technologies.   
The second part is the study of the OGSA specification and all its supporting 
standards and specifications, together with related implementations.  OGSA is 
the fundamental standard for the proposed system framework. Around OGSA, 
there are a number of supporting standards and specifications that help define 
the standard interfaces and protocols for handling various aspects (e.g., 
interoperability, security, etc.) in an OGSA-based Grid system.  
Three possible models are proposed and argued for as the solutions to the 
problems of realizing the key capabilities (including data-collection, data-access 
and integration) required by HIV/AIDS collaborative research, and addressing 
various security issues.  
1.5. Layout of Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as follows: 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
The problem-context, the research objectives and the research methodology are 
introduced here.  
Chapter 2. The Grid Approach to Cross-Institutional Collaboration 
A comprehensive introduction to the Grid is followed by a discussion of an 
approach combining Grid and database technology.  In the area of Grid 
technology, the concept, architecture, characteristics and evolution are 
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discussed.  Due to the weaknesses of current database technology in supporting 
distributed, heterogeneous data sources, the Grid approach is employed to 
enable data-access and integration across distributed institutions.  Based on the 
classification of data in a Grid environment and categories of data-based 
distributed applications, integration strategies are discussed.  
Chapter 3. Grid-Enabled Distributed Data Warehouse System 
Based on the discussion of the problem-context and approach, this chapter starts 
discussing the proposed distributed data warehouse system enabled by the Grid 
technology.  The features of the envisaged environment are followed by a 
thorough analysis of the system’s functional requirements.  
Chapter 4. System Framework 
The chapter focuses on the framework for the proposed system according to the 
study of existing Grid-related standards and specifications.  This framework 
recognizes all supportive standards and defines essential services to meet the 
requirements discussed in chapter 3.  Two models are included to illustrate 
how to realize the main capabilities within the problem-context.  
Chapter 5. Security 
This chapter firstly identifies the main security concerns in this dissertation.  A 
broad study of the Grid security architecture, mechanisms, standards and 
implementations is followed by the discussion of solutions for each security 
aspect in the proposed system.  A model is included to show how to combine 
all necessary security components to provide protection to the proposed system.  
Chapter 6. Conclusion 
A summary of the findings of this research is followed by a discussion of 
possible future research.  
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Chapter 2.  
The Grid Approach to Cross-Institutional 
Collaboration 
The term ‘e-Science’ (http://www.nesc.ac.uk/nesc/define.html) is used to 
describe computationally intensive science that is carried out in highly 
distributed network environments, or science that uses immense data sets that 
require Grid computing.  It was created by Dr. John Taylor, the Director 
General of the United Kingdom's Office of Science and Technology, in 1999 
and was used to describe a large funding initiative started in November 2000.  
E-Science is essentially about global collaboration in key areas, including 
scientific, engineering and medical research, and the next generation of 
infrastructure that will enable it.  One of its primary features is a new and 
systematic way of collecting, managing, sharing, publishing and exploiting large 
volumes of data.  Another crucial feature is growing international, 
multi-disciplinary collaboration, which jointly addresses challenging problems.  
The e-Science approach requires new technological infrastructure as well as 
new behaviours.  Existing database technology has been implemented 
extensively by distributed applications in both scientific and commercial areas.  
It is a determinant in planning and implementing data-access and integration.  
Grid technology has been adopted widely to enable efficient cross-institutional 
resource-sharing and collaboration.  The combination of database and Grid 
technology introduces a suitable approach for building infrastructure in the 
e-Science environment.  Therefore, the essential features of the Grid and 
database technology, and the approach combining them is introduced in this 
chapter.  
2.1. Grid Technology 
Grid computing has emerged as a new field using multiple, distributed resources 
to cooperatively work on a single application.  Grid concepts and technologies 
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were originally developed to enable resource-sharing within scientific 
collaboration, first within early gigabit/sec test-beds, and then on increasingly 
larger scales.  Applications in this context include distributed computing for 
computationally demanding data analysis (pooling of computer power and 
storage), the federation of diverse distributed datasets, collaborative 
visualization of large scientific datasets (pooling of expertise), and coupling of 
scientific instruments with remote computers and archives.  More recently, 
similar requirements arose in commercial settings, not only for scientific and 
technical computing applications, but also for commercially distributed ones, 
including enterprise-application integration and business-to-business partner 
collaboration over the Internet.  Both science and industry can benefit from the 
Grid at present.  In brief, the Grid approach coordinates resource-sharing and 
problem-solving across multiple organizations. 
2.1.1.  Grid definitions 
Grid is not a new idea.  The concept of using multiple distributed resources to 
cooperatively work on a single application has been around for several decades.  
The word ’grid’ is used by analogy with electric power grid, which provide 
pervasive access to electricity.  The term ‘the Grid’ was coined in the 
mid-1990s to denote a proposed distributed computing infrastructure for 
advanced science and engineering.  In 1998, Foster and Kesselman defined a 
computational Grid as, “a hardware and software infrastructure that provides 
dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to high-end 
computational capabilities” (Foster & Kesselman, 1998).  Before this, efforts 
to coordinate wide-area distributed resources were known as metacomputing 
(Smarr & Catlett, 1992).  Metacomputing represents applications enabled by 
the construction of networked virtual supercomputers, or metacomputers.  The 
term ‘metacomputer’ denotes a networked virtual supercomputer, constructed 
dynamically from geographically distributed resources linked by high-speed 
networks.  An example of such a system is the I-WAY experiment (DeFanti, 
Foster, Papka, Stevens & Kuhfuss, 1996).  Since the earliest definition, there 
have been a number of other attempts to define what a Grid is.  For example, “ 
A Grid is a software framework providing layers of services to access and 
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manage distributed hardware and software resources” 
(http://www.extreme.indiana.edu/ccat/glossary.html) or a “widely distributed 
network of high-performance computers, stored data, instruments, and 
collaboration environments shared across institutional boundaries” 
(http://www.ipg.nasa.gov/ipgflat/aboutipg/glossary.html).  In 2001, the 
definition of a Grid was refined by Foster, Kesselman and Tuecke as: 
“coordinated resource-sharing and problem-solving in dynamic, 
multi-institutional virtual organizations” (Foster, Kesselman & Tuecke, 2001). 
This is the most commonly used definition at present.  From a commercial 
view point, IBM (IBM Grid Computing, 
http://www-1.ibm.com/grid/grid_literature.shtml) defines a Grid as “a 
standard-based application/resource-sharing architecture that makes it possible 
for heterogeneous systems and applications to share, compute and storage 
resources transparently”. 
A simple checklist (Foster, 2002
2
) is used to help understand the essence of the 
Grid definition:  
 Coordinating resources that are not subject to centralized control.  A Grid 
integrates and coordinates resources and users that live within different 
control domains — for example: different administrative units of the same 
company; or different companies; and addresses the issues of security, 
policy, payment, membership, and so forth that arise in these settings.  
 Using standard, open, general-purpose protocols and interfaces, a Grid is 
built from multi-purpose protocols and interfaces that address such 
fundamental issues as authentication, authorization, resource discovery, and 
resource access. These protocols and interfaces are standard and open.  
 Delivering non-trivial qualities of service. A Grid allows its constituent 
resources to be used in a coordinated fashion to deliver various qualities of 
service, relating, for example, to response time, throughput, availability, 
and security, and/or co-allocation of multiple resource types to meet 
complex user demands, so that the utility of the combined system is 
significantly greater than that of the sum of its parts. 
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2.1.2.  Virtual organization 
The Grid concept is about coordinated resource-sharing and problem-solving in 
dynamic, multi-institutional virtual organizations.  A set of individuals and/or 
institutions, defined by such sharing rules, is called a virtual organization (VO) 
(Foster et al., 2001).  The LHC (Large Hadron Collider) Computing Grid 
Project (LCG, http://lcg.web.cern.ch/LCG/) at European Council for Nuclear 
Research (CERN) is a classic example of where VOs are being used.  A VO 
normally consists of a number of mutually untrusted participants with varying 
degrees of prior relationship (perhaps none at all) who want to share resources 
in order to perform some tasks.  
The Grid is about resource-sharing.  The sharing concerned is not primarily 
file exchange, but rather direct access to computers, software, data storage, 
sensors, networks and other resources, as required by a range of collaborative 
problem-solving and resource-brokering strategies emerging in industry,  
science, and engineering.  This sharing is highly controlled.  It is obviously 
always conditional and based on factors like trust, resource-based policies, 
negotiation and how payment should be considered.  For example, the resource 
providers and consumers define clearly and carefully just what is shared, who is 
allowed to share, and the conditions under which sharing occur.  Sharing 
relationships can vary dynamically over time, in terms of the resources 
involved, the nature of the access permitted, and the participants to whom 
access is permitted.  These relationships do not necessarily involve an 
explicitly named set of individuals, but rather may be defined implicitly by the 
policies that govern access to resources.  The dynamic nature of sharing 
relationships requires mechanisms for discovering and characterizing the nature 
of the relationships that exist at a particular point in time.  Sharing 
relationships are often not simply client-server, but peer-to-peer: providers can 
be consumers, and sharing relationships can exist among any subset of 
participants.  Sharing relationships may be combined to coordinate use across 
many resources, each owned by different organizations.  The same resource 
may be used in different ways, depending on the restrictions placed on the 
sharing and its goals.   The Grid also includes coordinated problem-solving, 
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which may need combinations of distributed data-analysis, computation and 
collaboration. These characteristics and requirements define what is called VO.  
The broad applicability of VO concepts makes the Grid paradigm important to 
modern computing.  
2.1.3.  Grid architecture 
This section introduces a high-level Grid architecture (Foster et al., 2001) that 
identifies fundamental system components, specifies their purpose and function, 
and indicates how they interact with one another.  It does not provide a complete 
enumeration of all required protocols (and services, APIs, and SDKs), but rather 
identifies requirements for general classes of components.  It is an extendible, 
open architectural structure within which can be placed solutions to key VO 
requirements.  
Interoperability is the central issue to be addressed.  In a VO environment: the 
sharing relationship can be initiated among arbitrary parties, accommodating 
new participants dynamically, across different platforms, languages, and 
programming environments.  In this context, the standard protocols and 
syntaxes for general resource-sharing are required to enable interoperability 
across organizational boundaries, operational policies and resource types.  A 
protocol definition specifies how distributed system elements interact with one 
another in order to achieve a specified behaviour, and the structure of the 
information exchanged during this interaction.  This focuses on externals 
(interactions) rather than internals (software, resource, characteristics), because 
VOs complement, rather than replace, existing institutions.  Sharing 
mechanisms cannot require substantial changes to local policies and must allow 
individual institutions to maintain ultimate control over their own resources.  A 
service is defined in terms of the protocol one uses to interact with it, and the 
behaviour expected in response to various protocol-message exchanges. The 
definition of standard services, i.e., access to computation and data, resource 
discovery, co-scheduling, data replication, and so forth, enhance the services 
offered to VO participants and also take out resource-specific details that would 
otherwise hinder the development of VO applications.  Moreover, Application 
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Programming Interfaces (APIs) and Software Development Kits (SDKs) are also 
need to be considered.  These provide the programming abstractions required to 
create a usable Grid.  In brief, this approach to Grid architecture emphasizes 
the identification and definition of protocols and services firstly; and APIs and 
SDKs secondly.  
As shown in Figure 2.1 (Foster et al., 2001), the components of this architecture 
are organized into layers.  The description of this architecture is high level and 
places few constraints on design and implementation.  Each layer is introduced 
as follows:  
 
 
         Figure 2.1 Grid Architecture 
 The Fabric layer provides the resources to which shared access is 
mediated by Grid protocols: for example, computational resources, storage 
systems, catalogues, network resources, and sensors. A ’resource’ may be a 
logical entity, such as a distributed file system, computer cluster, or 
distributed computer pool.  Fabric components implement the local, 
resource-specific operations that occur in specific resources (whether 
physical or logical) as a result of sharing operations at higher levels.  At a 
minimum, resources should implement enquiry mechanisms that permit 
discovery of their structure, state, and capabilities on the one hand, and 
resource management mechanisms that provide some controls of delivered 
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quality of service on the other.  
 The Connectivity layer defines core communication and authentication 
protocols required for Grid-specific network transactions.  Communication 
protocols enable the exchange of data between Fabric-layer resources.  
Communication requirements include transport, routing, and naming.  The 
alternatives to these protocols are drawn from TCP/IP protocol stack: 
specifically, the Internet (IP and ICMP), transport (TCP, UDP), and 
application (DNS, OSPF, RSVP, etc.) layers of the Internet layered protocol 
architecture (Baker, 1995).  The security aspects of the Connectivity layer 
should be addressed based on existing standards, whenever possible.  As 
with communication, many of these security standards, which were 
developed within the context of the Internet protocol suite, are applicable. 
Authentication solutions for VO environments should have characteristics 
such as single sign-ons, delegation, and user-based trust-relationships 
(Butler et al., 2000) (Foster, Kesselman, Tsudik & Tuecke, 1998).  They 
should integrate with, rather than replace local security solutions.  Grid 
security solutions should also provide flexible support for communication 
protection (e.g., control over the degree of protection, independent data unit 
protection for unreliable protocols, and support for reliable transport 
protocols other than TCP) and enable stakeholder control over authorization 
decisions, including the ability to restrict the delegation of rights in various 
ways.  
 The Resource layer builds on the Connectivity layer communication and 
authentication protocols in order to define protocols (and APIs and SDKs) 
for the secure negotiation, initiation, monitoring, control, accounting, and 
payment of sharing operations of individual resources.  Resource-layer 
implementations of these protocols call on Fabric-layer functions to access 
and control local resources. Resource-layer protocols are concerned entirely 
with individual resources, and hence ignore issues of global state and 
atomic actions across distributed collections.  Resource-layer protocols 
can be divided into two primary classes: information protocols and 
management protocols.  Information protocols are used to obtain 
information about the structure and state of a resource, for example, its 
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configuration, current load, and usage policy.  Management protocols are 
used to negotiate access to a shared resource, specifying, for example, 
resource requirements (including advanced reservation and quality of 
service) and the operations to be performed, such as process creation, or 
data-access.  Since management protocols are responsible for instantiating 
sharing relationships; they must serve as a “policy application point”, 
ensuring that the requested protocol operations are consistent with the 
policy under which the resource is to be shared. 
 While the Resource layer is focused on interactions with a single resource, 
the Collective layer contains protocols and services (and APIs and SDKs) 
that are not associated with any one specific resource, but are rather global 
in nature and capture interactions across collections of resources.  The 
collective components can implement a wide variety of sharing behaviours 
without placing new requirements on the resources being shared, for 
example, directory services, co-allocation, scheduling, and brokering 
services, monitoring and diagnostics services, etc.  Collective functions 
can be implemented as persistent services, with associated protocols, or as 
SDKs (with associated APIs), designed to be linked with applications.  
Collective components may be tailored to the requirements of a specific 
user community, VO, or application domain, for example, an SDK that 
implements an application-specific coherency protocol, or a co-reservation 
service for a specific set of network resources.  Other collective 
components can be more general-purpose.  
 The Application layer comprises the user applications that operate within 
a VO environment.  Applications are constructed in terms of, and by calling 
upon, services defined at any layer. 
In summary, it is a standards-based open architecture that facilitates 
extensibility, interoperability, portability, and code-sharing.  It uses standard 
protocols to make it easy to define standard services that provide enhanced 
capabilities. 
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2.1.4.  Standards-Bodies 
This section gives a brief overview of Grid standards-bodies.  For Grid-related 
technologies, tools and utilities to be taken up widely by the community at 
large, it is vital that developers design their software to conform to the relevant 
standards.  The most important standards organization is the Global Grid 
Forum (GGF, http://www.ggf.org).  In September 11 2006, the GGF and the 
Enterprise Grid Alliance merged to form the Open Grid Forum (OGF, 
http://www.ogf.org).   
OASIS (http://www.oasis-open.org) is a non-profit consortium that drives the 
development, convergence and adoption of e-business standards, which is 
having an increasing influence on Grid standards.  Other bodies that are 
involved with related standards efforts are the Distributed Management Task 
Force (DMTF, http://www.dmtf.org/): Common Information Model (CIM) and 
the Web-based Enterprise Management (WBEM).  In addition, the World 
Wide Web Consortium (W3C, http://www.w3.org) is also active in setting Web 
services standards, particularly those that relate to eXtensible Markup Language 
(XML) and Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP). 
2.1.5.  Grid evolution 
The Grid technology is evolving at a very fast rate.  At present, three 
generations of Grid systems are identified by De Roure (Eds.) (De Roure, 
Baker, Jennings & Shadbolt, 2003): the first-generation systems were the 
forerunners of the Grid; the second-generation systems focused on middleware 
to support large-scale data and computation; and the current third-generation 
systems shift the emphasis to distributed global collaboration, a service-oriented 
approach and information layer issues.  As discussed in section 2.1.1, the 
commonly used definition of a Grid as “a flexible, secure, coordinated 
resource-sharing among dynamic collections of individuals, institutions, and 
resources”, emphasizes the importance of information aspects, essential for 
resource discovery and interoperability.  Current Grid projects are beginning to 
take this further, from information to knowledge.  These aspects of the Grid 
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are related to the evolution of Web technologies and standards, such as XML to 
support machine-to-machine communication and the Resource Description 
Framework (RDF, http://www.w3.org/RDF/) (W3C, 2004
1
) (W3C, 2004
2
) to 
represent interchangeable metadata.  The Grid currently has a close 
relationship with World Wide Web.  Evolving Web technology will provide 
the basis for the next generation of Grid systems.  
2.1.5.1. The First Generation 
The first-generation systems were recognised as forerunners of Grids.  The 
early to mid 1990s marked the emergence of the early metacomputing or Grid 
environments.  Typically, the objective of these early metacomputing projects 
was to provide computational resources for a range of high-performance 
applications.  These projects differed in many ways, but they all had to solve a 
number of similar problems, including communications, resource management, 
and the manipulation of remote data, to be able to work efficiently and 
effectively.  Two representative projects in the vanguard of this type of 
technology were FAFNER (http://www.npac.syr.edu/factoring.html) and 
I-WAY (Foster, Geisler, Nickless, Smith & Tuecke, 1997).  Both FAFNER and 
I-WAY were highly innovative and successful.  FAFNER was tailored to a 
particular factoring application that was, in itself, trivially parallel and was not 
dependent on fast inter-connectivity.  I-WAY was designed to cope with a 
range of diverse high-performance applications that typically needed a fast 
inter-connectivity and powerful resources.  However, both of them lacked 
scalability. 
2.1.5.2. The Second Generation 
The second-generation systems focus on middleware to support large scale data 
and computation.  Middleware is generally considered to be the layer of 
software sandwiched between the operating system and applications, providing 
a variety of services required by an application to function correctly.  Recently, 
middleware has re-emerged as a means of integrating software applications 
running in distributed heterogeneous environments.  In a Grid, middleware is 
used to hide the heterogeneous nature and provide users and applications in a 
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homogeneous and seamless environment by providing a set of standardized 
interfaces to a variety of services.  The key second-generation Grid 
technologies include core technologies, distributed object systems, resource 
brokers and schedulers, complete integrated systems and peer-to-peer systems.  
There are growing numbers of Grid-related projects, such as Globus and Legion, 
dealing with areas such as infrastructure, key services, collaborations, specific 
applications and domain portals.  These projects represent the core technologies 
of the second generation.  The Globus project is a multi-institutional research 
effort that seeks to enable the construction of computational Grids.  Globus 
(Foster & Kesselman, 1997) provides a software infrastructure that enables 
applications to handle distributed heterogeneous computing resources as a single 
virtual machine.  A central element of the Globus system is the Globus Toolkit 
(GT), which defines the basic services and capabilities required to construct a 
computational Grid (Foster & Kesselman, 1999).  The toolkit consists of a set of 
components that implement basic services, such as security, resource location, 
resource management, and communications.  Globus has evolved from its 
original, first-generation incarnation as I-WAY, through version 1 (GT1) to 
version 2 (GT2) (Foster & Kesselman, 1998).  The protocols and services that 
Globus provide have changed as it has evolved, and its emphasis has moved away 
from supporting high-performance applications towards more pervasive services 
that can support virtual organizations.  Legion (Grimshaw et al., 1997) is an 
object-based metasystem which encapsulated all of its components as objects.  
This method has all the normal advantages of an object-oriented approach, such 
as data-abstraction, encapsulation, inheritance and polymorphism.  It provides 
the software infrastructure so that a system of heterogeneous, geographically 
distributed, high-performance machines can interact seamlessly.  
Earlier representatives of the distributed object system include the Common 
Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA, http://www.corba.org) and Jini 
(http://www.jini.org).  CORBA automates many common network 
programming tasks, such as object registration, location, and activation; request 
de-multiplexing; framing and error-handling; parameter marshalling and 
de-marshalling; and operation dispatching.  Although CORBA provides a rich 
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set of services, it does not contain Grid-level allocation and scheduling services.  
Jini has been designed to provide a software infrastructure that can form a 
distributed computing environment that offers network plug and play.  In Jini, 
applications are normally written in Java and communicated using the Java 
Remote Method Invocation (RMI) mechanism.  The Common Component 
Architecture Forum (Armstrong et al., 1999) attempts to define a minimal set of 
standard features that a high-performance component framework would need to 
provide in order to use components developed within different frameworks.  
There are a number of systems available whose primary focus is batching, 
resources scheduling and resource brokering.  Condor 
(http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor/) is a software package for executing batch jobs 
on a variety of UNIX platforms, in particular those that would otherwise be idle.  
The major features of Condor are automatic resource location and job 
allocation, check pointing, and the migration of processes.  The Storage 
Resource Broker (SRB) (Rajasekar & Moore, 2001) has been developed at San 
Diego Supercomputer Centre (SDSC) to provide uniform access to distributed 
storage across a range of storage devices, via a well-defined API.  A key feature 
of the SRB is that it supports metadata associated with a distributed file system, 
such as location, size and creation date information. It also supports the notion of 
application-level (or domain-dependent) metadata, specific to the content, which 
cannot be generalized across all data sets.  Nimrod-G is a Grid broker that 
performs resource-management and scheduling of parameter-sweep and 
task-farming applications (Buyya, Abramson & Giddy, 2000).  The Nimrod-G 
scheduler has the ability to lease Grid resources and services depending on their 
capability, cost, and availability.  It also supports resource discovery, selection, 
scheduling, and the execution of user jobs on remote resources.  
As the second generation of Grid components emerged, a number of international 
groups started projects that connected these components into coherent systems, 
called integrated systems.  The European DataGrid project 
(http://eu-datagrid.web.cern.ch/), led by CERN, is funded by the European Union 
with the aim of setting up a computational and data-intensive Grid of resources 
for the analysis of data coming from scientific exploration (Hoschek, 
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Jaen-Martinez, Samar, Stockinger & Stockinger, 2000).  The DataGrid is built 
on top of the GT.  The primary objective of the DataGrid project is 
implementing middleware for fabric and Grid management, including the 
evaluation, test, and integration of existing middleware and research and 
development of new software as appropriate.  Uniform Interface to Computing 
Resources (UNICORE) (Almond & Snelling, 1999) is another important 
integrated system that needs to be mentioned.  It is a project funded by the 
German Ministry of Education and Research.  The design goals of UNICORE 
include a uniform and easy-to-use Graphical User Interface (GUI), an open 
architecture based on the concept of an abstract job, consistent security 
architecture, minimal interference with local administrative procedures, and 
exploitation of existing and emerging technologies through standard Java and 
Web technologies.  UNICORE provides an interface for job preparation and 
secure submission to distributed supercomputer resources.  
The traditional client-server model can be a performance bottleneck and a single 
point-of-failure.  Peer-to-Peer (P2P) computing (Clark, 2001) implemented by 
several systems are examples of the more general computational structures that 
are taking advantage of globally distributed resources.  In P2P computing, 
machines share data and resources, such as spare computing cycles and storage 
capacity, via the Internet or private networks.  Machines can also communicate 
directly and manage computing tasks without using central servers.  This 
permits P2P computing to scale more effectively than traditional client-server 
systems.  Project JXTA (http://www.jxta.org/), created by Sun Microsystems, is 
an open-source development community for P2P infrastructure and applications.  
JXTA is a specification, rather than software.  
2.1.5.3. The Third Generation 
Current third-generation systems shift emphasis to distributed global 
collaboration, a service-oriented approach and information layer issues.  New 
Grid applications desire to be able to reuse existing components and information 
resources, and to assemble these components in a flexible manner.  The 
adoption of a service-oriented model and increasing attention to metadata are 
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two key characteristics of third-generation systems. The third generation is a 
more holistic view of Grid computing and can be said to address the 
infrastructure for e-Science.  By 2001, a number of Grid architectures were 
apparent in a variety of projects, for example, the one introduced in section 
2.1.3.  Around this time, the emergence and wide adoption of Web services 
technology (W3C, 2004
3
) introduced promising standards to support the 
service-oriented approach.  In fact, one research community, focussing on 
agent-based computing, had already undertaken extensive work in this area: 
software agents can be seen as producers, consumers and indeed, brokers of 
services.  Web services and software-agent technologies are closely aligned to 
the third-generation Grid at present.  
“The Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) Framework”, the Globus-IBM 
vision for the convergence of Web services and Grid computing, was presented 
at the GGF meeting held in Toronto in February 2002.  It was initially 
described as a “physiology” paper (Foster et al., 2002).  It introduced a 
service-oriented Grid architecture which tailors a Web services approach to 
meet some Grid-specific requirements.  The OGSA supports the creation, 
maintenance, and application of ensembles of services maintained by VOs.  
Here, a service is defined as a network-enabled entity that provides some 
capability, such as computational resources, storage resources, networks, 
programs and databases.  
Web services provide interoperability to Grid computing.  However, they do 
not provide a new solution for many of the challenges of large-scale distributed 
systems.  Agent-based computing (Jennings, 2001) (Foster, 2004) is suggested 
as another input to inform the service-oriented Grid vision.  An agent “is an 
encapsulated computer system that is situated in some environment, and that is 
capable of flexible, autonomous action in that environment in order to meet its 
design objectives” (Wooldridge, 1997).  Agent-based computing is particularly 
well suited to a dynamically changing environment, where the autonomy of 
agents enables the computation to adapt to changing circumstances.  The 
Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA, http://www.fipa.org) is an 
international organization, dedicated to promoting the commercial application 
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of intelligent-agent technology, by openly developing specifications supporting 
interoperability for agents and agent-based services.  FIPA produces software 
standards for heterogeneous and interacting agents and agent-based systems, 
including extensive specifications.  In the FIPA abstract architecture, agents 
communicate by exchanging messages using speech act-based FIPA Agent 
Communication Language (FIPA-ACL) (FIPA, 2002) to promote 
interoperability.  FIPA-ACL is a language with precisely defined syntax, 
semantics and pragmatics that is the basis of communication between 
independently designed and developed software agents.  
2.2. Combining Database and Grid Technology 
Key elements of e-Science are in-silico experimentation and design, and 
information-based discovery through data-mining and visualization of 
integrated, large data-collections.  The maturity of database technology means 
that it is used extensively in applications, including virtually all of those in the 
e-Science domain, and in building the infrastructure itself.  However, the 
integration of large-size data-sets, the geographic distribution of users and 
resources, and computationally-intensive analyses result in complex and 
stringent performance demands not being satisfied by any existing 
data-management infrastructure.  The Grid approach provides a platform that 
potentially enables this integration. 
Combining Grid technology with database access and integration technology is 
an essential approach to meeting those infrastructure requirements and to 
supporting the evolving behaviours.  The infrastructure should provide the 
technology required to enable e-Scientists to make effective and convenient use 
of structured data.  The data-access and integration are primary targets to be 
considered for two reasons.  Firstly, a great many Grid applications include a 
significant data-access and integration requirement.  Virtually every scientific, 
engineering, medical and decision-support application depends on accessing 
distributed heterogeneous collections of structured data.  Secondly, the Grid 
itself uses many structured data-collections for its own operation and 
administration.  As the Grid technology becomes more sophisticated and 
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autonomic, the number, volume and diversity of these collections will increase.  
It is, therefore, imperative that Grid designers and developers support and use 
systematic data-access and integration methods.  
This section, firstly, reviews the current data-management technologies and 
limitations, and then introduces the approaches that have been adopted to 
support integration of data-intensive services, according to the scope of 
applications and the variety of structured data.  
2.2.1.  Current database-management technologies 
Data management technologies, such as Database Management Systems 
(DBMSs), have been studied for several decades, and are well established.  
The Grid introduces new challenges like scale, heterogeneity, distribution, and 
autonomy.  However, current data-management software has already addressed 
these challenges to some extent, especially heterogeneity and distribution 
transparency.  This section reviews current database-management 
technologies.  A good database text (Elmasri & Navathe, 2000) provides more 
related information. 
2.2.1.1. Basic Concepts 
A database is defined as an organized collection of data.  DBMSs are frequently 
chosen to provide a higher-level interface to manage structured data.  A 
schema is metadata that describes the logical structure of a database in terms of 
some data model, such as the relational model.  There may be additional 
metadata available, describing the physical organization of the database, the 
access policies and some of its enforced invariants, called integrity constraints.  
Notations for describing subsets of data are called query languages.  These 
have been extended to include object-oriented features and to allow embedded 
programming language expressions, such as Java static methods.  The term 
‘query language’ also includes those parts of the language used to perform 
updates.  A view mechanism represents the state of a subset of a database, 
specified as a query.  Views are used to give application developers a 
controlled and simplified view of the data, appropriate to their task.  
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Materialised views avoid the repeated evaluation of the query defining the view.  
Updates are propagated to the view by a consistency protocol that may be 
driven by triggers. 
2.2.1.2. Single-Site DBMSs 
Traditionally, DBMSs have focused on structured data, laid out in tabular form.  
In recent years, they have been extended to provide support for non-tabular data, 
including large objects, abstract data types, user-defined functions, and so on 
(Stonebraker & Moore, 1996).  The organization of data held in a DBMS tends 
to be highly structured, and the logical groupings must conform to a defined 
data schema.  The grouping can be based on fields, records and files.  In a 
relational database management system (RDBMS), the grouping is based on 
columns, rows, and tables, and in an object-oriented database (OODBMS), it is 
based on objects and classes.  XML (W3C, 2006
1
) has now become popular, 
not only as a markup language for data exchange, but also as a data format for 
semi-structured data.  Therefore DBMSs have been adapted to store XML 
data, either shredded into relational rows (without the markup), or stored intact 
in the tables (with the markup).  XML offers great flexibility in how the 
structure, and the syntactical and semantic rules of data are conveyed, and how 
structural links and non-linear pathways between data can be defined.  A new 
query language for XML, called XQuery (W3C, 2006
6
), is under design in the 
W3C.  Prototype implementations for XQuery are gradually becoming 
available, including implementations that query over XML views of relational 
data (Funderburk, Kiernan, Shanmugasundaram, Shekita & Wei, 2002).  
DBMSs provide a high-level interface to manage structured data.  This 
interface virtualizes the details of the physical data organization, and provides 
applications with a high level, declarative query language, SQL (Structured 
Query Language).  Besides declarative access, DBMSs also provide several 
business-critical features such as transactional updates, data integrity, reliability, 
availability, high performance, concurrency, parallelism, and replication.  They 
automatically control access to data, manage the referential integrity of data 
within transactions, log changes made to data, audit database activity, 
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synchronise data replicated in a distributed environment, and recover data to a 
consistent state.  Applications only need to specify what task they want to 
perform, and do not have to program how the task is to be performed.  DBMSs 
also provide facilities to reorganize database contents in order to manage space 
efficiently, to optimize queries, and to balance available resources dynamically.  
For example, the DBMS optimizer automatically searches among several 
possible implementations and chooses the best one.  Most DBMSs support the 
specification of detailed authorization and privacy mechanisms.  
The efficient evaluation of statements in query languages is well developed, and 
includes sophisticated data organizations, such as caching, indexes, 
fragmentation and optimising transformations.  This optimization has been 
extended to distributed-queries necessary for integrating distributed resources 
(Kossmann, 2000).  The development of transaction mechanisms that deliver 
atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability, has greatly simplified the task 
of writing applications.  More complex transaction mechanisms support larger 
and longer-lived operations.  Distributed transactions are supported by 
standard two-phase commit protocols, e.g., Web Services Transaction 
(WS-Transaction) (Cabrera et al., 2005).  Standard mechanisms for connecting 
programs to data typically establish a session, and then submit a series of query 
statements within some transaction regimes.  Each submission obtains a 
response, either a result-set or a status-response, indicating whether the 
execution has succeeded or has failed.  DBMSs provide schema evolution, 
representation of complex data, data-sharing, caching, effective management of 
data resources, backup, and recovery.  Schema evolution is the process of 
changing the description of the data and how it may be used.  As it is a 
common operation, DBMSs support it and deal with the implicit changes 
required to make the existing data comply with the new definition.  DBMSs 
also support efficiently implemented triggers: assertions or integrity constraints, 
paired with actions, that fire, e.g., cause a transaction to abort, compensation 
operations, or notifications, when they are triggered by an update.  
Using standard mechanisms, such as Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) and 
Java Database Connectivity (JDBC), the application program is independent of 
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some aspects of the database to which it connects, and remote connection is 
supported.  ODBC and JDBC (SUN, 2002) are the most widely used 
programmatic interfaces to access SQL DBMSs.  They provide support for a 
variety of database operations, including SQL query specification and 
execution, transaction processing, etc.  The popularity of Web services as a 
method for programs to communicate with one another has introduced another 
interface to relational DBMSs.  It is now possible for Web service clients to 
issue SQL requests and to invoke database stored-procedures (e.g., Web 
Services Object Runtime Framework (IBM, 2001)).  ADO.NET 
(http://www.microsoft.com/data/ado/default.htm) is an application-level 
interface to Microsoft's OLE DB data sources.  Derived from the earlier 
ActiveX Data Objects (ADO), it enables applications to query databases using 
SQL, access information in a file store over the Internet, access email systems, 
save data from a database into an XML file, and perform transactional database 
operations.  ADO.NET also supports a disconnected mode of operation, where 
clients can work on cached copies (datasets) of prior query results without a 
connection to the data source.  However, all these interfaces still have further 
limitations with respect to virtualization.  JDBC and ODBC provide some 
heterogeneity transparency, handling SQL DBMSs and a few other simple data 
types (like comma-separated-value files).  They do not handle many kinds of 
data sources well, especially ones without database-like query and transaction 
interfaces. 
2.2.1.3. Federated DBMSs 
To achieve performance and dependability, and to deliver multi-site data 
services, many DBMSs are able to exploit high levels of parallelism and to 
operate on distributed computers.  A distributed database is one that has been 
deliberately distributed over a number of sites, is designed as a whole 
(Stonebraker, Aoki et al., 1996), and is subject to considerable centralised 
control – local DBMSs may have different physical schemas even when there is 
a shared global schema (e.g., there may be explicit fragmentation schemas).  
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The data management community has developed federated database technology, 
which provides unified access to diverse and distributed data (Sheth & Larson, 
1990).  In a federated database, many databases contribute data and resources 
to a multi-database federation, but each participant has full local autonomy.  In 
a loosely-coupled federated database, the schemas of the participating databases 
remain distinguishable, whereas in a tightly-coupled federated database, a 
global schema hides (to a greater or lesser extent) schematic and semantic 
differences between resources (McBrien & Poulovassilis, 2002) – single, logical 
schema mapped to multiple physical schemas.  Based on these and other more 
detailed database achievements, there are products that provide access to and 
integration of distributed data resources, e.g., IBM DiscoveryLink (Haas et al., 
2001) and Kliesli or K2 (Davidson et al., 2001).  The WebSphere Information 
Integrator (Lee, Magowan, Dantressangle & Bannwart, 2005) is the IBM 
information-integration middleware that provides a range of integration 
technologies: enterprise-search, data-federation, replication, transformation, and 
event-publishing, to meet varied integration requirements. 
In a federated architecture, a federated DBMS serves as middleware, providing 
transparent access to a number of heterogeneous, distributed data sources.  A 
federated system appears to the application developer like a regular DBMS.  
Applications can use any supported interface (including ODBC, JDBC, or a 
Web service client) to interact with the federated DBMS.  A user can run 
queries to access data from multiple sources, joining and restricting, aggregating 
and analyzing it at will, with the full power of a DBMS query language like 
SQL or XQuery.  A user can also update the data, if they have the right 
permissions at the sources.  Yet, unlike with JDBC, ODBC, or ADO, the data 
sources in a Grid-based federated system need not be DBMSs at all, but, in fact, 
could be anything, ranging from sensors to flat files to application programs to 
XML, and so on.  
An ideal federated DBMS provides good heterogeneity transparency and some 
distribution transparency.  A key limitation is that applications have to 
explicitly specify the data sources in a federated query.  This means that the 
addition of new data sources can involve changing the application, typically a 
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very expensive task.  Each data source must also be explicitly registered to the 
federated DBMS, along with its wrapper.  
2.2.1.4. Security 
DBMSs currently handle security on a per-data source basis. Data security 
includes authentication, authorization and auditing.  Current DBMSs systems 
offer various “sign-on” mechanisms to identify the user.  The simplest of these 
mechanisms rely on trust; the DBMS assumes that the application above the 
DBMS authenticates the user.  A slightly more robust authentication 
mechanism allows the application to provide a user ID and password, either as 
plain text or encrypted.  Some DBMSs also support more sophisticated 
schemes, like Kerberos, which uses encrypted authentication tickets.  Once a 
user is authenticated, a DBMS must determine what data they may access, and 
what tasks (query, update, create table, etc.) they may perform.  SQL DBMSs 
use “GRANT” and “REVOKE” statements to maintain permissions internally.  
Authorization can be granted at the level of a single user or a group and can also 
be managed by an external security service.  An advantage of external security 
services is that they can easily control access to multiple DBMS systems, thus 
reducing the overhead of managing them.   Most DBMS systems support 
auditing of data-access to verify that authorizations are being enforced correctly.  
Audit records can log who accessed the data, and what they did, and allow the 
detection of unauthorized access.  The main limitation of security support in 
current systems lies in security across multiple sources.  Authentication, 
authorization, and auditing are typically enforced and managed separately for 
each data source, even for the same user.  This results in a loss of ownership 
transparency, because applications have to separately handle security with each 
data source. 
2.2.2.  Data life-cycle classification 
Data in a Grid environment can be classified in different ways.  No attempt was 
made in the analysis exercise to distinguish between data, information, and 
knowledge when identifying requirements, on the basis that one worker’s 
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knowledge can be another worker’s information or data.  However, a distinction 
can be drawn between each stage in the data life cycle that reflects how 
data-access and operations vary.  This classification is based on a combination 
of creation, purpose, and usage.  The types of data in this classification are: raw 
data, reference data, processed data, results data, derived data and metadata.   
 Raw data is created and put out from a data source, either as an instrument or 
an application program, for example, meteorological data from remote 
sensors or astrophysical data from optical surveys.  The structure and 
format of raw data are determined by the data source.  Instrument data 
sources tend to create raw data with limited value until processing has taken 
place.  A raw data set is characterized by being read-only, and is normally 
accessed sequentially.  It may be repeatedly reprocessed and is commonly 
archived once processing is complete.  Therefore, the Grid needs to provide 
the ability to secure this type of data off-line and to restore it back on-line. 
 Reference data is frequently used in processing raw data, when 
transforming it, as control data in simulation modelling, and when analyzing, 
annotating, and interpreting data, for example, the constants for a map 
projection or a coordinate system.  Common types of reference data 
include: standardized and user defined coding systems, parameters and 
constants, and units of measure.  By definition, most types of reference data 
seldom change.  A feature of all types of reference data is that their values 
remain static.  Although classification systems and ontology are defined as 
metadata, their shorthand codes are a type of reference data.  
 Processed Data.  Almost all raw data sets undergo processing to apply 
necessary corrections, calibrations, and transformations.  Producing 
processed data sets may involve filtering operations to remove data that fails 
to meet the required level of quality or integrity, and data that does not fall 
into a required specification tolerance.  Conversely, it may include merging 
and aggregation operations with data from other sources.  Therefore, the 
Grid must maintain the integrity of data in multi-staged processing, and 
should enable check-pointing and recovery to a point in time, in the event of 
failure.  It should also provide support to control processing through the 
 31 
definition of workflows and pipelines, and enable operations to be optimized 
through parallelization. 
 Result data is created as the output of a data retrieval or interrogation 
operation, normally within an application, or when examining data content 
during the discovery process.  Result data sets are subsets of one or more 
database that match a set of pre-defined conditions.  Typically, a result 
data set is extracted from a database for the purpose of subjecting it to 
focused analysis and interpretation.  The types of application functionality 
that produce result-data output include algorithmic analysis, simulation, and 
data transformation.  It may be a statistical sample of a very large data 
resource that cannot be feasibly analyzed in its entirety, or it may be a subset 
of the data with specific characteristics, e.g., gene-expression data.  A result 
data set may also be used as input data for a simulation run in a modelling 
application.  It may also be a set reference data for a visualization 
application, e.g., map projection reference data, and oceanographic data for a 
regional study.  Users may choose to create a copy of the result data and 
retain it locally for reasons of performance or availability.  
 Derived data sets are created from other existing processed, result, or other 
derived data.  Statistical parameters, summarizations, and aggregations are 
all types of derived data that are important in describing data, and in 
analyzing trends and correlations.  There are two main ways to create 
derived data.  The first is by performing statistical analysis on other data to 
create statistical parameters, summaries and aggregations.  This type can 
be considered to be a form of results data, and it is particularly important 
when analyzing trends and correlations in data.  The second way to 
produce derived data is through recording observations on, or drawing 
inferences from, other data, or any subject (e.g., image, scientific sample or 
environment) under investigation.  An observation is an annotation, or a 
description, of the features, properties or behaviour of data, experiments, or 
subjects.  An inference is a deduction or conclusion drawn from analysis 
and interpretation.  Inferences add to understanding and knowledge, and 
they are used to explain correlations, trends and anomalies.  They may 
also include evidential reasoning.  An important feature of derived data 
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created during analysis and interpretation is volatility.  Data can change as 
understanding evolves, and as hypotheses are refined over the course of 
study.  Equally, derived data may not always be definitive, particularly in 
a collaborative work environment.  For this reason, it is important that the 
Grid provides the ability to maintain personalised and multiple versions of 
inference data. 
2.2.3.  Structured data, sources and resources 
This section clarifies several terms used in this dissertation.  These terms are 
“imported” from database technology and are critical to data manipulation in the 
Grid environment.  
The term ‘structured data’ is used to denote any data whose structure is 
explicitly defined, so that operations may exploit that structure, e.g., queries 
may extract subsets of data based on it.  Typically, this is relationally 
structured data or an XML document.  However, it may be binary data, for 
which there is an explicit structure definition, and software that exploits that 
structure.  One of the goals of data-access and integration is to treat all of this 
data, whatever its origin, within a uniform framework (Abiteboul, Buneman & 
Suciu, 1999). 
A ‘data source’ denotes any facilities, including instruments, devices, or 
application programs that create and output structured data.  A data source 
need not be connected to the Grid infrastructure, or defined in a Grid 
environment in order to do this.  The Grid must provide the ability to capture 
output data directly from a data source that is connected to a Grid environment, 
and it must provide the ability to import output from a data source that is not 
connected.  It must also have the ability to integrate output with existing data in a 
Grid environment, e.g., an historical processed output, and make the combined 
result data available for pseudo-real time analysis and interpretation.  This type 
of ability is necessary to enable dynamic monitoring and control of other types of 
Grid resources. 
A ‘data resource’ is a persistent data store held in either file structures or in 
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DBMSs in a Grid environment.  It has an owner and a name, and is stored at a 
physical location in a file system or in a raw device.  There are no constraints 
over type, structure, volume, or status of the content a data resource can hold.  
A data resource may conform to an agreed standard, or be totally 
owner-defined.  In a Grid environment, a data resource should be readable by 
someone other than the owner.  Users can be granted privileges to read all or 
part of its contents, to create new data, and to modify and delete data content.  
The Grid must support any type of data resource, such as relational database, 
XML database or file system.  It must also provide the ability for data owners 
and custodians to manage data resources online.  Data resource replication 
across multiple sites must also be provided in order to satisfy the service level 
requirements identified for a Grid environment. 
2.2.4.  Categories of structured data and its applications 
Five categories of structured data illustrate diversity and prevalence.  This 
diversity needs to be considered in approaches to data-access and integration, 
primarily because of the many different usage patterns.  
 Primary structured data is usually used for recording observations by 
scientists and instruments.  Direct recording in databases also supports 
many other forms of data-collection, from a field-worker’s personal 
record-keeping to the output of highly automated laboratories.  
 Ancillary data represents the structured metadata that is used to support 
bulk binary or structured data.  Several forms of structured metadata are 
used for different purposes.  Technical metadata is used to support 
management technology that underpins data Grid operations, and also used 
to organize the interpretation of primary data.  Application metadata 
guides the interpretation of the primary data.  Data products, including 
summaries, catalogues and indexes that are produced by successive steps in 
deriving information from the primary data, may also be treated as primary 
data by some scientists and as metadata by others. 
 Collaboration data is that collected to enable scientific information to be 
shared quickly and precisely.  Scientists increasingly collaborate by 
 34 
recording and sharing data via databases, normally using agreed 
terminologies.  Groups of scientists have communicated by writing to 
publicly available structured data-collections.  This leads to many 
collections of related data, each curated by a particular group, who impose 
standards and structure.  Mechanisms have emerged for others to annotate 
some of the collections in independently stored databases that refer to data 
in curated collections. 
 Personal data is assembled by, or about, individual users.  It is, typically, 
private and may contain profile data, such as preferences and re-usable 
working methods, digital laboratory notebooks, representations of work in 
progress and personalised workflow scripts.  
 Service data is used to provide a Grid, data-access and integration 
infrastructure and other e-Science-enabling technology, for example, data in 
registries, that describing services, defining authorization policies, 
describing progresses, enacting work flows and defining the current states 
of a system.  Current systems include: the Grid Information Services 
(Dinda & Plale, 2001) and the Spitfire (Bell et al., 2002), which use 
relational storage to provide database administration, user management, 
data-dictionary access and statement evaluation.  
In addition to the variety of structured data, the categories of applications also 
need to be considered to understand the requirements more clearly.  For 
example, each e-Science application needs different combinations of data from 
multiple data resources.  The application programs may retrieve data from data 
resources held at different sites, and the result of queries may be set as part of 
the workflow organizing the whole computation.  Moreover, new discoveries 
become possible as scientists mine correlations and anomalies from multiple 
sources.  This is becoming a major modus operandi for scientific collaboration 
(Pearson, 2002).  More and more data will be recorded and organized as 
structured resources, available to large communities of scientists from many 
disciplines.  More and more investigations will involve accessing subsets of 
these resources, extracting specific data from each, and using it in combination 
to test or develop some or other scientific models.  
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2.2.5.  Integration strategies 
Three integration strategies were identified based on the categories of structured 
data and applications (Atkinson et al., 2004).  
 The virtual database introduces the ideal approach.  It allows a set of 
databases to be presented as a single, integrated view with a single, 
federated schema, so that users then use them directly, unaware of the 
separate databases behind the view.  The concept of a virtual database 
introduces transparencies that should be considered when designing any 
integration schema.  
 Bespoke integration.  Many of scientific projects combining multiple 
data resources depend on the application users developing their own 
integration systems, including queries, programs, data flows and 
workflows, specific to a particular project.  The approach, that partitions 
the integration task into queries, program execution construction of 
intermediate data resources, explicit data transfers and transformations, and 
updates to data resources holding data products, requires much investment 
in designing, implementation, tuning, maintaining and operating.  The 
Grid provides mechanisms for introspection of resources and services to 
support tools, dynamic adaptation and operation validation.  It also enables 
query and result delivery, program and data transport, scheduling of the 
stages of the evaluations, and progress monitoring.  These Grid functions 
will be used by the individual generic data-access and integration 
components and explicitly by code, written by the application developers. 
 Incremental integration.  A virtual database is the ideal goal.  It is 
unlikely that the ideal will ever satisfy all requirements.  Hence, scientists 
often take creative steps to combine data in new ways that involve encoding 
the science.  In such cases, the arrangement for processing large volumes 
of data, at the limits of available computational resources, will be developed 
and negotiated.  However, much scientific, diagnostic and analytic work 
requires repetitive routines.  These repetitive processes generally operate 
in a relatively stable context with pre-chosen, mostly read-only data and 
established workflows.  Such cases are supported today by products such 
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as IBM DiscoveryLink.  
2.3. Summary 
This chapter gives a comprehensive introduction of the Grid technology, 
including its concept, architecture, evolution and the state-of-the-art.  It can be 
used with federated database systems to enable data-access and integration 
across multiple distributed institutions in a virtualized, transparent manner.  
The combination of database technology and Grid technology thus introduces a 
suitable approach for realizing a VO, as depicted in the HIV/AIDS collaborative 
research problem-context.  Database concepts discussed in this chapter will be 
extrapolated into the use of data warehousing, which will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 3.  
Grid-Enabled Distributed Data-Warehouse 
Systems 
As illustrated earlier, the Grid concerns coordinated resource-sharing and 
problem-solving in dynamic, multi-institutional VOs.  The combination of 
database and the Grid technology introduces a great opportunity to provide 
cross-institutional data-access and integration for multi-institutional 
collaboration and problem-solving within a specific problem domain.  In the 
example of HIV/AIDS collaborative research described in chapter 1, 
data-collection from distributed data-providers, data analysis and sharing across 
multiple institutions are three key elements to realize collaborative HIV/AIDS 
research.  This problem domain will be used to elucidate important concepts in 
this chapter. 
Building data-analysis and data-mining methods (Pyle, 2003), (Groth, 1997), 
(Westphal & Blaxton, 1998) over data warehouses is a traditional approach to 
aggregate data and supply data-intensive analysis ability within one institution’s 
boundary.  In the context of HIV/AIDS collaborative research, it is imperative 
to build data warehouses for storing HIV/AIDS patients’ (demographic) data 
collected from medical institutions, and to develop data-mining and 
data-analysis methods over established data warehouses.  Data warehouses are 
essentially databases.  Compared to on-line operational databases, data 
warehouses contain aggregated data which are not changed frequently.  They 
represent a most suitable data source for information-mining and analysis 
operations.   
This dissertation proposes a Grid-enabled, distributed data-warehouse system 
designed to facilitate HIV/AIDS collaborative research.  It uses the Grid 
technology, combined with multiple data warehouses, to realize all required 
capabilities required by this type of research.  Data warehouses within different 
institutions are primary data storage resources, which are used for different 
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purpose compared to on-line operational databases.  Institutions may also have 
other kind of data storage resources, such as single databases and data marts.  
They are all essentially databases that may allow external institutions access 
conditionally.  In this system, either data warehouses or data marts are all 
considered as data resources, which may be available from a variety of 
infrastructures and in a range of formats.  These databases and data-analysis 
services construct the resource fabric of the proposed system.  For building a 
data warehouse through data-collection, the Grid is used to operate the 
workflows that populate the data warehouse.  For data-sharing, the Grid 
provides access to data warehouses or data marts.  Other Grid capabilities 
include coordinating the data-sharing and handling interoperability and security 
challenges in the system.  Further capabilities include resource-discovery and 
management, job scheduling, metadata management, authentication, 
authorization, etc.  
The main concerns of this dissertation are to define a workable and feasible 
framework in-the-large, and to address security issues within the pre-defined 
VO environment, by using existing standards, specification and technologies.  
The envisaged framework contains a rich set of components for providing 
different capabilities, such as data-collection, access, integration, authentication, 
and authorization etc., according to the requirements of the proposed system.  
Identifying specific data-mining and data-analysis methods to be used is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation.  In this chapter, the background of data 
warehouse and data/information-mining will be introduced, initially.  The 
proposed VO environment, and the requirements of the Grid-enabled, 
distributed data warehouse system will be described in detail subsequently. 
3.1. Overview of Data Warehousing and 
Data-mining 
A data warehouse is a subject-oriented, integrated, non-volatile, and 
time-variant collection of data in support of management’s decision (Inmon, 
1996).  It contains granular corporate data (Inmon & Hackathorn, 1994).  It is 
a logical collection of information, gathered from many different operational 
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databases, used to create business intelligence that supports business-analysis 
activities and decision-making tasks.  Primarily, it is a record of an enterprise's 
past transactional and operational information, stored in a database designed to 
favour efficient data analysis and reporting.  Basically, a data warehouse 
contains the aggregation of a company’s data that is prepared to support 
data-based analysis operations.  
Extract, transform, and load (ETL) is a process in data warehousing that 
involves extracting data from outside sources, transforming it to fit business 
needs, and ultimately loading it into a data warehouse.  The first part of an 
ETL process is to extract data from different source systems.  Common data 
source formats are relational database and flat files, but may include 
non-relational database structures.  Extraction converts the data into a format 
for transformation processing.  The transformation phase applies a series of 
rules or functions to the extracted data to derive the data to be loaded.  The 
load phase loads the data into a data warehouse.  Depending on the 
requirements of an organization, this process varies widely.  Some data 
warehouses merely overwrite old information with new data.  More complex 
systems can maintain a history and audit trail of all changes to the data.  While 
an ETL process can be created using almost any programming language, 
creating one from scratch is quite complex.  Increasingly, companies are 
buying ETL tools to help in the creation of ETL processes.  A good ETL tool 
(e.g., SQL Server Integration Services) must be able to communicate with the 
many different relational databases and read the various file formats used 
throughout an organization. 
Data-mining is fully integrated with a data warehouse and flexible interactive 
business analysis tools.  Many definitions of data-mining exist.  Hand, 
Mannila and Smyth define it as, “The analysis of (often large) observational 
data sets to find unsuspected relationships and to summarize the data in novel 
ways that are both understandable and useful to the data owner” (Hand, Mannila 
& Smyth, 2001); it can also be defined as: "The nontrivial extraction of implicit, 
previously unknown, and potentially useful information from data" (Frawley, 
Piatetsky-Shapiro & Matheus, 1992).  The essence of data-mining is the 
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finding of structure in data.  It primarily provides these facilitaties:  
 Automated prediction of trends and behaviours.  Data-mining 
automatically finds predictive information in large databases (e.g., linear 
regression makes predictions for all input values).  
 Automated discovery of previously unknown patterns.  A pattern refers 
only to the restricted regions of space spanned by the variables.  
Data-mining tools search databases and identify previously hidden patterns 
in one step.  
Data-mining tools (e.g., SQL Server Analysis Services) can analyze massive 
databases in minutes, if these tools are implemented on high-performance, 
parallel-processing systems.  Faster processing allows users to automatically 
experiment with more models to understand complex data. 
3.2. Description of Example VO 
Collaborative HIV/AIDS research introduces a dynamic environment that 
consists of multiple, physically distributed institutions and/or individual 
researchers.  The proposed Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system – 
for this problem domain - is essentially a Grid system intended to provide 
infrastructure-level capabilities to facilitate data-collection, data-sharing across 
multiple boundaries, and handle issues such as interoperability or security.  All 
involved institutions participate in a VO that integrates all accessible 
heterogeneous data resources and users.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the envisaged 
VO environment.  The participants could be either HIV/AIDS institutions or 
individual HIV/AIDS researchers.  The participant institutions are considered 
as resource providers, and, at the same time, as resource consumers.  
Individual researchers are solely considered as resources consumers.  The data 
warehouses, data marts or other kind of data storage resources, hosted by 
participant institutions are all considered as data resources.  The data-mining or 
data-analysis services are considered as computational (processing) resources.  
Resources are variably physically distributed within either one institution’s 
boundary or federally across multiple institutions.  Data and computational 
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resources within each participant institution form the resource fabric in this 
system.  
VO for HIV/AIDS 
Collaborative Research
Participants in Institution 
A can use service in 
Institution B
Institution C
Data ServiceService
Participants in Institution C 
can access data in 
Institution A
Individual Researcher D
Institution B
Data Service Data
Individual Research D is 
allowed to use data in 
Institution B 
Institution A
Data Service Data
 
Figure 3.1 VO Description 
For example, the users in Institution C may need to retrieve data from Institution 
A to complete its data-analysis tasks/services.  Institution A may need to use 
the data-analysis service in Institution B to perform another data-analysis task.  
A sharing relationship can be created across all three institutions, 
accommodating new participants dynamically; this can occur across different 
platforms, different DBMSs, and different programming environments.  For 
example, Institution A may use an ORACLE database, which is hosted in a 
Java-Linux environment, and Institution B may use a SQL Server database in 
a .NET-Windows environment.  Subsequent sections will describe how the 
sharing is controlled and how interoperability and security is to be handled in 
the proposed system.  
3.3. System Functional-Capabilities 
The proposed Grid-enabled, distributed data-warehouse system needs to provide 
a set of capabilities to enable data collection from distributed data sources, and 
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data-sharing across multiple and dispersed HIV/AIDS research institutions in 
pre-defined VO.  This section will discuss necessary functional capabilities of 
the proposed system based on (Foster, Gannon, Kishimoto & Von Reich, 2004
2
) 
(Von Reich et al., 2004) (Foster et al, 2006) (Atkinson et al., 2003) (Atkinson et 
al., 2004) (Pearson, 2002).  These capabilities include data-collection and 
operation, resource-management, job-execution management, security, 
activity-monitoring, metadata-management, data provenance, and data resource 
publishing and discovery.   
3.3.1.  Virtualization 
The fundamental value proposition of a Grid system is virtualization, or 
transparent access to distributed computer resources.  Grids need to provide the 
ability to virtualize remote resources and capabilities, and make them appear as 
contiguous entities to end-user applications.  For a data-intensive application to 
derive value from a Grid, this virtualization needs to include federated data 
sources as well.  For example, a virtual database integrates a set of distributed 
databases presented in a single view, with a single federated schema, that could 
be used directly.  Generally, data-access and processing in a Grid environment 
require two sets of transparencies: one that presents a unified view of data sources 
to applications accessing data, the second is a transparency for data-processing 
that presents a unified view of computational resources to applications processing 
data.  Transparent access to distributed data sources is, therefore, a fundamental 
requirement for a Grid-enabled, distributed (HIV/AIDS) data-warehouse system.  
3.3.1.1. Data-access Transparency 
 Heterogeneity Transparency.  The access mechanism should be 
independent of the actual implementation of data sources (such as whether it 
is a flat file system, a DB2 data base, or an Oracle database, etc.).  Even 
more importantly, it should be independent of the structure (schema) of the 
data source.  For example, a data source should be allowed to rearrange its 
data across different tables without affecting applications. 
 Name Transparency.  An application should be able to access data 
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without knowing its name or location.  Some systems, like DNS (Domain 
Name System) and distributed file systems, provide a URL (Universal 
Resource Locator) or name as levels of indirection, but this still requires 
knowing the exact name of the data object.  Instead, data-access should be 
via logical domains, qualified by predicates on attributes of the desired 
object.  For example, in the proposed system, an HIV/AIDS researcher 
may want to calculate the total number of HIV-positive patients in a 
specific age group.  “Patients” is the logical domain, spanning multiple 
HIV/AIDS research institutions.  The researcher should not have to 
specify which institution’s data warehouse or database should be used in the 
query; rather a separate discovery service should be used by the query 
processor to map logical domains to data sources.  Name transparency 
includes the traditional notions of location and replication transparency. 
 Ownership and Costing Transparency.  If Grids are successful in the 
long term, they will almost certainly evolve to span even virtual 
organizational boundaries, and will involve multiple autonomous data 
sources. As far as possible, applications should be spared from separately 
negotiating for access to individual sources, whether in terms of access 
authorization, or in terms of access costs. 
3.3.2.  Data-collection 
Data-collection, as discussed in Chapter 1, primarily focuses on providing 
required processes to build data warehouse for the institutions which have not 
yet built their own aggregated HIV/AIDS patients’ data storage.  A data 
warehouses is constructed through a set of processes called ETL services.  
Figure 3.2 illustrates a typical approach to building a data-warehouse system.  
Data-collection essentially initiates the ETL process to populate a data 
warehouse.  
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         Figure 3.2 Building a Data Warehouse 
3.3.2.1. Extraction and Transport 
The first part of an ETL process is to extract the data from the distributed 
sources.  Each data source may use different organizations or formats, such as 
relational database, and flat files.  The extracted data needs to be formatted for 
transformation processes.  In the proposed (HIV/AIDS) distributed 
data-warehouse system, the extraction process comes from data-providers, 
because the data sources are mostly on-line operational databases within 
multiple institutional boundaries.  In this system, the data-providers are 
responsible for providing extract components according to the data collectors’ 
requirements.  The extracted data can be formatted as binary files which will 
be submitted to data collectors.  It is necessary to define the data and data-file 
schema which are stored as metadata in a data-providers’ metadata repository.  
Data schema identifies which data is required by subscribers.  A data file 
schema is a logical structure of an extracted data file.  It identifies the data 
field name, format, etc., required by the subscribers.  Both data and data file 
schema must be predetermined for both the data provider and the data collector.  
This metadata ensures that all data-providers supply data in a uniform format, 
usable by subscribers (users submitting queries).  When an extract process 
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starts, it needs to reference the local metadata repository first to transform the 
data at this level.  The extracted binary data files, combined with a information 
file in XML format, are either submitted by data-providers or retrieved by 
data-subscribers periodically by, for example, using FTP (File Transfer 
Protocol).  The added information file contains descriptive information such as 
create-time, data-source, destination-name, etc.  
3.3.2.2. Transformation and Loading 
The transformation phase applies a series of rules or functions to the extracted 
data to derive the data to be loaded.  These transformation processes depend on 
the requirements of the data warehouse system.  The transformation types 
include: 
 Selecting only certain columns to load;  
 Translating coded values (e.g., if the source system stores M for male and F 
for female, but the warehouse stores 1 for male and 2 for female);  
 Encoding free-form values (e.g., mapping "Male" and "M" and "Mr" onto 
1);  
 Deriving a new calculated value (e.g., sale_amount = qty * unit_price); 
 Joining together data from multiple sources (e.g., lookup, merge, etc);  
 Summarizing multiple rows of data (e.g., total patients for each region);  
 Generating surrogate key values;  
 Transposing or pivoting (turning multiple columns into multiple rows or 
vice versa).  
The loading phase loads the data into the data warehouse.  Depending on the 
requirements of the owners of data warehouse, this process varies widely. For 
example, some data warehouses merely overwrite old information with new 
data.  However, more complex systems can maintain a history and audit trail of 
all changes to the data which is contained in a metadata (information) file 
submitted with the extracted data file.  
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3.3.3.  Data operations 
The ability to retrieve data is a basic requirement in the Grid-enabled, 
distributed data warehouse system.  Users must be able to retrieve selected 
data directly into Grid applications.  
3.3.3.1. Data-Access and Integration 
Data-access and integration provide the capabilities to enable cross-institutional 
data-sharing.  Data-access generally involves the retrieval, insertion or 
modification of data, which may be available on a variety of platforms and in 
various formats.  As pointed out previously, VOs typically contain diverse data 
resources with different storage systems, data types, data models and access 
mechanisms.  Data-access primarily focuses on querying data from distributed 
and diverse data warehouse systems in order to provide uniform support for data 
analysis and data-mining.  Data warehouses contain aggregated historical data 
that cannot be updated frequently.  However, the ability to modify and insert 
still needs to be provided.  The distributed data warehouses either reside in one 
institution or across multiple institutions.  Clients from different institutions 
need to query data remotely from multiple data resources and retrieve result data 
sets from the local site for processing.  These clients typically establish a 
session and then submit a series of query statements within some transaction 
regime.  Each submission gets a response: either a result data set or a status 
report indicating whether the execution succeeded or failed.  When linking 
data resources, the system must provide the ability to use data in one resource as 
the matching criteria or conditions for retrieving data from another resource, 
e.g., to, perform a sub-query.  The system must be also able to construct 
distributed queries when the target data resources are located at different sites, 
and must be able to support heterogeneous and federated queries when some 
data resources are accessed through different query languages.  
Data integration is the ability to combine data residing at different resources and 
to provide the user with a unified view of this data (Lenzerini, 2002).  It 
ensures that the retrieved data from heterogeneous resources can be merged and 
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aggregated in order to return a single, logical set of results which can be 
interpreted by local data-mining or analysis tools.  Data-access and integration 
should of course be independent of some aspects of the database (as discussed 
under “Virtualization”).  
3.3.3.2. Data Analysis and Interpretation 
A principle aim of Grid systems is to make information more accessible across 
trust boundaries.  The proposed Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse 
system intends to provide a much greater opportunity for users to analyze and 
interpret data they have not created or do not own.  The purpose of analysis is 
to identify features, properties, and behaviours in data, and to identify 
correlations and anomalies between data.  The purpose of interpretation is to 
explain what has been identified and to derive inferences and conclusions.  Both 
activities, in turn, lead to the creation of further data, information, and 
knowledge.  The generalized tools for providing multi-dimensional and 
multi-variate analysis capabilities are particularly important for mining 
historical data to identify trends, correlations, and anomalies in a data 
warehouse.  The multiple analysis techniques may need to apply to the same or 
related data sets concurrently.  Ability is required to record inferences and 
conclusions drawn by assimilating evidence from each analysis and 
interpretation step in the process, and to capture the analysis workflow.  It 
should also allow the workflow to be replayed in order to reproduce the analysis 
steps accurately and to demonstrate the provenance of any derived data.  When 
new data content is created, or existing data content is modified during analysis 
and interpretation, it must able to capture and save all the changes.  When 
network performance is poor, data-access paths are slow, or data resources are 
at remote sites, data availability may be limited, and users may need to carry out 
analysis on locally maintained copies of data resources.  
3.3.4.  Data resource publishing and discovery 
The ability to publish all types of data must be supported, regardless of volume, 
internal structure and format.  It must also allow users to describe and 
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characterize published data in user-defined formats and terms.  In addition, the 
physical characteristics of the data, e.g., volume, number of logical records, and 
preferred access paths, are necessary in order to access and transport the data 
efficiently.  The minimum information that a user must know in order to 
reference a data resource is its name and location.  Much of the functionality 
required for defining and maintaining publications are required for defining and 
maintaining metadata.  The ability to register and deregister data resources 
dynamically is also needed.  The burdens of manual metadata entry and editing 
need to be minimized.  
Data resource discovery allows users to discover desired data resources from 
resources registry with metadata attributes by using interactive browsing tools.  
The discovery search criteria use user-defined terms and rules, and use defined 
naming conversions and ontology.  
3.3.5.  Provenance 
Provenance is a record of the origin and history of a piece of data.  It is a 
special form of audit trail that traces each step in sourcing, moving, and 
processing data, together with “who did what and when”.  It is an essential 
requirement for establishing the ownership, quality, reliability and currency of 
data when making use of other institutions’ data, particularly during the data 
resource discovery process.  Provenance also provides information that is 
necessary for recreating data.  Conversely, it can avoid time-consuming and 
data-intensive processing expended in recreating data.  For example, the 
derived data is often originated from multiple sources, multi-staged processes 
and multiple analysis and interpretation, which could cause the content of a 
record of provenance to be complex.  The capability to record data provenance 
and the ability for a user to access the provenance record need to be provided in 
order to establish the quality and reliability of data. 
3.3.6.  Resource management 
The resources in the Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system are 
mainly data resources such as a data warehouse and data marts, but also 
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computational resources, such as data-mining and data-analysis services, 
deployed within each institution.  All kinds of resources need a standardized 
representation model for publishing and discovery.  From the Grid perspective, 
resource management is categorized into three types at different levels: the 
management of resources themselves, resources management in the Grid 
environment and the management of Grid infrastructure to provide basic 
functionalities.  The system must provide resource management at all these 
levels.  Resource management in a Grid system is quite complex.  This 
section only discusses the data resources management in relation to the 
proposed (HIV/AIDS) Grid system. 
In this system, data warehouses are primary data resources located at distributed 
sites.  They should be managed directly through their native manageability 
interfaces.  Management at this level involves monitoring (i.e., obtaining the 
state of the resource, which includes events), setup and control (i.e., setting the 
state of the resource), and discovery.  These resources are managed by 
following the description given by a resource model, which defines their 
properties, operations, events, and their relationships with each other. 
Large numbers of data resources of every type and size could be made available 
in a Grid environment in the future.  The system must provide the capability to 
manage these resources across multiple, heterogeneous environments globally.  
Data management facilities must ensure that data resource catalogues, or 
registries are always available and that the definitions they contain are current, 
accurate, and consistent.  This applies equally to the content of data resources 
that are logically grouped into virtual databases.  
3.3.7.  Job execution management 
Job execution management is concerned with the problems of instigating and 
managing to completion, units of work.  For example, a data-analysis task is 
likely to span multiple data warehouses located in distributed sites.  A high-level 
analysis task may be broken down into subtasks prior to execution.  Job 
execution management enables applications to have coordinated access to 
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underlying resources, regardless of their physical locations or access 
mechanisms.  It is the key to making resources easily accessible to end-users.  
In brief, the execution of a task may need these steps: execution planning and 
scheduling, task initialisation, preparation and execution.  The Grid-enabled, 
distributed data warehouse system requires little planning because it performs 
repetitive tasks according to well-defined workflows, such as data-gathering for 
populating a data warehouse and data-analysis of historical data.  These 
repetitive processes generally operate in a relatively stable context with 
pre-chosen, mostly read-only, data and established workflows.  The ability to 
schedule, execute, prioritize and allocate resources to jobs based on such 
information is required, as is realizing mechanisms for scheduling across 
administrative domains, using multiple schedulers.  Once the execution is 
started, the required applications and data resources should be able to deployed 
and configured automatically.  Jobs must be managed and monitored during 
their entire lifetime.  For example, whether the job execution is successful or 
not, it must be logged into a log repository or a log database.  Data-access ability 
can be used to access and update log storage.  
3.3.8.  Metadata management 
There are several types of metadata which are important for Grid data 
operations.  
• Technical metadata defines the location of data sources and resources; the 
physical data structure, organization and grouping of data items into logical 
records; and those characteristics of the data that are important in deciding 
how data is best accessed and transported.  Technical metadata also defines 
data currency and history; i.e., versions and ownership. 
• Contextual metadata defines naming conventions, terminologies and 
ontology through which data can be logically referenced.  Contextual 
metadata increases the quality and reliability of data because the definitions 
conform to an agreed-upon syntax and semantics, and also record structural 
associations and relationships within the data between definitions, and to 
define rules for conflicts between mappings. 
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• Derived metadata defines the context and meaning of data derived from 
any other data.  This type of metadata is commonly used in data 
warehousing environments, where it is often more efficient to store derived 
data than to recalculate the values dynamically each time they are required. 
• Mapping metadata defines equivalences between discrete contextual 
metadata definitions, and between contextual and technical metadata.  The 
ability to map relationships between contextual metadata is particularly 
important because of the lack of agreed standards in scientific naming 
conventions for terminologies and ontologies.  It enables users to compare 
classifications and ontology in terms of their naming conventions, and 
structural relationships and rules.  It also enables them to establish what 
alternative definitions are available for referencing data content. 
The ability to map contextual metadata to physical data structures and schemas 
is a requirement in order to enable users to access data content using logical 
references; i.e., without needing to know the definition of its underlying record 
structure or data schema.  Mapping, in conjunction with contextual metadata, 
enables users to integrate data sets defined in different classifications and 
ontologies.  This provides the ability to specify a single set of search criteria 
and data-matching rules when performing integrated or federated queries within 
multiple data resources, and for referencing data in a virtual database.  The 
ability must be provided to update metadata when new data resources are 
created or updated.  
3.3.9.  Monitoring 
System monitoring depends on the information about applications, resources 
and services in the Grid environment.  The term ‘information’ refers to 
dynamic data or events used for status monitoring, relatively static data used for 
discovery; and any data that is logged.  Information retrieval could make use of 
data-access and distributed query processing.  
The administrative tools are a set of applications that provide system 
administrators with the ability to maintain monitor and control a system.  The 
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interfaces to the services and resources available should be intuitive and easy to 
use, as well as being heterogeneous in nature. Typically, user and administrative 
access to Grid applications and services are Webbased interfaces.  
3.3.10.  Security 
The consequence of unauthorized access to data resources can be catastrophic, 
and thus, data owners must be able to control sharing of data within the VO.  
Such sharing requires user authentication, and access-control mechanisms for 
enforcing local and community policies for data-access and resources usage.  
For example, when performing a data transfer, users must be authenticated and 
authorized to access the data being transferred.  Different institutions may have 
different security infrastructures, so the ability to integrate and operate within 
existing security architectures and models must be provided.  Resources may 
have to be accessed across organizational boundaries.  It is necessary to 
provide standard and secure mechanisms that can be deployed to protect 
institutions, while also enabling cross-domain interaction without compromising 
local security mechanisms.  Furthermore, the data-access may have to operate 
within an environment where a variety of legal and ethical policies affect its 
operation.  For example, some policies may restrict the entities that can access 
personal data (such as personal ID No, name, etc.) and limit the operations that 
they can perform (confidentiality).  Privacy concerns may limit the queries that 
can be made about individuals, although, in some cases, the policies may permit 
queries that return results about a group as a whole, such as average income or 
total salary.  The security mechanism needs to allow these restrictions to be 
specified.  When used with data services, these mechanisms must allow the 
specification of policies that apply at the level of groups (e.g., tables) or 
elements within a resource.  Other requirements such as delegation and single 
sign-on mechanism are all primary security challenges that need to be handled.  
Security issues in proposed system are a main concern of this dissertation and 
will be discussed in the security chapter.  
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3.4. Summary 
Section 3.2 primarily discussed the envisaged VO environment and 
requirements of the Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system.  This 
system intends to use the Grid approach to build the foundation for realizing 
data-collection and data-sharing required by HIV/AIDS collaborative research.    
The proposed system introduces a number of challenges, like resource 
virtualization, interoperability, security and so on.  This chapter identified a set 
of functional capabilities which are essential to coordinate data-sharing, access 
data, handle interoperability, security, etc. in a Grid-enabled data warehouse 
context.  
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Chapter 4.  
A Proposed System Framework 
This chapter proposes a Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse framework 
within the context of building the infrastructure to support collaborative 
HIV/AIDS research.  Data warehouses, located at distributed institutions, are 
the main data resources for data-mining and data analyses.  The set of 
functional capabilities identified in the previous chapter are implicitly 
presupposed in this framework.  (These capabilities include data-collection, 
data-access, data integration, resource management, data resources publishing, 
data resources discovery, system monitoring, metadata management, data 
provenance, security, etc.).   
The Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA), a GGF specification, represents 
an evolution towards a Grid system architecture based on Web service concepts 
and technologies.  OGSA accommodates stateful services to compensate for 
plain Web services, which are usually stateless.  It incorporates the Web 
Services Resource Framework (WSRF), which is emerging as a promising 
standard for modelling stateful resources using Web services.  The latest 
version of Globus Toolkit (GT), developed by the Globus Alliance 
(http://www.globus.org/), is a realization of the OGSA requirements based on 
WSRF.  OGSA and GT are de facto standards for building a service-oriented 
Grid system.  The Open Grid Services Architecture Data-access and 
Integration (OGSA-DAI, http://www/ogsadai.org.uk/) (Karasavvas et al., 2005) 
is a middleware technology that can used easily to access and integrate data 
from a variety of data sources, such as relational databases, XML databases and 
file systems.  OGSA-DAI itself is both specification and (open-source) 
implementation.  
The proposed Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system is essentially an 
OGSA-based Grid system that provides essential capabilities to facilitate 
HIV/AIDS collaborative research.  OGSA, WSRF, GT and OGSA-DAI 
provide the infrastructure services, standard interfaces and protocol bindings to 
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coordinate resource-sharing, especially data resources, for developing the 
proposed system.  
This framework proposes the standards, specifications, and implementations 
that can be used to develop such a system.  Finally, two models, using the 
defined services, are proposed in order to realize data-collection, data-access 
and integration, which are key capabilities to HIV/AIDS collaboration. 
The OGSA infrastructure and federal data warehousing have been 
pre-emptively suggested as the most suitable foundation for this proposed 
collaboration context. The following sections will attempt to first justify this 
contention, by examining the available distributed computing paradigms, before 
elaborating the proposed framework.  
4.1.  Evolution of Distributed Computing  
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) is an architectural style, the goal of which 
is looser coupling among interacting software systems, compared to traditional 
distributed computing approaches.  The technology of Web services is the 
most likely connection technology of SOA.  SOA and Web Services are the 
basis of service-oriented Grid architecture.  It is necessary to provide a brief 
overview of SOA and related technologies.  
4.1.1. Traditional distributing computing 
The traditional client/server applications use a variety of communication 
techniques, such as sockets, Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) (Srinivasan, 1995) 
(Birrell & Nelson, 1984), JAVA Remote Method Invocation (RMI, 
http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.4.2/docs/guide/rmi/spec/rmiTOC.html), Distributed 
Component Object Model (DCOM) (Horstmann & Kirtland, 1997), and 
Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA, http://www. 
omg.org/corba/).  
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4.1.1.1.  Socket Programming 
Sockets provide low-level APIs for writing distributed client/server 
applications.  Before a client starts communicating with a server, a socket 
endpoint needs to be created.  The transport protocol for communication can 
be either TCP or UDP in the TCP/IP protocol stack. The client also needs to 
specify the hostname and port number that the server process is listening on.  
The standard socket API is well-defined, but the implementation is 
language-dependent, which means the socket APIs vary with each language.  
Typically, the socket client and server can be implemented in the same language 
and use the same socket package, but can run on different operating systems.  
Socket programming has the advantage of a low latency and high-bandwidth 
mechanism for transferring large amounts of data compared with other 
techniques.  However, the application development may be an onerous and 
time-consuming task due to the complexity of interaction between multiple 
components.  
4.1.1.2.  RPC 
RPC is another mechanism that is used to build distributed client/server 
applications and can use either TCP or UDP as transport protocols.  RPC relies 
heavily on an Interface Definition Language (IDL) interface to describe the 
remote procedures executing on the server-side.  From an RPC IDL interface, 
an RPC compiler can automatically generate a client-side stub and server-side 
skeleton.  Client-side stub and server-side skeleton help RPC hide the 
low-level communication abstraction and provide high-level communication 
abstraction for a client to directly call a remote procedure. A client must specify 
the hostname or the IP address of the server 
RPC itself is a specification and implementations, such as Open Networking 
Computing (ONC) RPC from Sun Microsystems and Distributed Computing 
Environment (DCE) RPC, from the Open Software Foundation (OSF), can be 
used directly for implementing RPC-based client/server applications.  RPC is 
not restricted to any specific language, but most implementations are in C 
programming language.  The same language and the same RPC package must 
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be used on both client and server sides.  Compared with socket programming, 
RPC is easier to use for developing distributed applications because it provides 
high-level communication abstraction.  However, RPC only supports 
synchronous communication (call/wait) between client and server and is not 
object-oriented.  
4.1.1.3.  Java RMI 
The Java RMI is an object-oriented mechanism from Sun Microsystems for 
building distributed client/server applications.  It is essentially an RPC 
implementation in Java. Similar to RPC, Java RMI also hides the low-level 
communications between client and server by using a client-side stub and 
server-side skeleton.  Java RMI itself is both a specification and 
implementation, and it is restricted to the Java language in that an RMI client 
and server have to be implemented in Java, but they can run on different 
operating systems in distributed locations.  Java RMI applies an 
object-oriented approach. Unlike RPC, a client can pass an object as a parameter 
to a remote object.  RMI has good support for marshalling, which is a process 
of passing parameters from client to a remote object.  The main disadvantages 
of Java RMI are its limitation to the Java language, its proprietary invocation 
protocol, JRMP, and that it only supports synchronous communications.  
4.1.1.4.  DCOM 
The Component Object Model (COM) is a binary standard for building 
Microsoft-based component applications, which is language-independent.  
DCOM is an extension of COM for distributed client/server applications.  
Similar to RPC and Java, DCOM also hides the low-level communications 
between client and server by using a client-side stub (called a proxy in DCOM) 
and server-side skeleton (called a stub in DCOM) using Microsoft’s Interface 
Definition Language (MIDL).  DCOM is language-independent, which means 
clients and DCOM components can be implemented in different programming 
languages.  Although it is available on non-Microsoft platforms, it has only 
achieved broad popularity on Windows.  The same as RPC and Java RMI, it 
only supports synchronous communications.  
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4.1.1.5.  CORBA 
CORBA is an object-oriented middleware infrastructure from the Object 
Management Group (OMG, http://www.omg.org) for building distributed 
client/server applications.  Similar to RPC, Java and DCOM, CORBA also 
hides the low-level communications between client and server by automatically 
generating a client-side stub (called a proxy in DCOM) and server-side skeleton 
(called a stub in DCOM) using IDL interface.  Compared to Java RMI and 
DCOM, CORBA is independent of location, a particular platform or 
programming language.  CORBA supports both synchronous and 
asynchronous communications.  However, CORBA itself is only an OMG 
specification.  There are many CORBA products available that can be used to 
build CORBA applications.  
In summary, Java RMI, DCOM, and CORBA represent the most popular 
distributed, object-oriented middleware, which can be used to develop 
distributed client/server applications rapidly.  Although they all share some 
similar features, they do differ in their specific implementations and features 
(Gopalan, 1998).  In summary, middleware, such as Java RMI, DCOM, and 
CORBA, are not based on open standards, which make it difficult for them to be 
ubiquitously taken up in heterogeneous environments.  Web Services has 
emerged as an open standards-based middleware infrastructure for building and 
integrating applications in heterogeneous environments.  
4.1.2. Service-Oriented Architecture 
SOA is not new (Box, 2003).  It was first proposed by Roy W. Schulte and 
Yefim V. Natis, who are Gartner analysts.  They specified SOA as “a style of 
multi-tier computing that helps organizations share logic and data among 
multiple applications and usage modes” (Schulte & Natis, 1996).  There are 
multiple definitions of SOA, but currently, only the OASIS group has created a 
formal definition with depth, which can be applied to both the technology and 
business domains.  OASIS defines SOA as a paradigm for organizing and 
utilizing distributed capabilities that may be under the control of different 
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ownership domains (OASIS, 2006
1
).  In computing, the term ‘SOA’ represents 
a perspective of software architecture that defines the use of services to support 
the requirements of software users.  In an SOA environment, resources on a 
network are made available as independent services that can be accessed 
without knowledge of their underlying platform implementation 
(Channabasavaiah, Holley & Tuggle, 2003).  
 
 
             Figure 4.1 SOA 
SOA is essentially an architectural style (He, 2003) (Burbeck, 2000).  It is a 
collection of services, and these services communicate with each other.  The 
communication can involve either simple data passing, or it could involve two 
or more services coordinating some activity.  Some means of connecting 
services to each other is needed. SOA can also be regarded as a style of 
information-system architecture that enables the creation of applications that are 
built by combining loosely coupled and interoperable services.  These services 
inter-operate, based on a formal definition (or contract, e.g., WSDL), which is 
independent of the underlying platform and programming language.  The 
interface definition hides the implementation of the language-specific service.  
SOA-compliant systems can therefore be independent of development 
technologies and platforms (such as Java, .NET etc).  For example, services 
written in C#, running on .Net platform, and services written in Java, running on 
J2EE platform, can both be consumed by a common composite application.  In 
addition, applications running on either platform can consume services running 
on the other as Web services, which facilitates reuse.  Figure 4.1 illustrates a 
basic Service-Oriented Architecture.  It shows a service consumer on the right 
sending a service request message to a service provider on the left.  The 
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service provider returns a response message to the service consumer.  The 
request and subsequent response connections are defined in some way that is 
understandable to both the service consumer and service provider.  A service 
provider can also be a service consumer.  
4.1.3. Web Services 
Web services technology has emerged as a promising infrastructure for building 
distributed computing.  Web services are based on a SOA in which clients are 
service requestors and servers are service provider.  These differ from 
traditional approaches, such as Java RMI, COBRA and DCOM, in their focus 
on simple open standards, such as XML and HTTP (HyperText Transfer 
Protocol), which have wide industry support and a chance to become truly 
ubiquitous.  
Web services standards are being defined within the W3C and other standards’ 
bodies, and form the basis for major new industry initiatives, such as Microsoft 
(.NET), IBM, and Sun (Sun ONE).  Web service is defined as a software 
system, designed to support interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over a 
network.  It essentially uses XML (W3C, 2006
1
) (W3C, 2001) to create a 
robust connection.  It has an interface, described as a machine-processable 
format (specifically WSDL).  Other systems interact with the Web service in a 
manner prescribed by its description using SOAP messages, typically conveyed 
using HTTP with an XML serialization, in conjunction with other Web-related 
standards (W3C, 2004
3
).   
Web services describe a computing paradigm, based on standard techniques for 
describing interfaces to software components, methods for accessing these 
components via interoperable protocols, and discovery methods that enable the 
identification of relevant service providers.  These techniques are 
programming language, programming model, and system software-neutral.  
They provide a standard means of interoperating between different software 
applications, running on a variety of platforms and/or frameworks.  
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A Web service is a loosely coupled, encapsulated, platform and programming 
language independent, composable server-side component that can be described, 
published, discovered and invoked over an internal network or on the Internet 
(Li & Baker, 2005).  This description summarizes the main features of Web 
services’ implementation.  A Web service can be implemented in any 
programming language and deployed on any platform.  It has a server-side 
component that uses an XML-based interface to describe its functionalities and 
capabilities, and it registers with a service registry.  Its implementation is free 
to change without impacting on the service client, as long as the service 
interface remains the same.  A Web service client can discover a service by 
searching a service registry via Intranet or the Internet.  Web services can be 
bound to by a service client by using standard transport protocols, such as HTTP 
or FTP.  
The core standards of Web Services, as defined by W3C, are SOAP (W3C, 
2003), Web Services Description Language (WSDL) (W3C, 2006
3
), and 
Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI, www.uddi.org).  
Web Services Inspection (WS-Inspection) (Ballinger, Brittenham, Malhotra, 
Nagy & Pharies, 2001) is another standard for service discovery.  
4.1.3.1.  SOAP 
Web services use only messages to communicate between services.  SOAP 
stands for “Simple Object Access Protocol”.  It is a simple and lightweight 
communication protocol for clients and severs to exchange messages in a XML 
format, over a transport-level protocol, which is normally HTTP.  
SOAP is a simple enveloping mechanism for XML payloads that defines a RPC 
convention and a messaging convention.  Figure 4.2 shows the structure of a 
SOAP message.  A SOAP header element is optional.  A SOAP header is an 
extension mechanism that provides a way to pass information (such as 
authentications, transactions and payments) in SOAP messages that is not 
application payload.  The SOAP body is the mandatory element within the 
SOAP, which implies that this is where the main end-to-end information 
conveyed in a SOAP message must be carried.  The body is the main payload 
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of the message.  When an RPC call is used in a SOAP message, the body has a 
single element that contains the method name, arguments and URI (Uniform 
Resource Identifier) of the service target address.  
 
 
Figure 4.2 SOAP Envelope 
4.1.3.2.  WSDL 
WSDL is an XML-based specification that is used for describing a Web service, 
e.g., the functionalities, capabilities and address of a service, and how to invoke 
it.  It defines services as a set of endpoints, operating on messages containing 
either document-oriented (messaging) or RPC payloads.  Using WSDL, a 
client can locate a Web service and invoke any of its publicly available 
functions.  Service interfaces are defined, abstractly, in terms of message 
structures and sequences of simple message exchanges or operations and then 
bound to a concrete network protocol and data-encoding format to define an 
endpoint.  
Figure 4.3 illustrates the common elements of a WSDL document. <portType> 
is the key element of a WSDL document.  It defines a set of abstract operations 
provided by a service.  Each operation uses messages defined in the 
<message> element to describe its inputs and outputs.  
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                         Figure 4.3 WSDL Document 
4.1.3.3.  UDDI and WS-Inspection 
UDDI is an industry standard for service registration and discovery.  A service 
provider uses UDDI to advertise its services, and a client uses UDDI to find the 
appropriate services for its purpose.  Data in UDDI can be organized in white 
pages, yellow pages and green pages, representing different types of 
information.  A client uses SOAP to access a UDDI registry.  A UDDI 
registry exposes a set of APIs in the form of SOAP-based Web services.  The 
API contains Inquiry and Publishing APIs for services discovery and 
publication.  
WS-Inspection comprises a simple XML language and related conventions for 
locating service descriptions published by a service provider.  A 
WS-Inspection Language (WSIL) document can contain a collection of service 
descriptions and links to other sources of service descriptions (Brittenham, 
2002).  A service description is usually a URL to a WSDL document; 
occasionally, a service description can be a reference to an entry within a UDDI 
registry.  A link is usually a URL to another WS-Inspection document; and 
occasionally, a link is a reference to a UDDI entry.  With WS-Inspection, a 
service provider creates a WSIL document and makes the document network 
accessible. Service requestors use standard Web-based access mechanisms (e.g., 
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HTTP GET) to retrieve this document and discover what services the service 
provider advertises.  
UDDI and WS-Inspection address different sets of issues with service 
registration and discovery (Nagy & Ballinger, 2001).  UDDI provides a high 
degree of functionality, but it causes the costs of increased complexity.  The 
WS-Inspection provides less functionality in order to maintain a low overhead.  
The two specifications can be used together or separately, depending on the 
situation.   
4.2.  Open Grid Services Architecture 
The Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) Framework, the Globus-IBM 
vision for the convergence of Web services and Grid computing, was presented 
at the GGF meeting, held in Toronto in February 2002.  It was initially 
described in the “physiology” paper.  The Open Grid Services Architecture, 
version 1.0 (Foster et al., 2005) produced by the OGSA working group within 
the GGF in 2005, provides a first version of this OGSA definition.  In July 2006, 
the Open Grid Services Architecture, version 1.5 (Foster et al., 2006) was 
published by GGF.  
In addition to defining a core set of standard interfaces and behaviours that 
address many of the technical challenges in a VO environment, OGSA provides 
a framework within which one can define a wide range of interoperable, 
portable services.  OGSA provides a foundation on which can be constructed a 
rich Grid-technology ecosystem, comprising multiple technology providers. 
This section gives an introduction of OGSA. 
4.2.1. Advantages of Web Services for Grid computing 
Grid computing concerns multi-institutional resources sharing and coordinating 
uses of diverse resources in a dynamic, distributed VO that assembles resources 
and services (and people).  Since Web service has emerged as an XML-based 
open standard for building distributed applications in a heterogeneous 
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computing environment, the Grid can benefit from the Web services framework 
by taking advantages of several factors.  
As described in previous section, Web services are independent of platforms, 
programming languages and locations.  Web services can be described, 
published and dynamically discovered, and bound to WSDL, a rich interface 
description language.  The Grid needs this support as the dynamic discovery 
and composition of Grid services in heterogeneous environments necessitates 
mechanisms for registering and discovering interface definitions and endpoint 
implementation descriptions, and for dynamically generating proxies based on 
(potentially multiple) bindings for specific interfaces.  WSDL supports this 
requirement by providing a standard mechanism for defining interface 
definitions separately from their embodiment within a particular binding 
(transport protocol and data encoding format).  The widespread adoption of 
Web-service mechanisms means that a framework based on Web services can 
exploit numerous tools and extant services  
4.2.2. Service-Oriented view 
OGSA introduces a service-oriented Grid architecture. OGSA focuses on 
services.  A service is defined as a network-enabled entity that provides some 
capability to its clients by exchanging messages.  A service is defined by 
identifying sequences of specific message exchanges that cause the service to 
perform some operations.  Defining these operations only in terms of message 
exchange achieves great flexibility in how services are implemented, and where 
they may be located.  A SOA is one in which all entities are services, and thus, 
any operation visible to the architecture is the result of message exchange.  In 
OGSA, computational resources, storage resources, networks, programs, 
databases, and the like are all represented as services.  
A critical requirement in a distributed, multi-organizational Grid environment is 
for mechanisms that enable interoperability.  In a service-oriented view, the 
interoperability problem is divided into two sub-problems: the definition of 
service interfaces and the identification of the protocol(s) that can be used to 
invoke a particular interface—and, ideally, agreement on a standard set of such 
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protocols.  A service-oriented view addresses the need for standard interface 
definition mechanisms, local/remote transparency, adaptation to local OS 
services, and uniform service semantics.  A service-oriented view also 
simplifies virtualization—that is, the encapsulation behind a common interface 
of diverse implementations.  Virtualization is easier if service functions can be 
expressed in a standard form, so that any implementation of a service is invoked 
in the same manner.  WSDL is adopted for this purpose.  WSDL supports a 
service interface definition that is distinct from the protocol bindings used for 
service invocation.  WSDL allows for multiple bindings for a single interface, 
including distributed communication protocol(s) (e.g., HTTP), as well as locally 
optimized binding(s) (e.g., local IPC) for interactions between request and 
service processes on the same host.  In brief, this service architecture supports 
local and remote transparency with respect to service location and invocation.  
4.2.3. The Grid Service 
A basic premise of OGSA is that everything is represented by a service. 
Computational resources, storage resources, networks, programs, databases, and 
so forth are all services. More specifically, OGSA represents everything as a 
Grid service.  
The ability to virtualize and compose services depends on more than standard 
interface definitions.  OGSA defines what is called a Grid service: a Web 
service that provides a set of well-defined interfaces and that follows specific 
conventions.  The interfaces address discovery, dynamic service creation, 
lifetime management, notification, and manageability; the conventions address 
naming and upgradeability.  Authentication and reliable invocation are also 
viewed as service protocol bindings and are thus, external to the core 
Grid-service definition. 
Grid services are characterized by the capabilities that they offer.  A Grid 
service implements one or more interfaces, where each interface defines a set of 
operations that are invoked by exchanging a defined sequence of messages.  
Grid service interfaces correspond to <portType> in WSDL.  The set of 
<portType>, supported by a Grid service, along with some additional 
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information relating to versioning, are specified in the Grid service’s 
<serviceType>, a WSDL extensibility element defined by OGSA.  
Grid services are stateful and dynamic.  Grid services can maintain an internal 
state for the lifetime of the service. Grid service instance refers to a particular 
instantiation of a Grid service.  Grid services can be created and destroyed 
dynamically.  The existence of state distinguishes one instance of a service 
from another that provides the same interface.  One instance can be created 
from another dynamically.  The protocol binding associated with a service 
interface can define a delivery semantics that addresses, for example, reliability.  
Services interact with one another by the exchange of messages.  Grid services 
may be upgraded during their lifetime.  
4.2.4. OGSA core services 
OGSA version 1.0 and OGSA version 1.5 are the specifications that focus on 
requirements and the scope of important capabilities required to support Grid 
systems and applications in both e-science and e-business.  OGSA addresses 
the need for standardization by defining a set of core capabilities and behaviours 
that address key concerns in Grid systems.  
OGSA is intended to facilitate the seamless use and management of distributed, 
heterogeneous resources.  The virtualization and abstraction are directed toward 
defining a wide variety of capabilities that are relevant to OGSA Grids.  The 
identified functional and non-functional requirements include: interoperability, 
resource-sharing across organizations, quality of service (QoS) assurance, job 
execution, data services, security, scalability, etc.  OGSA realizes these 
capabilities in terms of services, the interfaces these services expose, the 
individual and collective state of resources belonging to these services, and the 
interaction between these services within a service-oriented architecture.  The 
services are built on Web-service standards, with semantics, additions, extensions 
and modifications that are relevant to Grids.  
The potential range of OGSA services is vast.  This definition of OGSA 1.5 is 
driven by a set of functional and non-functional requirements derived from a 
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broad set of use cases (Foster et al., 2004
2
) (Von Reich et al., 2004).  OGSA 
defines a set of capabilities to meet these requirements. It presents a refinement 
of the required functionality into capabilities: Execution Management, Data, 
Resource Management, Security, Self-Management, and Information services.  
There is a core set of non-null interfaces, standards and common 
knowledge/bootstraps that services must implement to be part of an OGSA 
Grid.  This set of common implementations and manifestations to support 
OGSA is referred to as the infrastructure services.  OGSA capabilities share 
and build on this set of infrastructure services.  The following is a brief 
introduction to OGSA’s capabilities:  
 Execution Management Services (OGSA-EMS) are concerned with the 
problems of instantiating and managing, to completion, units of work.  
There are three broad classes of EMS: resources that model processing, 
storage, executables, resource management, and provisioning; job 
management; and resource selection services that collectively decide where 
to execute a unit of work. 
 Those OGSA services are concerned with the management of, access to and 
update of data resources, along with the transfer of data between resources, 
are collectively called “Data Services”.  OGSA Data Services can be used to 
move data as required; manage replicated copies; run queries and updates; 
and federate data resources.  They also provide the capabilities necessary to 
manage the metadata that describes this data, in particular, the provenance of 
the data itself.  The heterogeneous nature of the Grid means that many 
different types of data must be supported.  These include, but are not 
limited to, flat files, streams, relational databases, XML databases, 
object-oriented databases, catalogues, derived data and even data services 
themselves.  OGSA Data Services provide a set of functional capabilities 
and properties.  Different subsets of the services are needed to implement the 
different capabilities.  Functional capabilities include: data transfer services, 
storage management services, data-access services, queries, data federation 
services, location management services, update services, data transformation 
services, security mapping extensions, resource and services configuration 
services, data discovery services and provenance services.  Properties are 
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non-functional capabilities of services.  Whereas functional capabilities are 
defined by entries in the service interfaces, non-functional properties are 
inherent in the design.  These properties include performance, availability, 
legal and ethical restriction and scalability.  
 OGSA Resource Management Services perform several forms of 
management on resources in a Grid.  In an OGSA Grid, there are three types 
of management that involve resources: management of the physical and 
logical resources themselves, management of the OGSA Grid resources 
exposed through service interfaces and management of the OGSA Grid 
infrastructure.  Different types of interfaces realize the different forms of 
management in an OGSA Grid.  These interfaces can be categorized into 
three levels: resource level, infrastructure level and OGSA functions’ level.  
At the resource level, resources are managed directly through their native 
manageability interfaces.  The infrastructure level provides the base 
management behaviour of resources, forming the basis for both 
manageability and management in an OGSA environment.  Management 
functionality at the infrastructure level is envisioned to use the Web Services 
Distributed Management (WSDM) specifications.  At the OGSA functions’ 
level, there are two types of management interfaces: a functional interface 
and a manageability interface.  Functional interfaces are provided by some 
common OGSA capabilities (e.g., OGSA EMS).  These capabilities 
themselves are a form of resource management.  Each capability has a 
specific manageability interface through which the capability is managed 
(e.g., monitoring of a job manager).  The properties provided by OGSA 
resource management services include scalability, interoperability, security 
and reliability.  
 OGSA Security Services facilitate the enforcement of the security-related 
policy within a VO.  OGSA Security Services provide a set of functional 
capabilities.  These functional capabilities include: authentication, identity 
mapping, authorization, credential conversion, audit and secure logging, and 
privacy.  
 OGSA Self-Management Services are used to help reduce the cost and 
complexity of owning and operating an IT infrastructure.  In a self-managing 
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environment, system components—including hardware components, such as 
computers, networks and storage devices, and software components, such as 
operating systems and business applications—are self-configuring, 
self-healing and self-optimizing.  One of the main objectives of 
self-management is to support service-level attainment for a set of services 
(or resources, depending on the taxonomy)—with as much automation as 
possible, to reduce the costs and complexity of managing the system.  While 
the self-management capability is a significant part of the OGSA, this work is 
still at a preliminary stage and hence, only some aspects of self-management 
are described in this specification (Foster et al., 2006).  
 The ability to efficiently access and manipulate information about 
applications, resources and services in the Grid environment is an important 
OGSA capability.  The term ‘information’, in defining OGSA Information 
Services, refers to dynamic data or events used for status monitoring; 
relatively static data used for discovery; and any data that is logged.  The 
scope of the OGSA Information Service covers publication through 
consumption.  An information service needs to support a variety of QoS 
requirements for reliability, security, and performance.  OGSA Information 
Services define capabilities, including discovery, message delivery, logging, 
and monitoring.  
4.3.  WSRF and WS-Notification 
4.3.1. OGSA requires stateful services 
OGSA introduced a service-oriented Grid architecture which tailors the 
Web-services approach to meet some Grid-specific requirements (Foster et al., 
2002).  Grid service is defined as stateful and dynamic as discussed in section 
4.2.3.  Web services were chosen as the underlying technology to support 
OGSA.  However, although the Web Services Architecture was certainly the 
best option, it still did not meet one of OGSA's most important requirements: 
that the underlying middleware has to be stateful.  Unfortunately, although 
Web services, in theory, are either stateless or stateful, they are usually stateless, 
and there is no standard way of making them stateful.  
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A stateless service implements message exchanges with no access or use of 
information not contained in the input message.  Plain Web services are 
usually stateless.  This means that the Web service cannot "remember" 
information, or keep state, from one invocation to another.  Although OGSA 
requires stateful services, statelessness is generally viewed as good engineering 
practice for Web-services implementations.  Statelessness in the 
implementation of the service itself tends to enhance reliability and scalability: a 
stateless Web service can be restarted following failure, without concern for its 
history of prior interactions, and new copies of a stateless Web service can be 
created (and subsequently destroyed) in response to changing loads.  
WS-Resource is an approach to solve this contradiction.  The WS-Resource 
Framework (WSRF) is a set of Web services specifications that define 
WS-Resource approach.  Figure 4.4 illustrates the relationship between Web 
services, stateful Web services, OGSA and WSRF.   
 
 
Figure 4.4 Relationships between OGSA, WSRF, and Web Services 
4.3.2. WS-Resource 
WS-Resource is an approach to modelling states in a Web-services context 
(Foster et al., 2004).  A WS-Resource is defined as the composition of a Web 
service and a stateful resource.  A stateful resource is defined as having a 
specific set of state data expressible as an XML document; having a 
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well-defined lifecycle; and be known to, and acted upon, by one or more Web 
services.  Examples of system components that may be modelled as stateful 
resources are files in a file system, rows in a relational database, and 
encapsulated objects, such as Entity Enterprise Java beans.  A stateful resource 
can also be a collection or group of other stateful resources.  
A stateful resource is addressed and accessed according to the implied resource 
pattern, a conventional use of WS-Addressing (W3C, 2006
2
) endpoint reference 
(EPR).  The term ‘implied resource pattern’ describes a specific kind of 
relationship between a Web service and one or more stateful resources.  
WS-Addressing standardizes the EPR construct, used to represent the address of 
a Web service deployed at a given network endpoint.  A WS-Addressing EPR 
is an XML serialization of a network-wide pointer to a Web service.  In the 
implied resource pattern, a stateful resource identifier is used to identify a 
WS-Resource.  It is encapsulated in an EPR and used to identify the stateful 
resource to be used in the execution of a Web-service message exchange.  
The lifetime of a WS-Resource is defined as the period between its creation and 
its destruction.  A WS-Resource can be created through the use of a 
WS-resource factory.  A WS-Resource factory is any Web service capable of 
bringing a WS-Resource into existence.  Bringing a WS-Resource into 
existence consists of creating a new stateful resource, assigning the new stateful 
resource an identity, and creating the association between the new stateful 
resource and its associated Web service.  The response message of a 
WS-Resource factory operation contains a WS-Resource-qualified EPR (an 
EPR containing a stateful resource identifier is a WS-Resource-qualified EPR), 
containing a stateful resource identifier that refers to the new stateful resource, 
though a factory may convey the reference to the new WS-Resource through 
other means, such as placing the WS-Resource-qualified EPR into a registry for 
later retrieval.  A new WS-Resource can exist for some finite period. After that 
time, it should be possible to destroy the WS-Resource so that its associated 
system resources can be reclaimed.  A WS-Resource can be destroyed by using 
the appropriate WS-Resource-qualified EPR to send a destroy request message 
to the Web service identified by the EPR.  The receipt of the response to the 
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destroy request message represents a point of synchronism between the service 
requestor and the Web service receiving the destroy request message. 
The term ‘resource property’ refers to an individual component of a 
WS-Resource’s state.  The XML document, describing the type of a stateful 
resource within the WS-Resource composition, is called a WS-Resource 
properties document.  The WS-Resource properties document is described 
using XML schema (W3C, 2001).  Specifically, the WS-Resource properties 
document is expressed as an XML global element declaration (GED) in some 
XML namespace.  The WS-Resource properties document declaration is 
associated with the WSDL <portType> definition via the use of a standard 
attribute, resourceProperties.  The state of a WS-Resource, i.e., the values of 
resource properties exposed in the WS-Resource’s resource properties 
document, can be read, modified, and queried by using standard Web services 
messages.  The base functionality is to retrieve the value of a single resource 
property using a simple Web services request/response message exchange.  It 
is also possible to use a standard message exchange to execute an arbitrary 
XPath (W3C, 2006
5
) expression against the resource properties document. 
4.3.3. WSRF and WS-Notification family of 
specifications 
The WSRF is a set of Web services specifications that define a rendering of the 
WS-Resource approach in terms of specific message exchanges and related 
XML definitions.  The WSRF allows WS-Resources to be declared, created, 
accessed, monitored for change, and destroyed via conventional Web-service 
mechanisms, but does not require that the Web-service component of the 
WS-Resource that provides access to the associated stateful resources be 
implemented as a stateful message processor.  Three related WS-Notification 
specifications define interfaces and behaviours that allow clients to subscribe to 
change in state, thus providing for push-mode access to state components. 
Initial work on the WS-Resource Framework has been performed by the Globus 
Alliance and IBM (Czajkowski et al., 2004
2
).  These documents were 
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submitted to the OASIS standards group in March 2004.  The OASIS WSRF 
Technical Committee 
(http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=wsrf) was 
formed to work on WS-ResourceProperties (OASIS, 2006
8
), 
WS-ResourceLifetime (OASIS, 2006
7
), WS-ServiceGroup (OASIS, 2006
6
), and 
WS-BaseFaults (OASIS, 2006
2
) specifications.  The four WSRF specifications 
define how to represent, access, manage, and group WS-Resources:  
 WS-ResourceProperties defines how WS-Resources are described by XML 
Resources Property documents that can be queried and modified.  
 WS-ResourceLifetime allows a requestor to destroy a WS-Resource either 
immediately or at a scheduled future point in time. 
 WS-ServiceGroup describes how collections of Web services and/or 
WS-Resources can be represented and managed.  It creates and uses 
heterogeneous by-reference collections of Web services.  This specification 
can be used to organize collections of WS-Resources, for example to build 
registries, or to build services that can perform collective operations on a 
collection of WS Resources. 
 WS-BaseFault defines a base fault type for use when returning faults in a 
Web services message exchange. 
The WSRF specifications are compliant with the WS-Interoperability (WS-I) 
Basic Profile (Ballinger et al., 2006).  It means that any WS-I compliant Web 
services client can interact with any service that supports WSRF specifications.  
In a dynamic Grid environment, it is critical that components can request and 
receive timely notification of changes in one another’s states.  WS-Notification 
is a family of related white papers and specifications that define a standard Web 
services approach to notification, using a topic-based publish/subscribe pattern.  
WS-Notification defines a general, topic-based Web service system for publish 
and subscribe (pub/sub) interactions that build on the WSRF.   The 
Event-driven, or Notification-based, interaction pattern is a commonly used 
pattern for inter-object communications.  The term ‘notification pattern’ refers 
to the interaction pattern that involves registration of consumers and subsequent 
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dissemination of events.  This notification pattern is increasingly being used in 
a Web services context.  In the notification pattern, a Web service, or other 
entity, disseminates information to a set of other Web services, without having to 
have prior knowledge of these other Web services.  The goals of 
WS-Notification are to standardize the roles, terminology, concepts, message 
exchanges and the WSDL needed to express the notification pattern and to 
provide a language to describe Topics.  The OASIS WSN Technical Committee 
(http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=wsn) was 
formed to work on WS-BaseNotification (OASIS, 2006
4
), WS-Topics (OASIS, 
2006
12
), and WS-BrokeredNotification (OASIS, 2006
5
) specifications. 
 WS-BaseNotification.  This defines the Web services interfaces for 
Notification Producers and Notification Consumers.  It includes standard 
message exchanges to be implemented by service providers that wish to act 
in these roles, along with operational requirements expected of them.  This 
is the base document on which the other WS-Notification specification 
documents depend.  
 WS-Topics.  This defines a mechanism to organize and categorize items of 
interest for subscription known as ‘topics’.  These are used in conjunction 
with the notification mechanisms defined in WS-BaseNotification 
specification.  WS-Topics defines three topic expression dialects that can be 
used as subscription expressions in subscribe request messages and other 
parts of the WS-Notification system. It further specifies an XML model for 
describing metadata associated with topics.  The WS-Topics specification 
should be read in conjunction with the WS-BaseNotification specification 
and the “Publish-Subscribe Notification for Web Services” white paper 
(Graham et al., 2004). 
 WS-BrokeredNotification.  This defines the Web services interface for 
the Notification Broker.  A Notification Broker is an intermediary which, 
among other things, allows publication of messages from entities that are not 
themselves service providers.  It includes standard message exchanges to be 
implemented by Notification Broker service providers, along with 
operational requirements expected of service providers and requestors that 
participate in brokered notifications.  This work relies upon 
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WS-BaseNotification specification and WS-Topics specification, as well as 
the “Publish-Subscribe Notification for Web Services” white paper. 
4.3.4. WSRF and OGSI 
The predecessor of WSRF, the Open Grid Services Infrastructure (OGSI) 
specification version 1.0 (Tuecke et al., 2003), was released in July 2003, by the 
OGSI Working Group of the GGF.  Since development started on OGSI in 
early 2002, the Web services world has evolved significantly.  Specifically, a 
number of new specifications and use patterns have emerged that simplify and 
clarify the ideas expressed in OGSI.  It is necessary to mention how the new 
WSRF and WS-Notification specifications derive from and relate to the OGSI 
specification. 
OGSI defines a set of conventions and extensions on the use of WSDL and XML 
Schema to enable stateful Web services.  It introduces the idea of a stateful Web 
services and defines approaches for creating, naming, and managing the lifetime 
of instances of services; for declaring and inspecting service state data; for 
asynchronous notification of service state change; for representing and managing 
collections of service instances; and for common handling of service invocation 
faults.  
The WSRF was proposed as a refactoring and evolution of OGSI aimed at 
exploiting new Web services standards, specifically WS-Addressing, and at 
evolving OGSI based on early implementation and application experiences.  The 
WSRF retains essentially all of the functional capabilities present in OGSI, while 
changing some of the syntax (e.g., to exploit WS-Addressing) and also adopting a 
different terminology in its presentation.  In addition, OGSI is considered a 
heavyweight specification with too much definition in one specification; the 
WSRF partitions OGSI functionality into a set of distinct, composable 
specifications (plus the related WS-Notification specifications).   
The “Refactoring and Evolution” document (Czajkowski et al., 2004
1
) explains 
the relationship between OGSI and the WSRF and the related WS-Notification 
family of specifications; explains the common requirements that both address, 
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and compares and contrasts the approaches taken to the realization of those 
requirements, and describes how OGSI constructs map to WS-Resource 
Framework constructs. 
4.4.  System Framework 
Web services family of standards, OGSA, WSRF are essential to build an 
OGSA-based Grid system.  Web services were chosen as the underlying 
technology to meet the requirements of OGSA.  WSRF introduces an approach 
to model stateful resources in a Web services framework.  WS-Notification 
specifications use standard approaches to notification using a topic-based 
publish and subscribe pattern.  WS-Notification defines notification 
mechanism for the components in a Grid system to request and receive timely 
notification of changes in one another’s states.   
Layered Framework
Grid Infrastructure
Web Services Standards
WSRF, WS-N
System-specific Services
OGSA
Applications
Middleware
OGSA-DAI
Globus Toolkit 
4
Resources
Data Warehouses
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XML 
DBData Marts
Computational 
Resources
Distributed
 
 
Figure 4.5 System Framework 
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The Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system is designed as an 
OGSA-based Grid system.  It requires a set of services to provide various 
capabilities based on OGSA, and its supporting standards and specifications.  
OGSA introduces a service-oriented Grid architecture, based on Web services.  
It represents everything as Grid services, which are stateful Web services with 
standard interfaces and protocol bindings.  In addition, OGSA defines a set of 
services that provide key capabilities in a Grid system.  Based on OGSA, the 
capabilities required by the system are represented as Grid services.  Figure 4.5 
illustrates the layered framework for the system.  In this framework, OGSA is 
the core standard to develop the proposed system.  In addition, it identifies all 
supportive standards, specifications, and implementations tools.  This 
framework is divided into four main tiers: resource, Grid infrastructure, 
system-specific services and applications.  
 Resources. This tier couples a variety of resources that are available in the 
pre-defined VO.  It primarily consists of data resources and computational 
resources.  Data warehouses are the main data resources that are 
fundamental to data-mining and data analyses.  A data warehouse is 
aggregated from a set of databases.  These databases could be relational 
databases, XML databases, object-oriented databases or even flat files.  
Furthermore, additional single databases are possibly required for some 
specific purposes.  For example, it is necessary to build information 
databases (of extraneous metadata) for logging events, monitoring data 
provenance, etc.  A metadata repository may be represented as an XML 
database for storing resource locations and data-mapping information.  
Computational resources are primarily data-analysis and data-mining 
components deployed within each institution.  
 Grid infrastructure. This tier provides infrastructure for building 
high-level capabilities (e.g., data analysis) required by the system.  It 
consists of two parts: the standards and specifications provide essential 
capabilities with standardized interfaces and protocol binding; the open 
source middleware for realising these standards and specifications.  Web 
services comprise the underlying technology to the OGSA-based Grid 
system.  The resources in the resource tier are represented as 
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WS-Resources.  WS-Notification provides the approach for notification of 
changes in one another WS-Resource’s states.  OGSA offers a set of basic 
capabilities, represented as Grid services, in order to fulfil the general 
requirements of an OGSA-based Grid system.  Globus Toolkit version 4 
(GT4) and OGSA-DAI are open source middlewares to implement these 
standards and specifications for developing the proposed system.  GT4 is a 
realization of OGSA, including a complete implementation of WSRF 
specifications.  The toolkit addresses issues of security, information 
discovery, resource management, data management, communication, and 
portability.  GT mechanisms are in use at hundreds of sites and by dozens of 
major Grid projects worldwide (Foster, 2002
1
).  OGSA-DAI (Antonioletti 
et al., 2005) allows data resources, such as relational or XML databases, to 
be accessed via Web services.  The WSRF version of OGSA-DAI is 
compatible with the GT's implementation of WSRF.  Open Grid Services 
Architecture Distributed Query Processor (OGSA-DQP) (Alpdemir et al., 
2003) is an extension of OGSA-DAI that provides a service-based 
distributed query processor which is an implementation of service-based 
distributed query processing based on OGSA-DAI data services.  It 
supports the evaluation of queries over collections of potentially remote 
relational data services. In practice, it is used by the system to support 
queries over OGSA-DAI Data Services and over other services available on 
the system, thereby combining data-access with data-analysis operations.  
 System-specific services. This tier primarily defines high-level services 
that are built on infrastructure-level services.  This tier would mainly 
contain data-analysis and data-mining services that would be used to 
facilitate HIV/AIDS-specific research.  The services defined in this tier 
should also be compliant with OGSA specifications (capabilities).  
 Applications. This tier comprises the user applications that operate within 
the pre-defined VO.  Through such applications, a set of data-mining and 
data-analysis tools invoke the services within the second and third tier to 
complete some analysis tasks and present meaningful results to users.  
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These four layers represent the services groups within different levels of the 
Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system.   The infrastructure tier is a 
critical part of the proposed system.  It defines the standardized services based 
on OGSA.  These services, therefore, virtualize resources and handle 
interoperability and security issues in the proposed system.  Based on this tier, 
more high-level services can be built to provide more domain-specific 
capabilities for the system, according to the system requirements.  Figure 4.6 
shows the service framework, which contains all required services in the Grid 
infrastructure tier.  These services are divided into two levels: infrastructure 
services and core services.  
 
 
              Figure 4.6 Service Framework 
4.4.1. Infrastructure services 
Some common components, including naming, representing state, notification 
and security, exist at a higher management level and are identified as 
infrastructure services.  As a brief recap: OGSA offers capabilities by defining 
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services; the services interfaces are defined by WSDL; XML acts as the lingua 
franca for description and representation, and SOAP acts as the primary 
message exchange format for all defined services.  The infrastructure services 
are OGSA services and can be described as follows:  
 Naming service.  According to the OGSA naming service, OGSA-naming 
uses a three-level convention.  The naming service in this system complies 
with OGSA-naming conventions.  Every name-able entity (e.g., a service 
or resource) in the system is associated with an (optional) human-oriented 
name, an abstract name, and an address.  The human-oriented name is 
usually human-readable and may belong to a name space.  Name spaces 
are usually hierarchic and usually have syntactic restrictions.  
Human-oriented names do not have to be unique.  The abstract name is a 
persistent name that does not specify a particular location.  The abstract 
names are globally unique in space and time.  The AbstractName element 
of a WS-Name (Grimshaw et al., 2006) is an example of abstract name.  
The address specifies the location of an entity.  WS-Addressing EPR is an 
example of an address.  The services or resources addressing in the system 
use WS-Addressing EPRs. 
 Security services.  Security is one key area in a Grid environment.  A 
service request needs to carry appropriate tokens securely for purposes of 
authentication, authorization and end-to-end message protection.  In 
addition, higher-level protection mechanisms, such as XML encryption and 
digital signatures and point-to-point transport-level security, are required 
too.  The security services will be discussed in the security chapter.  
 Representing state.  WSRF specification addresses the key issues in the 
area of state representation and manipulation: the ability to model, access 
and manage state, and related, activities.  
 Notification.  WS-Notification specification provides the notification 
mechanisms that support subscription to, and subsequent notification of 
changes to state components.  
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4.4.2. Core services 
The core services provide Fabric-level capabilities to meet the requirements of 
the Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system.  These services are 
compliant with OGSA Grid services.  They are built upon the infrastructure 
services, which use the standard interfaces and mechanisms to describe 
operations, exchange messages, name and represent resources and services, and 
handle security.  They can be described as follows:  
4.4.2.1.  Publishing and Discovery Services 
An OGSA Grid system is structured according to SOA principles.  Since 
everything (e.g., databases, computational resources, programs, etc.) in an 
OGSA-based system is represented as services, a service provider needs to 
publish a description of a service to a service registry, which can be consulted 
by a service requestor.  The services registry has persistent storage for the 
latest information and is optimized for searches.   It contains metadata about 
the resources. The services registry may be replicated and distributed in multiple 
locations for scalability, and it need to be updated frequently and simultaneously 
to adapt to the dynamic Grid environment.  Additionally, a discovery service 
virtualizes the name and location of services on the system.  
 
 
           Figure 4.7 Service Discovery 
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A registry can use standard description models, such as UDDI and 
WS-Inspection.  UDDI is an industry standard for service registration and 
discovery.  A service provider uses UDDI to advertise the services, and a 
service requestor uses UDDI to find the appropriate services by using SOAP 
message.  A UDDI registry exposes a set of APIs containing inquiry and 
publishing APIs for services discovery and publication.  In WS-Inspection, 
services are described in WS-Inspection documents.   A WS-Inspection 
document provides a means for aggregating references to pre-existing service 
description documents, which have been authored in arbitrary number of 
formats such as WSDL, UDDI or plain HTML.  UDDI and WS-Inspection can 
work either together or separately.  Figure 4.7 shows the service discovery 
with UDDI and WS-Inspection.  Furthermore, data discovery requires 
languages or ontologies for describing the data and a query language that 
operates over these descriptions.  The infrastructure for data 
discovery—registries, notification, etc. use the same mechanisms.  
4.4.2.2.  Resource Management Services 
The resource management is a complex task in a Grid environment.  The 
resource management in the proposed system complies with the OGSA resource 
management mechanism (or architecture) (Maciel, 2005).  OGSA resource 
management concerns three types of management that involve resources: 
 Management of the physical and logical resources themselves  
 Management of the OGSA Grid resources, exposed through service 
interfaces (e.g., resource reservation, job submission and monitoring) 
 Management of the OGSA Grid infrastructure, exposed through its 
management interfaces (e.g., monitoring a registry service) 
Different types of interfaces realize these forms of management.  These 
interfaces can be categorized into three levels, shown in the middle column of 
Table 4.1 (Maciel, 2005). 
Several definitions are clarified in the OGSA standard:  
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 A manager initiates management actions; it might be either a management 
console operated by a human, or a software entity that is able to monitor and 
control its targets automatically. 
 Manageability defines information that is useful for managing an entity. 
Manageability encompasses those aspects of an entity that support 
management, specifically through instrumentation that allows managers to 
interact with the entity.  The manageability may be provided by the entity 
itself or by a separate means. 
 Manageability interfaces are sets of standardized interfaces that allow a 
manager to interact with an entity in order to perform common management 
actions on it.  Typical management actions include starting the entity, 
stopping it, and gathering performance data. 
 Manageable entities are entities that provide manageability interfaces and 
thus, as the name implies, can be managed.  Manageable entities can be: 
physical (e.g., a node, a network switch, or a disk) or logical (e.g., a process, 
a file system, a print job, or a service), discrete (e.g., a single host) or 
composite (e.g., a cluster), and transient (e.g., a print job) or persistent (e.g., a 
host) 
Type of management Level of interface Interface 
Resource level WBEM, SNMP, etc Management of the 
resources themselves Infrastructure level WSRF, WSDM, etc. 
Resource management 
on the Grid 
Functional interfaces 
Management of OGSA 
infrastructure 
OGSA functions level 
Specific manageability 
interfaces 
                 
Table 4.1 Resource Management 
At the resource level, the resources are managed directly through their native 
manageability interfaces.  These resources are managed by following the 
description given by an information model, which defines their properties, 
operations, events, and their relationships with each other.  For example, the 
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Distributed Management Task Force: Common Information Model (CIM, 
http://www.dmtf.org/standards/cim/) (DMTF, 1999) infrastructure is an 
approach to the management of systems and networks that applies the basic 
structuring and conceptualization techniques of the object-oriented paradigm.  
CIM is a model for describing overall management information in a 
network/enterprise environment.  Web-Based Enterprise Management 
(WBEM, http://www.dmtf.org/standards/wbem/) is a set of technologies 
developed to unify the management of enterprise computing environments.  
WBEM is based on CIM.   It is composed of CIM, which defines the resource 
model semantics, and a set of encodings and protocols to access the resource 
model.  
The infrastructure level provides the base management behaviour of resources, 
forming the basis for both manageability and management.  At this level, it uses 
standardized management behaviours to integrate the vast number and type of 
resources.  The infrastructure level provides: a base manageability model, 
basic functionality, and generic manageability.  The base manageability model, 
which represents resources as services and allows resources in the system to be 
manipulated through the standard Web services means for discovery, access, 
etc.  All manageable resources are either Web services or are represented by 
Web services.  WSRF defines the interfaces and behaviours which are the 
basis for representing resources.  Furthermore, WS-Notification defines 
interfaces and behaviours for event notification.  The Web Services Distributed 
Management (WSDM) specifications define: 1) how management of any 
resource can be accessed via Web services protocols – Management Using Web 
Services (MUWS), and 2) management of the Web services resources via the 
MUWS – Management Of Web Services (MOWS).  WSDM MUWS (OASIS, 
2005
6
) (OASIS, 2005
7
) provides a foundation for management using Web 
services.  WSDM MOWS (OASIS, 2005
5
) builds on the MUWS specification 
for the management of Web services.  The WSRF and WSN specifications, 
together with WSDM MUWS, will provide the core functionality for the base 
manageability interfaces.  Basic functionality at infrastructure level includes: 
the interfaces for capabilities that are common to many resources (e.g., start, 
stop, etc.); representation of the state graph of a resource, including the states 
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and transitions, and operations to change the state; describing and discovering 
relationship among resources; and notification.  A generic manageability 
interface is common to all services implementing OGSA capabilities.  This 
manageability interface has functionality such as introspection, monitoring, and 
creation and destruction of service instances.  WSDM MOWS defines standard 
manageability interfaces for Web services that should be applicable to OGSA 
services. 
At the functions level, there are two types of management interfaces: the 
functional interface and the manageability interface.  In an OGSA-based Grid, 
some common OGSA capabilities (e.g., job management) are a form of resource 
management.  Services that provide these capabilities expose them through 
functional interfaces.  Each capability has a specific manageability interface 
through which the capability is managed (e.g., monitoring of registries, 
monitoring of a job manager, etc.).  This interface could extend the generic 
manageability interface, adding any manageability interfaces that are specific to 
the management of this capability. 
4.4.2.3.  Job Execution Management Services 
Job execution management services are concern with instantiating and 
managing, to completion, units of work.  The job execution management in the 
proposed system complies with OGSA Execution Management Services 
(OGSA-EMS).  EMS services enable applications to have coordinated access 
to underlying resources services, regardless of their physical locations or access 
mechanisms.  More formally, EMS addresses problems with executing units of 
work, including their placement, provisioning, and lifetime management.  It 
primarily includes:  finding execution candidate locations, selecting execution 
location, preparing for execution, initiating the execution and managing the 
execution.  EMS defines three classes of services: service container, job 
management and resource selection services.  
A service container contains running entities, whether they are jobs or running 
services.  Containers have resources properties that describe static information, 
such as what kind of executables they can take—OS version, libraries installed, 
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policies, and security environment—as well as dynamic information.  A basic 
container interface may expose only a small set of operations (Grimshaw, 
Newhouse, Pulsipher & Morgan, 2006).  In particular, a container is expected to 
implement a manageability interface which could be a WSDM managed 
resource. 
The OGSA-EMS definition of a ‘job’ incorporates and extends the notion of a 
traditional job.  The job encapsulates all there is to know about a particular unit 
of work (i.e., an instance of a running application or a service).  A job is the 
smallest unit that is managed.  It represents the manageability aspect of a unit of 
work.  A job implements a manageability interface, which could be a WSDM 
managed resource.  A job is named by an EPR.  It is created at the instant that it 
is requested, even though, at that point, no resources may have been committed.  
The job keeps track of execution state (e.g., started, suspended, restarted, 
terminated, and completed), resource commitments and agreements, job 
requirements, and so on. Many of these are stored in a job document.  A job 
document describes the state of the job, the agreements that have been acquired, 
its job status, metadata about the user (credentials, etc.), and how many times the 
job has been started.  The job document may be exposed as a resource property 
of the job. 
The Job Manager (JM) is a higher-level service that encapsulates all of the 
aspects of executing a job, or a set of jobs, from start to finish. A set of jobs may 
be structured or unstructured.  The JM implements a manageability interface 
which could be a WSDM collection—a collection of manageable entities.  The 
JM is responsible for orchestrating the services used to start a job or set of jobs, 
by, for example, negotiating agreements, interacting with containers, and 
configuring monitoring and logging services.  It may also aggregate job resource 
properties from the set of jobs it manages.  The JM may be a portal that interacts 
with users and manages jobs on their behalf. 
Resource selection services contain several services: Execution Planning 
Services (EPS), Candidate Set Generator (CSG), and Reservation services.  An 
EPS is a service that builds “schedules,” where a schedule is a mapping (relation) 
between services and resources, possibly with time constraints.  An EPS will 
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typically attempt to optimize some objective function, such as execution time, 
cost, reliability, etc.  It first calls a CSG (see below) to get a set of resources, then 
gets more current information on those resources from an information service, 
then executes the optimization function to build the schedule.  EPS generate a 
schedule, and a schedule is enacted by JM.  CSG determines the set of resources 
on which a unit of work can execute.  CSG generates a set of EPRs of containers 
in which it is possible to run a job described by a job document.  CSGs should be 
primarily called by EPSs, or by other services, such as JMs, that are performing 
EPS-like functions.  Reservation services manage reservations of resources, 
revoke reservations, etc.  This may not be a separate service, rather an interface 
to get and manage reservations from containers and other resources.  The 
reservation itself is likely to be an agreement document that is signed.  A 
reservation service presents a common interface to all varieties of reservable 
resources on the Grid.  Reservation services will generally be used by many 
different services: a JM might create reservations for the groups of jobs which are 
being managed, or an EPS might use reservations in order to guarantee the 
execution plan for a particular job.  It could also be the case that the creation of 
reservations will be associated with the provisioning step for a job. 
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        Figure 4.8 Job Execution Management 
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Figure 4.8 is an example of job execution.  It illustrates the involved services and 
the interaction among them.  This case use EMS to control the processing of a 
new job.  The JM firstly creates a new job with the appropriate job description.  
The JM then call an EPS to get a scheduler.  The EPS, in turn, calls CSG, which 
calls information services to determine where the job can be executed, based on 
binary availability and policy settings.  Basically, information services (see 
section 4.4.2.4) are databases of attribute metadata about resources.  The EPS 
selects a service container, after first checking with the service container that the 
information is accurate.  The EPS returns the schedule to the JM.  The JM then 
may interact with reservation (or deployment and configuration) services to set 
up the job execution environment.  The service container is invoked to start the 
job.  Logging services are used for accounting and audit trails.  When the job 
terminates, the job manager is notified by the container.  If the job terminates 
abnormally, the whole cycle may repeat again. 
4.4.2.4.  Information Services 
The ability to efficiently access and manipulate information about applications, 
resources and services is an important capability in an OGSA Grid.  In OGSA 
specifications, information refers to dynamic data or events used for status 
monitoring, relatively static data used for discovery and any data that is logged.  
In practice, an information service needs to support a variety of QoS 
requirements for reliability, security, and performance.  The information 
services for the proposed system comply with OGSA Information Services and 
inherit most of the capabilities provided by OGSA Information Services.  The 
approach, defined by Grid Monitoring Architecture, will be used to provide 
capabilities for information discovery and delivery.  
The characterization of an information service depends greatly on factors, such 
as the demand placed on the source of information (e.g., static versus dynamic, 
publication rate), its purpose (e.g., discovery, logging, and monitoring) and QoS 
requirements.  Information is made available for consumption, either from the 
originating producer, or through an intermediary (e.g., logging service or 
notification broker), acting on behalf of the originating producer.  Either one or 
 90 
more consumers wish to obtain information from one or more producers, or one 
or more producers wish to send information to one or more consumers.  The 
data model used to implement an information services, or the language used to 
query for information, are mostly based on XML and XPath/XQuery query 
languages, and those that use the relational model and the SQL query language.  
Metadata is associated with information (e.g., events or messages) for 
describing its structure, properties and usage.  For interoperability, a standard 
event scheme for information services is desirable.  
OGSA Information Services define discovery, message delivery, logging, and 
monitoring capabilities.  Discovery service is discussed in section 4.4.2.1. 
Information producers and consumers interact by exchanging messages.  
Producers either send messages directly to relevant consumers or make use of an 
intermediary (message broker) that decouples producers from consumers.  
Logging service keeps log recorders in a persistent store for a period of time.  It 
acts as an intermediary between log artifact producers and consumers.  
Producers write log artifacts sequentially, and consumers may read (but not 
update) the log records.  Information that carries a field for ordering purposes 
(e.g., a time stamp and sequence number) can be used for monitoring.  A 
monitoring service could be equally used for applications or resources.  Some 
situations (e.g., real-time applications) might impose strict requirement on the 
monitoring service (e.g., high update rates and high performance).  In such a 
case, a special purpose service might be needed. 
For Grid resources in general (including services and applications), the amount 
of available information about resources could be large, dispersed across the 
network, and updated frequently.  A direct exchange between a producer and 
consumer is not appropriate or not possible, and searches in this space may have 
unacceptable latencies.  In order to manage such information in a controllable 
way, it is important to separate information source discovery from information 
delivery.  Grid Monitoring Architecture (GMA) (Tierney et al., 2002) 
introduces an approach for this separation, based on the 
Producer-Intermediary-Consumer pattern, which is the basic pattern of 
decoupling producers from consumers using an intermediary and is widely used.  
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In the Producer-Intermediary-Consumer pattern, producers put data into an 
intermediary, and consumers extract data from it.  In a general sense, this is the 
pattern followed by any data store, that is, producers write to and consumers read 
from a file, RDBMS, ODBMS etc.  In addition to supporting producer and 
consumer interfaces, an intermediary may also support a management interface to 
control those functions that are not directly associated with reading or writing to 
the data store.  
 
 
           Figure 4.9 An Example of Monitoring 
Figure 4.9 shows a sample use of GMA.  In GMA, a producer is any 
component that uses the producer interface to send events to a consumer.  A 
consumer is any component that uses the consumer interface to receive event 
data from a producer.  The GMA defines a directory service to store 
information about producers and consumers that accept requests.  Producers 
and consumers publish their existence in the directory service.  They typically 
also publish information regarding the types of events they produce or consume, 
along with the meta-information about accepted protocols, security mechanisms, 
and so forth.  This publication information allows other producers and 
consumers to discover the types of event data that are currently available, or 
accept the characteristics of that data, and the ways to gain access to that data.  
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The directory service is not responsible for the storage of event data itself as it 
contains only per-publication information about which event instances can be 
provided or accepted.  The event schema may, optionally, be available through 
the directory service.  
A given component may have multiple producer interfaces, each acting 
independently and sending events.  The core interaction functions that may be 
supported by a producer include: maintaining registration (add/update/remove 
directory service entry or entries describing events that the producer will send to 
a consumer), accepting a query request from a consumer, accepting a subscribe 
request from a consumer, accepting unsubscribe request form the consumer, 
locating consumer (search the directory service for a consumer), notifying (send 
a single set of event(s) to a consumer), initiating subscribe (request to consumer 
to send it events), and initiating unsubscribe (terminate a subscription with a 
consumer).  A given component may have multiple consumer interfaces, each 
acting independently and receiving events.  The core interaction functions that 
may be supported by a consumer are: locating producer (search the directory 
service for a producer), initiating query (request one or more events from a 
producer), initiating subscribe (request establishment of a subscription with a 
producer), terminating a subscription, maintaining registration 
(add/update/remove directory service entry or entries describing events that the 
consumer will accept from the producer), accepting notification (accept a single 
set of event(s) from a producer),accepting subscribe (accept a subscribe request 
from a producer), accepting subscribe (accept a subscribe request from a 
producer) and locating event schema (search request to the schema repository 
for a given event type).  Many types of consumers are possible, such as a 
real-time monitor or an archiver.  Real-time monitors collect monitoring data 
in real time used by online analysis tools.  An archiver aggregates and stores 
event data in long-term storage for later retrieval or analysis.  Many Grid 
services may, in fact, be both consumers and producers of monitoring events.  
These advanced services is the compound producer/consumer, which is a single 
component that implements both producer and consumer interfaces.  Use of 
these intermediate components can lessen the load on producers of event data 
that is of interest to many consumers.  It is effective to reduce the network 
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traffic, as the intermediaries can be placed “near” the data consumers.  The 
data used to construct events can be gathered from many sources.  Hardware or 
software sensors that sample performance metrics in real time constitute one 
type of data source. Another is a database with a query interface, which can 
provide historical data. 
4.4.2.5.  Data Services 
Data services provide the key capabilities that are specific to data-access and 
operation.  OGSA Data Services are concerned with the management of, 
access to and update of data resources, along with the transfer and replica of 
data between resources.  It provides a broad set of functional and 
non-functional capabilities that can be defined by entries in the service 
interfaces.  The data services for this system comply with the OGSA Data 
Services and inherit most capabilities provided by OGSA Data Services.  They 
can be used to move data as required; manage replicated copies; run queries and 
updates; and federate data resources.  The combination of subsets of data 
services can provide more high level capabilities such as data-collection and data 
analysis.  
A distributed system may contain a variety of data resources.  These resources 
may use different models to structure the data, different physical media to store 
it, different software systems to manage it, different schema to describe it, and 
different protocols and interfaces to access it.  The data may be stored locally 
or remotely; may be unique or replicated; may be materialized or derived on 
demand.  Virtualizations are abstract views that hide these distinctions and 
allow the data resources to be manipulated without regard to them.  The data 
virtualization provides transparency for data-access and processing (see section 
3.3.1.1).  
A layer of Grid data virtualization services (Raman et al., 2003) provide such 
transparency and enable ease of data-access and processing.  These services 
support federated access to distributed data, dynamic discovery of data sources 
by content, dynamic migration of data for workload balancing, parallel data 
processing, and collaboration.  These services virtualize various aspects of the 
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Grid, and make it appear as a single entity to the end-user applications.  Data 
virtualization services may include data discovery, federation, consistency 
management service, collaboration, workflow coordination etc. They are 
described as follows: 
 Resources are represented as services in an OGSA Grid.  Discovery 
service (discussed in section 4.4.2.1) virtualizes the name and location of 
data on the Grid, and forms the basic data virtualization service.  Other 
virtualization services build on top of this name transparency to offer other 
kinds of transparency. 
 A data federation service will analyze each query that it receives to 
determine how to best answer the query.  This may involve the generation 
of sub-queries against one or more of the data resources making up the 
federation, applying transformations to the results of those sub-queries, 
combining those query results in (arbitrarily) complex ways, and then 
transforming the result into the format requested by the client.  It may also 
determine where intermediate processing is done in order to minimize 
network traffic.  It will allow data sources to be added and removed from 
the federation, provided they satisfy that service’s semantic restrictions.  
The application specifies its queries in terms of logical domains and 
predicates; the discovery service maps these onto relevant sources.  Thus, 
the combination of federation and discovery services provide applications 
with heterogeneity, distribution, and location transparency. 
 A data-intensive Grid applications may use Grids for scalability of 
performance, rather that for integrating data sources.  This type of 
applications typically takes the form of complex workflows of 
transformation and data-analysis operations, running over large numbers of 
discrete objects.  These operations are often data parallel Grids, which can 
be used to scale up these applications on demand.  A Workflow 
Coordination Services will automatically spread these operations across 
Grid nodes, taking responsibility for moving and caching data and 
functions, recovering from node failures, and so on.  Workflow 
Coordination Services solve workflow parallelizing without changing 
applications.  
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 Grid applications often distribute their data across multiple sites.  A 
consistency management service is used to keeps the different data pieces 
consistent with one another.  The simplest form of such consistency is 
referential integrity (Ramakrishnan & Gehrke, 1998), which can be 
provided by DBMS.  Some Grid datasets may also need more 
sophisticated integrity constraints, which could also vary on an 
application-specific (user community-specific) basis 
 Data-intensive Grid applications involve sharing of data between users at 
different sites.  A collaboration service is used to propagate updates to all 
users and to resolve conflicts in order to virtualize independent, distributed 
data updates.  The collaboration service must rely on the Grid data sources 
to maintain version information. 
Data services offer data transfer from one location to another.  This may be to 
create a copy of the original data or migrate it completely.  QoS can be specified, 
such as reliable transfer, the maximum bandwidth to use, the time when delivery 
is required, or delivery guarantees.  The base functionality transfers bytes from 
one source to a single sink.  Thin layers above this supports transfer to multiple 
sinks, and allow the preservation of semantic information, such as file 
hierarchies, byte ordering or encodings.  Most services have a security policy 
decision point before transferring data. An access operation may then check 
whether the resulting transfer is allowed, depending on the contents of the data, 
and whether any restrictions apply to that transfer (such as encryption).  
Data-access generally concerns the retrieval, insertion or modification of data, 
which may be available from a variety of infrastructures and in a range of 
formats.  Data-access services include simple access, queries, federation access 
(discussed above), and update.  
 Simple access services operations for reading and writing (logically) 
consecutive bytes from a data resource.  The virtualization interface hides 
the details of the data location.  
 Data-access services provide mechanisms for applying queries against data 
resources. In simple cases these may run an SQL query over a relational 
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database, an XML query over an XML database.  Other services may 
implement distributed queries over federated databases or text mining over 
a set of documents. Synchronous queries return the data in the response to a 
request, while asynchronous queries expose the derived data as new 
resources.  Services could be data resources.  It means they may also 
deliver the results of a query to a specified set of other services.  Query 
services may optimize a query before sending it to the resource.  The 
resources may further optimize the query and may also handle issues, such 
as concurrent access to the data.  Data services provide a range of 
mechanisms for updating data resources, depending on the semantics of the 
data resource, and the nature of the data to be uploaded. Examples include 
updating a record in a database, or bulk loading data to such resources.  
Data services may specify some form of transactional behaviour for update 
operations.  When a data resource has replicated versions or is the source 
for derived data services, the updates may be propagated to the replicated or 
derived versions.  When several clients are updating the same data 
resource, the various forms of consistency should be maintained by the 
virtualization interface (consistency management service).  
 Various components of the system may transform data. In the most general 
sense, any service that consumes data of one sort and generates other data 
could be viewed as a transformation.  Data services may themselves 
transform data from one format to another, or filter it by using built-in 
functionalities, before moving it or updating it.  These transformations 
may be instigated explicitly by certain operations, or they may be 
programmed to be triggered automatically in response to certain conditions. 
Data services also provide management capabilities to manage data storage, 
security mapping extension, resource and service configuration, metadata 
catalogue, and provenance.  They are described as follows: 
 Storage management services control the provision of storage to 
applications and other services.  They manage quotas, lifetime, and 
properties such as encryption and persistency. 
 Database management systems often implement sophisticated security 
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mechanisms.  Some of these provide a large range of possible operations 
and access control at the level of individual records.  The data services 
support the standard OGSA security infrastructure that allows effective use 
of fine-grained mechanisms in the OGSA Grid.  
 Data services can provide functionalities to enable clients to use 
configuration options provided by data resources.  In addition, the services 
may provide additional operations for configuring the virtualization of the 
resource provided by the service. 
 Metadata catalogues are data services that store descriptions of data held in 
certain other data services.  On the other hand, the metadata for data 
services may include information about the structure of the data, including 
references to the schemas that describe the data.  For some services this is 
not practical, as the data resources include many schemas that are modified 
frequently, and in these cases, schema information will be provided by the 
services themselves. 
 Users of data services may wish to see information about the provenance and 
quality of the data provided by the services.  Provenance is a special form of 
audit trail that traces each step in sourcing, moving, and processing data.  
This may be at the level of the whole resource or of its component parts, 
sometimes to the level of individual elements.  This, in turn, requires the 
services or other processes that generate the data to also maintain the 
consistency of the provenance information. Complete provenance 
information can allow the data to be reconstructed by following the 
workflow that originally created it. Provenance information may be provided 
by the service itself, or it may be maintained in a metadata catalogue or a 
logging service. 
4.4.3. Grid portal 
The Grid end users (e.g. health workers, HIV/AIDS scientists, researchers and 
medical practitioners), use the Grid to solve domain-specific problems.  A Grid 
portal is a Web-based gateway that provides seamless access to a variety of 
backend resources.  In general, a Grid portal provides end users with a 
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customised view of software and hardware resources specific to their particular 
problem domain.  It also provides a single point of access to Grid-based 
resources that they have been authorized to use.  For the Grid-enabled, 
distributed data warehouse system, this will allow HIV/AIDS researchers to 
focus on their problem area by making the Grid a transparent extension of their 
desktop computing environment.  So far, Grid portal development can be 
broadly classified into two generations.  First-generation Grid portals are 
tightly coupled with Grid middleware, such as GT.  The second generation of 
Grid portals are those that are starting to emerge and make use of technologies, 
such as portlets, to provide more customisable solutions.  Most Grid portals 
currently in use belong to the first-generation.  This section focuses on the 
architecture and services of first-generation Grid portals, which will provide a 
Web-based gateway for the Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system.  
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        Figure 4.10 Grid Portal Architecture 
The first generation of Grid portals primarily used a three-tier architecture 
(Gannon et al., 2002) as shown in Figure 4.10.  It consists of an interface tier 
of a Web browser, a middle tier of Web servers and a third tier of backend 
services and resources, such as databases, programs, etc.  A user interacts with 
Web browser through a secure connection.  The Web server obtains a proxy 
credential from a proxy credential server and uses that to authenticate the users.   
When users complete defining parameters of the task they want to execute, the 
portal Web server launches an application manager, which is a process that 
 99 
controls and monitors the execution of Grid tasks.  The Web server delegates 
the user’s proxy credential to the application manager so that it can act on the 
user’s behalf.  The proxy credential, proxy credential server and proxy 
credential delegation will be discussed in the next chapter in detail.  
The Grid portal generally accommodates the following Grid services: 
 Job management:  A portal provides users with the ability to manage 
their tasks’ execution.  For example, a user’s application is launched via 
the Web browser in a reliable and secure way; the statues of tasks are 
monitored; and the user can pause or cancel tasks if necessary.  
 Discovery services:  A portal uses a discovery service to find resources 
and services that are needed and available for a task.  
 Information services:  Dynamic and static data or events can be collected 
by using real-time monitoring services and events archivers.  This data can 
be retrieve from either real-time monitoring or event archives for 
monitoring purpose.  
 Authentication:  When users access the Grid via a portal, the portal can 
authenticate users with their username and password.  Once authenticated, 
a user can request the portal to access Grid resources on the user’s behalf.  
The GridPort 2.0 (GP2, http://Gridport.npaci.edu) and Grid Portal Development 
Kit (GPDK) (Novotny, 2002) are two representatives of Grid portal toolkit used 
to facilitate the easy development of application-specific portals.  GP2 is a 
Perl-based Grid portal toolkit, which is a collection of services, scripts and 
tools, where the services allow developers to connect Web-based interface to 
backend Grid services.  The script and tools provide consistent interfaces 
between the underlying infrastructure, which is based on Grid technologies, 
such as GT, and standard Web technologies, such as CGI.  GPDK is another 
Grid portal toolkit that uses Java Server Pages (JSPs) for portal presentation and 
JavaBeans to access backend Grid resources via GT. Grid portals currently in 
use include XACT Science Portal (Krishnan et al., 2001), JiPANG (Suzumura, 
Matsuoka & Nakada, 2001), ASC Grid Portal (Allen et al., 2001) etc.  
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4.4.4. Models 
The previous sections defined the essential services to support the Grid-enabled, 
distributed data warehouse system based on OGSA.  These services provide a 
rich set of fundamental capabilities.  The combinations of subsets of these 
services are used to provide more high-level capabilities to meet some of the 
system’s requirements (see section 3.3).  This section will introduce two 
models in order to realize data-collection services, and cross-institutional 
data-access and integration services required by the HIV/AIDS research 
framework.  These two models contain all the components required by these 
two services, and show the interactions between them. 
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       Figure 4.11 Data-Collection Model 
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4.4.4.1.  Data-Collection Model 
As discussed in section 1.1 and 3.3, data-collection is one of the main 
requirements of a Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system.  It is 
required, e.g., to build data warehouses to aggregate HIV/AIDS patients’ 
demographic data.  Patients’ data are collected from distributed data-providers 
through ETL processes.  The data-collection model uses Grid services to 
control data transfer, data transformation, and the loading process.  
Additionally, the main processes are monitored through real-time monitoring 
services and logged into log storage.  Figure 4.11 shows this data-collection 
model.  It contains a number of defined services and illustrates the interactions 
among them. It can be described as follows: 
 The patients’ data is collected from physical distributed data-providers.  
The data extraction components are provided by data-providers according 
to a data collector’s requirements.  The required data is extracted and 
transformed into a specific format, depending on a data schema provided by 
a data collector. This data schema mainly describes what data (for example, 
patients’ gender, age, race, diagnosis, symptom, treatment, etc.) will be 
extracted, and in what format (e.g., data type, sequence, etc.).  Data 
schema is stored in a local metadata repository on the data provider’s side.  
When the data extraction process is started, it needs to search its metadata 
repository to get required information.  The extracted data will be exported 
into a binary data file with an XML metadata file.  The metadata file 
contains the information, such as the data provider’s description (e.g., 
name, location, etc.), file create-date, data volume, data collector’s 
description, etc.  
 On the data collectors’ side, they need to transfer data and its metadata file 
to a file server periodically by invoking a data transfer service deployed on 
the Grid.  The data update service is responsible for reading data files and 
metadata files from the file server, and performing transformation before 
inserting new data into the data warehouse.  The transformation process at 
this stage performs operations, such as selecting certain columns, 
translating coded values, deriving new calculated values, summarizing 
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multiple rows of data, etc.  The loading process is essentially inserting 
data into the data warehouse.  The corresponding metadata will be inserted 
into log storage for future audit purposes.  A data-access service can be 
used to read logged data from the log storage.  
 A job manager is used to initiate, schedule, and execute jobs.  It invokes 
data transfer service, data update services, and monitoring services, 
depending on the job description.  Job manager services use discovery 
services to find the location of these deployed services and control their 
execution.  Discovery services search resource directories to retrieve the 
location, and other information, of resources (services) and return this 
information to job manager services.  The resource directory contains 
metadata for describing deployed services and resources.  It may have 
multiple copies distributed at different locations.  
 Data transfer, transformation and loading process are monitored during 
their processing by using real-time monitoring services.  Data transfer 
services, data update services and job manager services register events in a 
directory service.  The directory service is the storage for keeping entries 
used for searching events and their producers.  The monitoring services 
subscribe all available event data for real-time visualization and 
performance analysis by searching the events directory.  The events are 
also sent to the event archiver for non-real-time audit and analysis purpose.  
A data-access service can be used to read archived events.  
4.4.4.2. Data-Access and Integration Model 
Cross-institutional data-access and integration are key capabilities of the 
Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system to facilitate data-mining and 
data analysis over distributed data warehouses.  Data services comprise a rich 
set of functionalities to provide different capabilities such as federated access, 
distributed queries, data management, consistency management, metadata 
management, etc.  Different combinations of these capabilities are used for 
different purposes, according to different requirements.  This model only 
contains a small set of capabilities, which are essential for data-analysis tasks. 
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Figure 4.12 shows the model used for access and integrating distributed data. 
This model is described below: 
 The model integrates various types of resources: the data-analysis 
components deployed within each institution, data warehouses, data marts, 
and single databases.  Data-analysis services are treated as computational 
resources that can be involved in collaborative operations.  Data 
warehouses and data marts are all considered as a groups of databases, 
which may use different data, different software systems to manage it, and 
different schema to describe it.  On the other hand, a data service is also a 
kind of data resource.  The output data from one data service may be the 
input of another data service.  Whether computational resources, data 
resources or services, all resources are represented as WS-Resources.  
Resources publish their description information in a resources directory.  
A resources directory can have multiple copies distributed at different sites, 
locations or institutions.  
 Data analysis needs to retrieve data from multiple distributed data resources 
or other data-analysis services.  The data services provide a set of 
capabilities, including federation access, data transfer, data transformation, 
metadata catalogue, and consistency management.  Data-analysis services 
invoke the subset of data services to complete specific tasks.  Data 
services invoke discovery services to search the resource directory in order 
to look for available data resources.  Discovery services respond to data 
services with data resources’ description information (e.g., location, name, 
etc).  Data services then can use this information to establish connections 
with these data resources and perform necessary operations.  
 Data-analysis services can also invoke other data-analysis services from 
remote sites to perform some collaborative operations. The Discovery 
service is used to search available data-analysis services in the pre-defined 
VO.  
 The responsibilities of job manager services and discovery service are as 
described in the data-collection model.  
 This model uses the same monitoring mechanism as the data-collection 
 104
model.  
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       Figure 4.12 Data-Access and Integration Model 
4.5.  Summary 
The Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system uses the Grid approach to 
achieve cross-institutional resource-sharing and collaboration, e.g., in order to 
facilitate HIV/AIDS research.  The proposed system is designed as an 
OGSA-based Grid system.  OGSA introduces a service-oriented Grid 
architecture, based on Web services technology.  It represents Grid resources 
as Grid services, which are Web services with standard interfaces and protocol 
bindings.  The stateful and dynamic nature of Grid service needs a Web service 
that has the capability to maintain and exchange internal information.  WSRF 
introduces the WS-Resource approach to modelling states in a Web-services 
context.  Additionally, the WS-Notification family of specifications defines a 
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standard Web services approach to notification, using a topic-based 
publish/subscribe pattern.  
This chapter defined a layered framework that consists of supportive 
Grid-related standards and specifications, including Web services, OGSA, 
WSRF, WS-Notification and GT.  Based on these standards and specifications, 
a feasible system framework is proposed.  OGSA offers a set of fundamental 
capabilities by defining Grid services in a general Grid context.  Based on 
OGSA-services, the services required by the proposed Grid system are 
identified at different levels.  The core services are built on infrastructure 
services that provide a set of common components, including naming, 
representing state, notification and security.  The core-service set provides 
capabilities, such as job execution, system monitoring, data-access, data 
integration, resource management, etc.  These services are finally integrated 
into two proposed models to achieve cross-institutional data-collection, 
data-access and integration.   
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Chapter 5.  
Security 
A Grid system is about resource-sharing.  The proposed Grid system integrates 
a distributed and heterogeneous collection of locally managed users and 
resources, hosted by multiple institutions, which are members of the VO.  Each 
institution may have a different security infrastructure to maintain the trust 
relationship within a single trust domain; in other words, the institutions in the 
VO are untrusted to each other.  Obviously, establishing trust relationships 
between VO participants is critical to ensure secure cross-domain interaction.  
It is also necessary to provide standard security mechanisms that can be 
deployed to protect local institutions, while simultaneously allowing 
interoperable secure interaction.  VO security is specifically concerned with 
user authentication and access control mechanisms for enforcing local and 
VO-wide policies for data-access and resource-usage.  
Grid security is typically based on what is known as the Grid Security 
Infrastructure (GSI), which is now a GGF standard.  It consists of a set of 
components for addressing different security issues (such as authentication, 
delegation and authorization) in Grid systems.  The main advantage of GSI is 
that the general security issues are solved at infrastructure level rather than 
application level; the applications need only deal with application-specific 
policy.  Version 4 of GSI (GSI4, 
http://www.globus.org/toolkit/docs/4.0/security/), corresponding to the GT4, 
integrates with the OGSA security mechanism to allow applications and users to 
operate in the Grid in a seamless and automated manner.   
This chapter will identify the security issues in the Grid-enabled, distributed 
data warehouse system, and discusses how to use GSI4 components to provide a 
security solution for the problem-context in question.  The envisaged security 
solution will discuss the use of Transport Level Security (TLS) protocol (Dierks 
& Rescorla, 2006) with X.509 public key certificate for authentication; X.509 
proxy certificate for single sign-on (SSO) and delegation; the MyProxy protocol 
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(http://grid.ncsa.uiuc.edu/myproxy/) as an online credentials repository; and 
Shibboleth (http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/) plus GridShib 
(http://grid.ncsa.uiuc.edu/GridShib/), which integrate X.509 certificates with 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) (OASIS, 2005
1
) for 
authorization.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows:  The first two sections 
give a brief overview of information security principles and existing security 
technologies.  Section 5.3 discusses the security challenges in the proposed 
Grid system.  Section 5.4 introduces a high-level Grid security architecture 
which identifies the compulsory Grid security components.  Section 5.5 
focuses on the mechanisms implemented by GSI for addressing different 
security issues.  Section 5.6 discusses the solution for the proposed Grid 
system.  
5.1.  A Brief Security Primer 
Information Security is a discipline that relies on the synthesis of people, policy, 
education, training, awareness, procedures and technology to improve the 
protection of an organization’s information assets.  The goals of security are 
threefold:  
 Prevention: prevent attackers from violating security policy.  
 Detection: detect attackers’ violation of security policy 
 Recovery: stop an attack, assess and repair damage, and continue to 
function correctly, even if an attack succeeds.  
Prevention is the ideal scenario.  Detection occurs only after someone violates 
the security policy.  Recovery implies that the attack has stopped (been 
stopped) and the system has been fixed.  
The three classic security concerns (Whiteman & Mattord, 2003) of Information 
Security deal principally with data, and are:  
 The confidentiality of information is the quality or state of preventing 
disclosure or exposure to authorized individuals or systems.  
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Confidentiality ensures that only those with the right and privileges to 
access a particular set of information are able to do so, and that those who 
are not authorized are prevented from obtaining access.   
 Integrity is the quality or state of being whole, complete and uncorrupted.  
The integrity of information is threatened when the information is exposed 
to corruption, damage, destruction, or other disruption of its authentic state.  
The threat of corruption can occur while information is being stored or 
transmitted.  
 Availability enables users who need to access information to do so without 
interface or obstruction, and to receive it in the required format.  A user 
means not only a person, but also another computer system.  
Additional concerns deal more with people and their actions: 
 Authentication: Ensuring that users are who they say they are.  
 Authorization: Making a decision about who may access data or a service.  
 Assurance: Being confident that the security system functions correctly.  
 Non-repudiation: Ensuring that a user cannot deny an action.  
 Auditability: Tracking what a user did to data or a service.  
Other security concerns relate to: 
 Trust: People can justifiably rely on computer-based systems to perform 
critical functions securely and on these systems to process, store and 
communicate sensitive information securely.  
 Reliability: The system does what you want, when you want it to. 
 Privacy: Within certain limits, no one should know who you are or what 
you do.  
5.2.  Security Technology 
Technology solutions of security, properly implemented, can maintain the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information in each of its three 
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states: storage, transmission, and processing.  This section will introduce some 
commonly used security technologies.  
5.2.1.  Firewalls 
A firewall, as part of an information security program, is any device that 
prevents a specific type of information from moving between the outside world, 
known as the un-trusted network (e.g., the Internet) and the inside world, known 
as the trusted network, and vice versa. It could be a hardware or software 
component added to a network to prevent communication forbidden by an 
organization’s administrative policy.  
Generally, there are two types of firewalls: traditional and personal.  A 
traditionally firewall is, typically, a dedicated network device or computer 
positioned on the boundary of two or more networks.  This type of firewall is 
used to filter all traffic entering or leaving the connected networks.  A personal 
firewall is a software application used to filter traffic entering or leaving a single 
computer.  
All traditional firewalls have the basic task of preventing intrusion on a 
connected network, but accomplish this in different ways: by working at the 
network and/or transport layer of the network.  A network-layer firewall 
operates at the network level of the TCP/IP protocol stack.  It undertakes 
IP-packet filtering, not allowing packets to pass the firewall unless they meet 
the rules defined by the firewall administrator.  Application-layer firewalls 
operate at the application level of the TCP/IP protocol stack, intercepting, for 
example, all Web/HTTP, Telnet and FTP traffic.  They will intercept all 
packets travelling to or from an application.  
5.2.2.  Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) work like burglar alarms.  When the alarm 
detects a violation of its configuration, it activates the alarm.  This alarm can 
be  audible and visual, or it can be a silent alarm that sends a message to a 
monitoring company.  As with firewall systems, IDSs require complex 
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configuration to provide the level of detection and response desired.  IDSs 
operate as either network-based, as when the technology is focused on 
protecting network information assets, or host-based, as when the technology is 
focused on protecting server of host information assets.  IDSs use one of two 
detection methods, signature-based or statistical anomaly-based.  
A host-based IDS resides on a particular computer or server, known as the host, 
and monitors activity on that system.  Most host-based IDSs work on the 
principle of configuration or change management, in which the system records 
the file sizes, locations, and other attributes of the files, and then reports when 
one or more of these attributes change, when new files are created, and when 
existing files are deleted.  It can also monitor systems’ logs for pre-defined 
events. Network-based IDSs work differently.  They monitor network traffic.  
When a pre-defined condition occurs, network-based IDSs respond and notify 
the appropriate administrator.  Network-based IDSs require a much more 
complex configuration and maintenance program than do host-based IDSs. They 
must match known and unknown attack strategies against their knowledge base 
to determine whether or not an attack has occurred.  
5.2.3.  Cryptography 
Cryptography is the realm of knowledge that deals with creating methods to 
assure that messages are secretly sent and received.  Cryptography is the most 
commonly used means of providing security. It can be used to address four 
goals: 
 Message confidentiality: Only an authorized recipient can extract the 
contents of a message from its encrypted form.  
 Message integrity: The recipient should be able to determine if the 
message has been altered during transmission.  
 Sender authentication: The recipient can identify the sender, and verify 
that the purported sender did send the message. 
 Sender non-repudiation: The sender cannot deny sending the message.  
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Obviously, not all cryptographic systems or algorithms realize, nor intend to, 
achieve all of these goals.  Cryptosystem are manual or computer-based 
systems used to encrypt or transform data for secure transmission and storage.  
The following several sections will introduce several popular cryptosystems 
briefly.  
5.2.3.1.  Symmetric Cryptosystems 
Symmetric cryptography, also known as private key cryptography, is built on 
symmetric encryption and uses a single key for both encryption and decryption 
of data.  Each participant in the secure communication must possess his or her 
own set of the identical keys.  Secure communication can be accomplished 
over insecure channels with a symmetric cryptosystem.  Because the 
symmetric encoding and decoding algorithm is public, the level of security 
generated by a symmetric cipher depends on the key length and the system’s 
ability to protect the key.  
IBM’s Lucifer algorithm, which was originally based on a key length of 
128-bits, was modified to a key length of 56-bits, renamed Data Encryption 
Standard (DES), and adopted as a standard for encryption of non-classified 
information.  DES consists of two components: an algorithm and a key.  The 
DES algorithm involves a number of iterations of a simple transformation which 
uses both transposition and substitution techniques applied alternatively.  DES 
is a so-called private-key cipher.  Data is encrypted and decrypted with the 
same key.  The DES algorithm is publicly known; thus, learning the encryption 
key would allow an encrypted message to be read by anyone.  
5.2.3.2.  Asymmetric Cryptosystems 
Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a key 
pair consisting of a public key and private (secret) key.  The public key 
encrypts, but cannot decrypt.  Asymmetric encryption is popular because one 
of the keys can be published and widely distributed, thereby allowing anyone to 
use another’s public key to encrypt data; however, only the person with the 
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corresponding private key can decrypt the data.  This makes encrypted data 
secure, as long as the private key remains secure.  
An example of a public-key cryptosystem is RSA, which was published by 
Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman (RSA).  The patented RSA 
algorithm has become the de facto standard for public-use encryption 
applications.  RSA provides authentication, as well as encryption, and uses two 
keys: a private key and a public key.  With RSA, there is no distinction 
between the function of a user’s private and public keys.  The keys are 
generated mathematically.  The security of the RSA algorithm depends on the 
use of very large numbers (RSA uses 256- or 512-bit keys).  
With both symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems, there is a need to secure 
the private key.  The private key must be kept private.  The stored keys 
should always be password protected.  Another issue, with key-based systems, 
is that the algorithms that are used are public.  This means that the algorithms 
could be coded and used to decrypt a message via a brute force method of trying 
all the possible keys.  However, such a program would need a significant 
amount of computational power to accomplish such a process.  With keys of 
sufficient length, the time to decode a message would be unreasonable.  
5.2.3.3.  Digital Signatures 
Digital signatures, based on the Digital Signature Standard (DSS), have been 
widely adopted for authenticating information.  The DSS approach uses a hash 
function to create a message digest, which is then input into the digital signature 
algorithm with a random number to generate a digital signature.  Integrity is 
guaranteed in public-key systems by using digital signatures.  Most digital 
signatures rely on public-key cryptography to work.  In this case, the digital 
signature function depends upon the sender’s private key.  The encrypted 
message containing the digital signature is then verified by the recipient by 
using the sender’s public key.  A strong hash function is applied to the 
message, and the resulting message digest is encrypted instead of the entire 
message, which makes the signature significantly shorter than the message and 
saves considerable time.  
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5.2.3.4.  Digital Certificates 
Digital certificates are electronic documents issued by a reputable third party 
that certify the identity of a user and the proof of identification associated with 
the presentation of a public key.   A certificate authority (CA) issues, manages, 
and authenticates signs and revokes a digital certificate containing the user’s 
name, public key, and other identifying information.  In contrast to a digital 
signature, which helps authenticate the origin of a message, a digital certificate 
authenticates the company that provides the verification of the digital 
signature’s authenticity.  Time and data stamps may be included, as a CA 
validates the identity of a certificate requestor, issues the electronic certificate, 
and certifies to recipients that the entity presenting the certificate is, in fact, who 
it claims to be.  The ITU-T (International Telecommunication Union 
Telecommunication Standardization Sector) X.509 version 3 (Housley, Polk, 
Ford & Solo, 2002) and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP, 
http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/openpgp-charter.html) (Callas, Donnerhacke, 
Finney & Thayer, 1998) are popular certificates used today.  
5.2.3.5.  Public Key Infrastructure 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is an integrated structure of software, 
encryption methodologies, protocols, legal agreements, and third-party services 
that enables users to securely communicate across the insecure Internet.  
Third-party suppliers integrate public key cryptography, digital certificates, and 
certification authority into an enterprise-wide solution to provide authenticated 
and secure communications between participants.  PKI protects information 
assets in several ways, including authentication, integrity, privacy, authorization 
and non-repudiation.  A typical PKI solution protects the transmission and 
reception of secure information by integrating the following components: 
 A certificate authority (CA) that issues, manages, authenticates, signs, or 
revokes a digital certificate containing the user’s name, public key, and 
other identifying information.  
 A registration authority  (RA) that operates under the trusted 
collaboration of the certificate authority and can be delegated day-to-day 
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certification functions, such as verifying registration information about new 
registrants, generating end-user keys, revoking certificates, and validating 
that users possess a valid certificate.  
 Certificate directories are central location for certificate storage, providing 
a single access point for administration and distribution.  
 Management protocols organize and manage the communications between 
CAs, RAs, and end users.  This includes the functions and procedures to 
register and initialize new users, recover, update, and revoke keys, as well 
as enable the transfer of certificates and status information among the 
parties involved in a PKI trust.  
 Policies and procedures assist an organization in the application and 
management of certificates, formalization of the legal liabilities and 
limitations, and actual business practice use.  
Certificates are electronic containers for the key values needed for the use of a 
cryptosystem.  The CA manages the housekeeping details of tracking who has 
been assigned which key, providing a directory of public key values for use 
across the organization, assisting users in safeguarding their private keys, and 
helping the organization manage common workplace events that could threaten 
the safety of keys in use.  If the trust relationship is broken, such as when a 
private key has been comprised or the key holder no longer has authority to 
manage the key, the certificate may be revoked.  The CA periodically 
distributes a certificate revocation list (CRL), which contains a singed 
time-stamped listing of all revoked certificates.  Key pairs provide encryption 
and non-repudiation required for secure transaction.  The key pair can be 
generated either by the end user or by the CA.  
5.3.  Grid Security Problems 
The Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system is a Grid system that 
integrates distributed heterogeneous resources hosted by multiple institutions in 
a VO.   The dynamic nature of a Grid system makes it difficult to entirely 
establish trust relationships between sites prior to application execution.   
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As discussed in section 3.2, the user population in the pre-defined VO is large 
and dynamic.  Participants in VOs, such as ones for scientific collaboration, 
will include members of many institutions and will change frequently.  A job 
may acquire, start processes on, and release resources dynamically during its 
execution.  While these processes form a single, fully connected, logical entity, 
low-level communication connections (e.g., TCP/IP sockets) may be created and 
destroyed dynamically during program execution.  Resources may require 
different authentication and authorization mechanisms and policies.  These may 
include Kerberos, plaintext passwords, TLS, and Secure Shell (SSH ，
http://www.openssh.com).  An individual user will be associated with different 
local name spaces, credentials, or accounts, at different sites, for the purposes of 
accounting and access control.  At some sites, a user may have a regular account.  
At others, the user may use a dynamically assigned guest account, or simply an 
account created for the collaboration.  In brief, the security solution for a Grid 
system is about coordinating diverse access control policies and operating 
securely in a heterogeneous environment.  In this section, the security 
challenges will be discussed in the context of the proposed Grid system.  
5.3.1.  Terminology 
Firstly, some Grid-based security terminology needs to be clarified:  
 In Grid systems, a subject is generally a user, a process operating on behalf 
of a user, a resource, or process acting on behalf of a resource.  
 An object is a resource that is being protected by the security policy.  
 A trust domain is a collection of both subjects and objects governed by a 
single administration and a single security policy.  
 A credential is a piece of information that is used to prove the identity of a 
subject (such as a password and a certificate). 
Generally, subjects provide data from their own data warehouse, data marts, and 
near-line operational data sources as Grid resources.  Typically, a Grid portal 
would provide a brokered interface to Grid applications.  A Grid application 
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may be responsible for invoking specific data services for completing 
user-group-specific tasks.  
5.3.2.  Security requirements 
Based on the characteristics of pre-defined VO and the system design discussed 
in previous chapters, the security requirements for the Grid-enabled, distributed 
data warehouse system are summarized as follows: 
 This system integrates distributed users with data resources, which are 
managed locally by their owners.  Each institution can be thought as a 
trust domain.  Operations that are confined to a single trust domain are 
subject to local security policy.  Operations across multiple trust domains 
require multiple authentications that allow a user, the processes and the 
resources used by those processes, to verify each other's identity.  
 Inter-domain access requires, at a minimum, a common way of expressing 
the identity of a security principal, such as an actual user or a resource.  
Hence, it is imperative to employ a standard for encoding credentials for 
security principals. 
 As both global and local subjects exist, a remote user can have a global user 
name, used to access the services portal, and also a local user name, defined 
by a local trust domain.  For persisting credentials, a global subject 
(identity and role) can be mapped to a local subject (identity and role).  
Local security policy will dictate the permission sets of virtual local 
(mapped) and true local subjects. 
 User credentials (such as passwords, private keys, etc.) must be protected 
during interaction either across different trust domains or within a single 
trust domain.  A secure transmission protocol is required to ensure privacy 
and integrity when these credentials are transported through the network.  
 One user’s request may involve many processes on many distributed 
resources.  It is necessary that a user only sign-on once for a long-lived 
program or process without further authentication.  A program or process 
should be allowed to act on behalf of a user and be delegated a subset of the 
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user’s rights. Processes running on behalf of the same subject within the 
same trust domain may share a single set of credentials.  
 VO resources are located within multiple institutions.  Inter-domain access 
mechanism should be provided. Access to local resources will typically be 
determined by local security policy that is enforced by local security 
mechanisms.  Each institution retains ultimate control over the (local) 
policies that control access to its resources.  The inter-domain security 
used for the proposed Grid must be able to interoperate with, rather than 
replace, the diverse intra-domain access control technologies.  
To summarize, the security solution for the Grid-enabled, distributed data 
warehouse system needs to allow computations to coordinate diverse access 
control policies and to operate securely in a heterogeneous and dynamic 
environment.  
5.3.3.  Security policy 
Based on the system security requirements, a security policy that addresses 
requirements for SSO, interoperability with local policies, and dynamically 
varying resource requirements, will be discussed in this section.  The policy 
focuses on authentication of users, resources and processes and supports 
user-to-resource, resource-to-user, process-to-resource, and process-to-process 
authentication. 
The security policy can be examined as follows:  
 The envisaged Grid environment consists of multiple trust domains.  This 
policy states that the Grid security policy must integrate a heterogeneous 
collection of locally administered users and resources.  The Grid security 
policy must focus on controlling the inter-domain interactions and the 
mapping of inter-domain operations into local security policy. 
 Operations that are confined to a single trust domain are subject to local 
security policy only.  No additional security operations or services are 
imposed on local operations by the Grid security policy.  The local 
security policy can be implemented by a variety of methods, including 
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firewalls, Kerberos and SSH.  
 Both global and local subjects exist.  For each trust domain, there exists a 
partial mapping from global to local subjects.  Each user of a resource will 
have two names: a global name and a potentially different local name on 
each resource.  A site might map global user names to: a predefined local 
name, a dynamically allocated local name, or a single group name. 
 Operations between entities located in different trust domains require mutual 
authentication (or two-way authentication) which refers to two parties 
authenticating each other suitably.  In technology terms, it refers to a client 
or user authenticating themselves to a server and that server authenticating 
itself to the user in such a way that both parties are assured of the other’s 
identity. 
 An authenticated global subject mapped into a local subject is assumed to be 
equivalent to being locally authenticated as that local subject. 
 All access-control decisions are made locally on the basis of the local 
subject. 
 A program or process is allowed to act on behalf of a user and be delegated a 
subset of the user's rights.  This policy element is necessary to support the 
execution of long-lived programs that may acquire resources dynamically 
without additional user interaction.  It is also needed to support the 
creation of processes by other processes. 
 Processes running on behalf of the same subject within the same trust 
domain may share a single set of credentials. 
5.4.  A Grid Security Architecture 
In this section a high-level Grid security architecture (Foster et al., 1998) is 
introduced, as illustrated in Figure 5.1.  Two types of proxy are defined: a user 
proxy and a resource proxy.  Four related protocols are defined: 
user-proxy-creation protocol, resource-allocation protocol, 
resource-allocation-from-a-process protocol and mapping-registration protocol. 
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A user proxy is a session-manager process given permission to act on behalf of 
a user for a limited period of time.  Once the user proxy has been created, the 
user may be disconnected in order to eliminate the need to have the user’s 
credentials available for every security operation.  It reduces the possibility of 
the credentials being compromised during operations.  Additionally, the 
lifetime of the user proxy credentials is under control of the user.   A resource 
proxy is an agent used to translate between inter-domain security operations and 
intra-domain (local) mechanisms.  It is allocated by the user proxy, and is 
responsible for scheduling the access to a resource and for mapping a 
computation onto that resource.  
When a principal logs on to the Grid system, it creates a user proxy by using the 
user-proxy-creation protocol.  The user proxy then allocates a resource and 
creates processes by using the resource-allocation-protocol.  A process may 
allocate additional resources by using the resource-allocation-from-a-process 
protocol.  The mapping-registration protocol can be used to define a mapping 
from a global subject to a local subject.  The following should be noted in this 
regard: 
 User proxy credentials should be signed by the user’s long-lived credentials 
and contain all information (user-id, local host name, etc.) required for 
authentication.  The integrity of user proxy credentials is protected by 
local security policy.  
 A user proxy requiring access to a resource first determines the identity of 
the resource proxy for that resource.  It then issues a request to the 
appropriate resource proxy.  If the request is successful, the resource is 
allocated, and a process created on that resource.  The request can fail 
because the resource is not available, or because of authentication failure or 
authorization failure.  
 The resource-allocation protocol is used to issue a request to a resource 
proxy from a user proxy.  The user proxy and resource proxy authenticate 
each other.  The resource proxy checks if the user who signed the proxy's 
credentials is authorized by local policy to make the allocation request.  At 
this time, the verification may require accessing a mapping table maintained 
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by the resource proxy (for mapping the user’s credentials onto a local 
user-id).  A single resource allocation request may result in the creation of 
multiple processes on the remote resources.  All such processes are created 
with the same credentials.  
 It is a common case that the resource allocation is initiated dynamically 
from a process created by a previous resource-allocation request.  The user 
proxy decides whether to honour the request through authentication 
between user proxy’s credentials and process credentials.  The resulting 
process handle is signed by the user proxy and returned to the requesting 
process. 
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         Figure 5.1 Grid Security Architecture 
This approach uses a user proxy to interact with the resource proxy to achieve 
SSO and delegation.  Authentication occurs between a user proxy and a 
resource proxy.  Consequently, the SSO leverages the existing trust 
relationship between a user and a resource that was established when the user 
was initially granted access to the resource. The user proxy and process 
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authenticate each other when a resource allocation request is issued by a process.  
The resource-allocation request is successful only when the user is authorized 
by the resource on the basis of local policy.  
5.5.  Grid Security Infrastructure 
The architecture discussed in the previous section defined protocols in abstract 
terms, rather than in terms of specific security technologies. Hence, these 
protocols can be implemented by using any modern security technologies and 
mechanisms.  Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI), as it appears in the GT, is 
essentially an implementation of the architecture discussed in previous section.  
It is based on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with CAs and X.509 
certificates. It provides: a public-key system; mutual authentication through 
digital certificates; credential delegation and SSO.  GSI defines a set of 
protocols, libraries, and tools that allow users and applications to securely 
access resources.  It acts as Grid security middleware to provide 
infrastructure-level security functionalities for addressing security issues in a 
Grid environment.  In the following sub-section, the mutual authentication, 
dynamic delegation and authorization mechanisms used by GSI will be 
introduced.  
5.5.1.  Authentication 
Authentication between two entities (users and resources) on remote Grid nodes 
means that each party establishes a level of trust in the identity of the other 
party.   An authentication protocol sets up a secure communication channel 
between the authenticated parties, so that subsequent messages can be sent 
without repeated authentication steps, although it is possible to authenticate 
every message.  The identity of an entity is, typically, some token or name that 
uniquely identifies the entity. 
VOs need a reliable means for identifying requestors, but participant 
independence complicates authentication across multiple sites.  Without an 
integrated authentication, VOs have used a variety of ad hoc schemes to achieve 
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resource-sharing, such as giving users an account at each institution with 
distinct login names and passwords.  This multiplicity of mechanisms and 
passwords makes access difficult, discouraging information sharing and 
collaboration.  It also hinders the creation of software that securely spans 
resources at multiple institutions or that allows secure collaboration between 
users at multiple institutions.  
5.5.1.1.  Kerberos and SSH 
Kerberos (Neuman, Yu, Hartman & Raeburn, 2005) and SSH are two widely 
used approaches for multi-site authentication.  However, they do not meet VO 
authentication requirements.  
Kerberos is used alone or under the distributed computing environment.  It 
authenticates users through a secure transaction with a centrally maintained key 
server.  Kerberos achieves inter-organizational, or cross-realm, authentication 
by designating trustworthy key servers in other organizations.  Kerberos meets 
many of the basic requirements for VO authentication.  However, Kerberos 
requires that all cross-domain trust be established at the domain level, meaning 
that organizations have to agree to allow cross-domain authentication, which 
can often be a heavy-weight administrative process (Neuman & Ts'o, 1994). 
SSH is a widely used login technology (Daniel, Silverman & Byrnes, 2005) and 
meets a number of VO authentication requirements.  It is based on public-key 
authentication technology, uses link encryption to protect user credentials, and is 
easily deployed.  It provides basic remote login and file copy capabilities 
without a lot of complexity.  SSH provides a strong system of authentication 
and message protection, but has no support for translation between different 
mechanisms or for creation of dynamic entities. 
5.5.1.2.  Using PKI for Authentication 
The GSI authentication mechanism is based on PKI (Thompson, Olson, Cowles, 
Mullen & Helm, 2003).   GSI provides libraries and tools for authentication 
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and message protection that use standard X.509 public key certificates with the 
TLS protocol.  
 
        Figure 5.2 X.509 v3 Certificate Structure 
GSI uses X.509 public key certificates and TLS for authentication for several 
reasons.  It is not only because these are well-known technologies with readily 
available, well-tested open source implementations.  The flexibility of trust 
model for X.509 certificates was a deciding factor between X.509 certificates and 
other common authentication mechanisms.  It means the trust model of X.509 
certificates allows an entity to trust another organization’s CA, without requiring 
that the rest of its organization does so, or requiring reciprocation by the trusted 
CA.  
ITU-T X.509 version 3 certificate is one commonly used identity token for 
authentication (ITU-T, 2005).  It is the public key of a user, together with some 
other information, rendered unforgeable by encipherment, with the private key 
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of the certification authority which issued it.  Figure 5.2 illustrates the structure 
of the X.509 public key certificate.  
TLS is a cryptographic protocol that provides communications privacy over the 
Internet.  The primary goal of the TLS protocol is to provide privacy and data 
integrity between two communicating applications.  In typical use, only the 
server is authenticated (i.e., its identity is ensured), while the client remains 
unauthenticated; mutual authentication requires PKI deployment to clients.  It 
is composed of two layers: the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake 
Protocol.  At the lowest level, layered on top of some reliable transport 
protocol (e.g., TCP), is the TLS Record Protocol.  TLS allows client/server 
applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, 
tampering, or message forgery.  TLS has a variety of security measures:  
 The TLS protocol exchanges records: each record can be optionally 
compressed, encrypted and packed with a message authentication code 
(MAC).  TLS numbers all the records and uses the sequence number in the 
MACs. 
 Using a message digest enhanced with a key (so only with the key can you 
check the MAC) (Krawczyk, Bellare & Canetti, 1997). 
 Protection against several known attacks (including man-in-the-middle 
attacks), like those involving a downgrade of the protocol to a previous 
(less secure) version or a weaker cipher suite.  
 The message that ends the handshake (“Finished”) sends a hash of all the 
exchanged data seen by both parties.  
 The pseudorandom function splits the input data in half and processes each 
one with a different hashing algorithm (MD5 and SHA), then XORs them 
together.  This provides protection if one of these algorithms is found to be 
vulnerable.  
In practice, GSI uses a X.509 public key certificate as an identity token. An 
X.509 certificate contains a public key, a subject name in the form of a 
multi-component distinguished name (DN), and a validity period and is signed 
by a trusted third party, or CA.  The associated private key is owned by the 
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correct remote subject with whom an encryption or digital signature mechanism 
will be used.  The standards’ documents refer to these certificates as “public 
key certificates” or “X.509 certificates”.  The term “identity certificates” are 
used to emphasize their use to securely identify an entity in a Grid environment. 
GSI uses the X.509 certificates with the TLS protocol to ensure a secure, 
authenticated connection between two parties.  A GSI user generates a public 
and private key pair and obtains an X.509 certificate from a trusted CA.  X.509 
certificates are exchanged between entities (users and resources).  The 
certificates are first tested by checking the expiration dates, possible revocation, 
acceptable key usage, and signature, by a trusted CA.  If the certificates pass 
all these checks, their public keys are then used to build a challenge handshake 
to prove that each entity that sent a certificate has the corresponding private key.  
Passing these tests gives each party a level of confidence that it has established a 
secure connection to the party represented by the certificate presented.  The 
X.509-TLS infrastructure supports multiple, independent CAs.  In a Grid, each 
site may choose which CAs it will accept for binding DNs and public keys.  
Most of the current Grid tools are built on GSI or HTTP, both of which use 
X.509 certificates for securely establishing a Grid identity.  The veracity of an 
entity’s identity is only as good as the trust placed in the CA that issued the 
certificate, so the local administrator installs these certificates, which are then 
used to verify the certificate chains.  The assurance provided by using TLS 
with mutual authentication depends on the correctness of the TLS and certificate 
validation implementation at all the sites that take part in establishing a secure 
connection, the diligence of the individual in protecting the private key, and the 
certificate policy (CP) and certification practice statement (CPS) of the trusted 
CAs 
5.5.1.3.  Grid Certificate Authority 
A Grid CA is defined as a CA that is independent of any single organization and 
is responsible for signing certificates for individuals allowed to access the Grid 
resources, hosts or services running on a single host (Thompson et al., 2003).  
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Grid CA is substantially different from a traditional organizational CA. 
Organizational CA only issues certificates for members of its organization, and 
these certificates are used to access resources within this organization.  In 
identity certificates issued by an organizational CA, the DN often contains a 
number of attributes (e.g., organizational unit, location, and email) retrieved 
from the organization's directory (such as X.500 and LDAP directory).  Since a 
Grid CA is independent of the organizations to which its subscribers belong, it 
does not have a way to verify much information about a subscriber or to know 
when such information changes.  The prudent approach for a Grid CA is to put 
as little information in the certificate as possible.  According to several Grid 
projects, such as CERN CA (http://globus.home.cert.ch/globus/ca/) and DOE 
Science Grids CA (http://www.doegrids.org), a minimal set of information of a 
DN contains:  
 An organization element that identifies the Grid to which the CA belongs. 
 A class designator that identifies the certificate as representing a person, 
host, or service, which is intended to be used when storing and retrieving 
certificates in the Grid CA’s publishing directory 
 A common name that reasonably identifies the entity for which the 
certificate is issued. 
Since the operator of a Grid CA does not personally know the persons who are 
requesting certificates and does not have access to a trusted directory of such 
users, he/she must rely on registration agents (RAs).  These are individuals 
who are likely to know a subset of subscribers first-hand or second-hand.  If 
the users of a Grid can be grouped by actual or VOs, an RA may be chosen for 
each such organization and given the responsibility to approve requests from 
members of that organization only.  The rules for establishing member 
identities should be published by each RA, and the procedures for verifying the 
identities and certificate requests should be consistent among all the RAs and 
approved by the CA. 
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5.5.2.  SSO and delegation 
The establishment of X.509 public key certificates and their issuing certification 
authorities provides a sufficient authentication infrastructure for persistent 
entities in Grids. However, X.509 certificates cannot cover SSO and dynamic 
delegation requirements in Grids well.  
It is often the case that a Grid user needs to delegate some subset of their 
privileges to another entity on relatively short notice and only for a brief amount 
of time.  For example, a user needing to move a dataset, in order to use it in a 
computation, may want to grant to a reliable file transfer service the necessary 
rights to access the dataset and storage, so that it may perform a set of file 
transfers on the user’s behalf.  In addition to delegation to persistent services 
and entities, the requirement exists to support delegation of privileges to 
services that are created dynamically, often by the users themselves that do not 
hold any form of identity credential.  For example, a user wants to access data 
or start a sub-job on other resource.  The point is that the user wants to 
delegate privileges specifically to the job and not to the resource as a whole.  It 
is common practice to protect the private keys associated with X.509 public key 
certificates, for example, by encrypting them with a pass phrase.  This poses a 
burden on users, who need to authenticate repeatedly in a short period of time, 
and occurs frequently in Grid scenarios when a user is coordinating a number of 
resources.  In a nutshell, Grids need authentication solutions that allow users to 
create identities for new entities dynamically, in a light-weight manner, to 
delegate privileges to those entities in a dynamic, light-weight manner, to 
perform SSO, and that allows for the reuse of existing protocols and software 
with minimal modifications.  Based on these requirements, X.509 Proxy 
Certificate (Tuecke, Welch, Engert & Thompson, 2004) is defined and 
standardized, and used in GSI for delegation and SSO (Welch et al., 2004).  
5.5.2.1.  Proxy Certificates 
Proxy credentials are commonly used in security systems when one entity needs 
to grant to another entity some set of privileges.  Proxy Certificates allow an 
 128
entity holding a standard X.509 public key certificate to delegate some or all of 
its privileges to another entity, which may not hold X.509 credentials at the time 
of delegation. 
Proxy Certificates use the format prescribed for X.509 public key certificates, 
with the prescriptions described in this paragraph.  The use of the same format 
as X.509 public key certificates allows Proxy Certificates to be used in 
protocols and libraries in many places, as if they were normal X.509 public key 
certificates, which significantly eases implementation.  Unlike a public key 
certificate, the issuer (and signer) of a Proxy Certificate is identified by a public 
key certificate or another Proxy Certificate rather than a CA certificate.  This 
allows Proxy Certificates to be created dynamically without requiring the 
normally heavy-weight vetting process associated with obtaining public key 
certificates from a CA.  The subject name of a Proxy Certificate is scoped by 
the subject name of its issuer to achieve uniqueness.  This is accomplished by 
appending a CommonName relative distinguished name (RDN) component  to 
the issuer’s subject name.  The value of this added CommonName RDN is 
statistically unique to the scope of the issuer.  The value of the serial number in 
the Proxy Certificate is also statistically unique to the issuer.  The public key in 
a Proxy Certificate is distinct from the public key of its issuer and has different 
properties (e.g., its size may be different).  All Proxy Certificates must bear a 
newly-defined critical X.509 extension, the Proxy Certificate Information (PCI) 
extension.  The PCI extension use a framework for carrying policy statements 
to allow the issuers to express their desire to delegate rights to the Proxy 
Certificate bearer, and to limit further Proxy Certificates that can be issued by 
that Proxy Certificate holder.  The existing policy language (e.g., XACML 
(OASIS, 2005
2
)) can be used to express delegation policies.  This use of 
arbitrary policy expressions is achieved through two fields in the PCI extension: 
a policy method identifier and a policy field.  The policy method identifier is 
an object identifier (OID) that identifies the delegation policy method used in 
the policy field.  The policy field then contains an expression of the delegation 
policy that has a format specific to the particular method.  There are two policy 
methods that are defined.  The PCI extension also contains a field expressing 
the maximum path lengths of Proxy Certificates that can be issued by the Proxy 
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Certificate in question.  A value of zero for this field prevents the Proxy 
Certificate from issuing another Proxy Certificate.  If this field is not present, 
then the length of the path of Proxy Certificates, which can be issued by the 
Proxy Certificate, is unlimited.  
The validation of Proxy Certificates is described in RFC 3280 (Housley et al., 
2002) and Proxy Certificate RFC3820 (Tuecke et al., 2004).  The Proxy 
Certificates are created with short life spans, typically in the order of hours.  
There currently exists no implemented method for revocation of Proxy 
Certificates.  It can use the same mechanism with public key certificate to 
revoke a Proxy Certificate.  
5.5.2.2.  Uses for SSO 
Proxy Certificates enable SSO that allows the user to manually authenticate 
once in order to create a Proxy Certificate which can be used repeatedly to 
authenticate for some period of time without compromising the protection on 
the user’s long-term private key.  This is accomplished by creating a new key 
pair (composed of a public and private key).  The user’s private key associated 
with their long-term public key certificate is accessed to sign the certificate 
request containing the public key of the newly generated key pair; hence 
generating a Proxy Certificate.  The Proxy Certificate binds the new public key 
to a new name and delegates some or all of the user's privileges to the new 
name.  The Proxy Certificate and the new private key are then used by the 
bearer to authenticate to other parties.  Generally, the Proxy Certificate private 
key is stored on a local file system and is protected by only local file system 
permissions, which allows the user’s applications to access it without any 
manual intervention by the user. 
5.5.2.3.  Uses for Delegation 
Proxy Certificates can also be created so as to delegate privileges from an issuer 
to another party over a network connection without the exchange of private 
keys.  Firstly, two involved parties perform mutual authentication, the initiator 
using its existing Proxy Certificate and the target entity uses the public key 
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certificate of its own.  After authentication, an integrity protected channel is 
established.  These two steps can be accomplished by using the TLS protocol.  
After the initiator expresses its desire to delegate by some application-specific 
means, the target entity generates a new public and private key pair.  With the 
new public key, a signed certificate request is created and sent back over the 
secured channel to the initiator.  The initiator uses the private key associated 
with its own Proxy Certificate to sign the certificate request, generating a new 
Proxy Certificate containing the newly generated public key from the target 
service.  The new Proxy Certificate is sent back over the secured channel to the 
target entity, which places it into a file with the newly generated private key.  
This new Proxy Certificate is then available for use on the target service for 
applications running on the user’s behalf.  
5.5.3.  Authorization 
In a Grid environment, each institution in a VO typically retains ultimate control 
over diverse, complex and dynamic policies that govern who can use which 
resources for which purpose.  Access to local resources will typically be 
determined by a local security policy that is enforced by a local security 
mechanism.  However, the VO will often wish to apply some common policy 
about how its users access the resources assigned to the VO.  A key problem 
associated with the formation and operation of distributed VO is that of how to 
specify and enforce community policies.  This section primarily introduces a 
conceptual Grid authorization framework (Lorch et al., 2004), which is built on 
the Authorization Framework, presented in RFC2904 (Vollbrecht et al., 2004) 
and the “Generic AAA Architecture”, presented in RFC2903 (de Laat, Gross, 
Gommans, Vollbrecht & Spence, 2000) of the IRTF AAA Architecture 
Research Group, as well as the Access Control Framework, described in the ISO 
recommendation (ITU-T, 1996).  With regard to this framework, there exist 
several authorization mechanisms and systems that are used by various Grid and 
other applications to address the authorization concerns.  For example, 
Community Authorization Service (CAS) is provided by GSI to implement 
access control in dynamically created overlaid trust domains.  
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5.5.3.1.  Grid Authorization Framework Concepts 
The term ‘authorization’ may means the process of issuing a proof of right, the 
proof of right itself, and the process of making an authorization decision by 
checking a proof of right.  In principle, authorization decisions are made based 
on authorization information provided by authorities.  These authorities must 
have a direct or a delegated relationship with either the authorization subject (e.g., 
user or organization member to which the authorization is issued), or with the 
resource that is the target of the request that prompted the authorization (e.g., 
owner or administrator of a resource), or with both.  
The authorization may involve three basic high-level entities: subject, resource 
and authority.  A ‘subject’ is an entity that can request, receive, own, transfer, 
present or delegate an electronic authorization so as to exercise a certain right.  
The subject may be identified as an individual user or as a member of a group of 
users. A subject may also be a process that acts on behalf of a user and, as such, 
holds access rights that were delegated to it from the user.  The subject may 
define a set of policies that determine how its authorization is used.  A Grid 
environment consists of a large number of diverse resources.  A component of 
the system provides or hosts services and may enforce access to these services 
based on a set of rules and policies defined by entities that are authoritative for the 
particular resource.  Access to resources may be enforced by a resource itself or 
by some entity (a policy enforcement point, gateway) that is located between a 
resource and the requestor, thus protecting the resource from being accessed in an 
unauthorized fashion.  ‘Authority’ is an administrative entity that is capable of 
and authoritative for issuing, validating and revoking an electronic means of 
proof so that the named subject (a.k.a. holder) of the issued electronic means is 
authorized to exercise a certain right or assert a certain attribute.  Right(s) may 
be implicitly or explicitly present in the electronic proof.  A set of policies may 
determine how authorizations are issued, verified, etc., based on the contractual 
relationships the authority has established.  There are currently three general 
types of authorities in common use: attribute authority, policy authority and 
identity authority.  Attribute authority issues attributes assertions that a given 
subject has one or more attribute/value pairs.  Policy authority issues 
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authorization policies with respect to resources and services offered by these 
resources.  These authorization policies contain assertions that a given subject 
has a certain right with respect to a given service.  Identity authority (e.g., the 
CAs of a PKI) issues certificates that assert a mapping of cryptographic tokens to 
subject identities.  Identity authority enables authentication rather than 
authorization.  Each of these three entities may implement a set of policies that 
control authorization. 
Authorization information, such as policies, attributes, identities and 
environmental parameters (e.g., time), are utilized and combined when making 
authorization decisions.  Every entity may use policies to determine how a 
request or response should be handled.  Policy defines rules for resource 
access.  Many policies use the concepts of conditions and actions, which have 
to be evaluated with respect to the actual request, the requesting subject’s 
identity and the attributes this subject holds.  Policies may also be expressed in 
strings that are compared, and if one string (the request) is more specific than 
another (the policy), then the request is granted.  Authorization attributes are 
statements about properties bound to an entity that implicitly or explicitly define 
the entities allowed actions on some resource.  Attributes can be grouped into 
descriptive and privilege attributes.  Descriptive attributes associate a 
characteristic with an entity, while privilege attributes define directly applicable 
access rights of an entity with respect to a resource.  An administrative domain 
is a definition of the scope of authority.  In a Grid environment, there are 
separate domains for identity, subject attributes, resource policy, and 
community policy authorities.  In a simple Grid-use case, the subject is in one 
administrative domain, its home domain, and the resource is in another (the 
home domain of the resource).  In more advanced scenarios, a community or 
VO domain is present.  A VO domain can provide authorities that perform 
privilege management for all the members of a VO.  Contractual relationships 
(often involving legal agreements) between the domains of the different 
subjects, authorities and resources are frequently necessary to enable the 
acceptance and issuing of authorizations. 
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Authorization is commonly divided into three distinct processes.  The first is 
defining an authorization policy at a high level by a person or organization.  
The second is implementing the high-level policy into a digital representation 
that can be interpreted by computers.  The third is evaluating the digital 
representation of the policy by a process, which subsequently makes decisions 
to issue a specific authorization to a subject or takes a specific action.  The 
component performing the evaluation of the executable policy by computing an 
authorization decision on behalf of the authorities is sometimes referred to as an 
‘authorization server’.  Typically, an authorization server may make or do (a 
combination of): an authorization decision that is, typically, the outcome of an 
evaluation of a policy; an authorization lookup of some entity’s rights that are 
represented in some form and returned; and delegation of an authorization 
decision to another authorization server.  
RFC2904 defined the authorization sequences, which can be recognized as 
sequences between the three generic entities.  These authorization sequences 
include: push sequence, pull sequence, agent sequence.  With the push 
sequence, the subject first requests an authorization from an authority (e.g., via 
an authorization server).  The authority may or may not honour the subject’s 
request. It then may issue and return some message or secured message (token 
or certificate) that acts as a proof of right (authorization assertion).  The 
assertion may subsequently be used by the subject to request a specific service 
by contacting the resource.  The resource will accept or reject the authorization 
assertion and will report this back to the requesting subject.  With the pull 
sequence, the subject will contact the resource directly with a request.  The 
resource then must contact its authorization authority. The authorization 
authority will perform an authorization decision and return a message that 
obtains the result of an authorization.  The resource will subsequently grant or 
deny the service to the subject by returning a result message.  Using the agent 
sequence, the subject will contact a higher-level agent with a request to obtain a 
service authorization.  This agent will make an authorization decision, based 
the rules established by the authorization authority, and if successful, it will 
contact the resource to provision a certain state as to enable the service.  These 
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three sequences are fundamental.  They do not cover all possible authorization 
situations. Sometimes, they are combined together to perform authorization.   
5.5.3.2.  Grid Authorization Architecture 
An authorization architecture consists of a set of entities and functional 
components that allow authorization decisions to be made and enforced, based 
on attributes, parameters and policies that define authorization conditions.  
Figure 5.3 (Lorch et al., 2004) provides an overview of an authorization system, 
based on the pull authorization sequence.  
Grid Authorization Architecture
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       Figure 5.3 Grid Authorization Architecture 
The subject, resource and authority are three basic involved entities.  There are 
two access control functions defined by ISO-101813 (ITU-T, 1996): Access 
Control Decision Function (ADF) and Access Control Enforcement Function 
(AEF).  ADF is equivalent to the Policy Decision Point (PDP), defined in 
RFC2904, and AEF is equivalent to the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), 
defined in RFC2904.  ADF makes authorization decisions about a subject’s 
access to a service.  AEF mediates access to a resource or service.  The ADF, 
AEF, subject and resources may be embedded inside one or more administrative 
domains in a variety of combinations.  
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There are three categories of information that may need to be passed between 
the subject, resource and various attribute authorities: attributes, policy and 
authorization queries and responses.  Attributes, parameters and policies, 
issued by the corresponding authorities, are made available to the authorization 
servers.  The authorization servers use this information to make authorization 
decisions upon request by the enforcement functions.  An authorization request 
must be securely bound to a subject and the subject’s service request.  The 
authorization response must be securely bound to a request, and when required, 
also to the response originator.  
There are a number of different paths for authorization attributes to get to the 
ADF (Farrell & Housley, 2002).  The subject may get the attributes from the 
attribute authority, the authority could pass the attributes directly to the relevant 
ADF, or it could put them in an attribute repository.  When the ADF needs an 
attribute to make an authorization decision, it may get it from the subject, either 
as part of the original request, or during a negotiation phase, or it may pull it 
from either a local repository or a repository associated with the attribute 
authority, the subject or VO.  Attributes need to be reliably bound to the 
holding entities (holder/recipient) as well as the issuing authority.  Attributes 
must be protected to provide for integrity, issuer authoritativeness and issuer 
non-repudiation.  This can either be accomplished by enclosing them in a 
digitally signed container (e.g., via an X.509 Attribute Certificate or a signed 
SAML Attribute Assertion), or by issuing them over a secured channel between 
authenticated and trusted entities, and only storing attributes in trusted and 
secured repositories.  Authorization requests and responses are similar to 
attributes in that it is necessary to provide for a secure binding.  
Policies are typically stored in a repository or provisioned directly to the 
decision functions by the policy authorities.  They may be distributed and 
stored in the domain of the policy issuer or in a common VO domain.  It is 
imperative to securely establish the authority of the issuer and to protect the 
integrity of a policy during the transferring of policies.  Once policy is written, 
it must be stored for use by an ADF.  Evaluating policy is the heart of the 
authorization-decision process.  The components res
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storing, retrieving and evaluating policy can be thought of as a policy 
subsystem.  The policy expression is usually done by a policy language, which 
contains the vocabularies to express various policy artifacts.  A variety of 
language primitives, such as XML, can be used as the basis for a policy language. 
Access policy for resources is written by policy authorities, which generally get 
their authority from the owner of the resource.  Some authorization decisions 
may be indeterminate, because there are conditions in the policy that the ADF 
cannot evaluate, involving the current state of the resource.  In this case, the 
conditions may be passed back to the AEF to evaluate, requiring the AEF to 
understand the policy language that is used to express these conditions.  During 
policies’ exchange, the policies must be bound securely to the issuer either by 
being contained within signed messages or by coming over a secured connection 
from a secure repository.  The participating end points need to agree on a 
common policy expression language.  Policy exchange may also include the 
exchange of metadata around policy, for example, creation time, policy validity, 
policy issuer and trust anchors.  For policy processing, existing policy systems, 
including those based on artificial intelligence and neural net paradigms, can be 
effectively used so long as they understand the policy expression and exchange 
mechanisms.  
5.5.3.3.  Grid Authorization Framework 
Based on the concepts and architecture introduced above, a general Grid 
authorization framework is defined. This framework consists of several 
components, including trust management, privilege management, policy 
management, authorization context, authorization server and enforcement 
mechanism.  
In general, authorization architecture, the assertions about policy and attributes 
are issued by different type of authorities.  Trust management defines these 
authorities and specifies what they should be trusted to do.  Policy and resource 
authorities both issue policy about resources, but the policy authority operates at a 
higher level and may issue access control policy for a whole site or VO.  It is the 
root of trust, and will be responsible for defining the domain's trust relationships.  
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Attribute authorities assign attributes to subjects and may belong to the subject's 
domain or to a VO.  In PKI-based systems, the authority is likely to be 
represented by a public/private key pair and present its assertions in signed 
documents or over a secured connection.  At the base of a PKI system is the 
acceptance by all the participating entities of one of more CAs to verify identities.  
Once a VO or resource domain knows how to represent various authorities, it 
needs to define which ones are to be trusted and for what purposes.  For 
example, the resource may want the sole say on what authorities it will trust, or it 
may accept the decisions of a VO policy authority.  In some models, the user 
may provide a pointer to the attribute authority that defines his attributes, and the 
resource may accept it or not.  The AEFs need to know which ADFs to trust for 
authorization decisions.  Trust management also concerns the policy about who 
can create proxies, which have all or some of the rights of the delegating entity, 
and who can delegate rights to other entities. 
Privilege management covers the definition, assignment, storage, presentation, 
delegation and revocation of both privilege and descriptive attributes.  Privileges 
can be considered a type of attribute, where an attribute is any characteristic 
associated with a subject that either implicitly or explicitly defines the subject’s 
allowed actions on some resource.  Attributes that explicitly allow some access 
on a resource are called privilege attributes.  Descriptive attributes, such as roles 
(for role-based access control), clearance level (for mandatory access control), or 
group membership, may be used by an authorization server interpreting an access 
policy to grant the user specific actions, and thus implicitly grant access rights.  
For the management of privilege and descriptive attributes, there are three 
distinct phases: granting the privilege, using the privilege, and removing the 
privilege.  For privilege attributes, there are two primary actors: the authority 
granting/removing the privilege, and the subject requesting/using the privilege.  
Policy is issued by policy authorities.  The creation of policy frequently involves 
a human entity and is done in advance of the use of a resource.  An ADF could 
query a policy authority in real time, but more typically, policy will be kept in 
some sort of repository.  This could take the form of an access control list 
(ACL), a database or a collection of signed assertions.  Policy management 
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addresses issues like who can create, modify and delete policy for each resource, 
how quickly policy can be revoked, and where does the ADF find the policy, i.e., 
who/what does it trust.  For distributed policy management, an ADF needs to 
know whether it has found all the relevant policy for making an access decision.  
Additionally, policy management needs to address how to clearly display the 
current policy to the resource owner or to anyone trying to add to the policy. 
The authorization context consists of those properties of the authorization 
request, which are neither provided via authorization attributes, nor included in 
authorization policies (specified by or for specific resources or sites), but which 
are relevant to the decisions made by the authorization server.  This includes 
information about the time, location, transport, and authentication of the service 
request, and may include an indication of the quality and trustworthiness of this 
information. 
Enforcement of access rights is done by limiting the operations performed on 
resources on behalf of a subject to those permitted by an authoritative entity.  In 
the Grid context, enforcement functions can either receive the set of authorized 
operations as part of the service request (push scenario), or by querying an ADF 
(pull scenario).  If the ADF and AEF are remote from each other, they can use 
authorization request/response protocols.  If they are collocated, there are a 
number of programming interfaces available.  Enforcement mechanisms can be 
characterized in two different groups: application-dependent mechanisms and 
application-independent mechanisms.  Application-dependent enforcement 
mechanisms are often directly integrated in the application or service and perform 
enforcement functions before the application attempts to access underlying 
operating system resources.  Application-independent enforcement mechanisms 
are separate from the service or application and take the approach of running the 
service in a very constrained execution environment.  This permits the running 
of un-trusted services, supports code migration and the uploading of 
user-provided executables. 
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5.5.4.  GSI security model for OGSA 
GSI is the portion of the GT that provides the fundamental security services, 
according to the mechanisms discussed above.  Globus Toolkit version 3 
(GT3) and its accompanying GSI (GSI3) is the first implementation of the 
OGSA. Since GSI3, GSI implements the OGSA security mechanism to allow 
applications and users to operate in the Grid in a seamless and automated 
manner (Welch et al., 2003).  As discussed in section 4.2., OGSA is built on 
Web services.  It defines standard Web service interfaces and behaviours as 
well as other capabilities for addressing Grid-specific requirements.  The 
combination of OGSA and Web services security specifications is used to 
implement OGSA security architecture (Siebenlist et al., 2002). 
5.5.4.1.  Web Services Security 
Web services security is an attempt within the Web services community to 
provide a standard XML vocabulary for defining protocols, message formats 
and policy languages for application to the entire range of security issues in 
distributed systems.  The strategy for addressing security within a Web service 
environment requires a comprehensive model that supports, integrates and 
unifies several popular security models, mechanisms, and technologies 
(including both symmetric and public key technologies), in a way that enables a 
variety of systems to securely interoperate in a platform- and language-neutral 
manner.  
In a Web-services environment, the following terms used for Web-services 
security will be used in this document. 
 A security token is a representation of security-related information (e.g., 
X.509 certificate, Kerberos tickets and authenticators, mobile device 
security tokens from SIM cards, username, etc.). 
 A proof-of-possession (POP) token is a security token that contains secret 
data that can be used to demonstrate authorized use of an associated 
security token.  Typically, although not exclusively, the 
proof-of-possession information is encrypted with a key known only to the 
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recipient of the POP token.  
 A claim is a statement about a subject, either by the subject or by a relying 
party that associates the subject with the claim.  Claims can be about keys 
potentially used to sign or encrypt messages. Claims can be statements the 
security token conveys.  Claims may be used, for example, to assert the 
senders identity or an authorized role. 
 A signed security token is a security token that contains a set of related 
claims (assertions) cryptographically endorsed by an issuer.  Examples of 
signed security tokens include X.509 certificates and Kerberos tickets. 
 As SOAP messages are sent from an initial requester to a service, they may 
be operated on by intermediaries that perform actions, such as routing the 
message or even modifying the message. 
 An actor is an intermediary or endpoint, which is identified by a URI and 
which processes a SOAP message.  Neither users nor client software (e.g., 
browsers) are actors. 
Web services can be accessed by sending SOAP messages to service endpoints 
identified by URIs, requesting specific actions, and receiving SOAP message 
responses (including fault indications).  Within this context, the broad goal of 
securing Web services is to provide facilities for securing the integrity and 
confidentiality of the messages and for ensuring that the service acts only on 
requests in messages that express the claims required by policies.  TLS can be 
used to provide transport-level security for Web-services applications. TLS 
offers several security features, including authentication, data integrity and data 
confidentiality.  However, TLS only enables point-to-point secure sessions.  
A comprehensive Web-services security solution needs the mechanism to 
provide end-to-end security.  
The WS-security framework (IBM & Microsoft, 2002) illustrated in Figure 5.4 
defines seven specifications of security functionality.  The specifications build 
upon foundational technologies, such as SOAP, WSDL, XML Digital Signatures 
(W3C, 2002
2
), XML Encryption (W3C, 2002
1
), and TLS. 
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This set includes a message security model (WS-Security) along with a Web 
service endpoint policy (WS-Policy), a trust model (WS-Trust), and a privacy 
model (WS-Privacy).  The follow-on specifications for secure conversations 
(WS-SecureConversation), federated trust (WS-Federation), and authorization 
(WS-Authorization) is built on these initial specifications to establish secure 
interoperable Web services across trust domains.  Each of these specifications 
is summarized below: 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Web Services Security Specifications 
 WS-Security (OASIS, 2006
10
) defines how to attach and include security 
tokens within SOAP messages.  It is an enhancement of SOAP messaging 
to provide quality of protection through message integrity and message 
confidentiality.  It is designed to support multiple security-token formats.  
Message integrity is provided by leveraging XML Signature in conjunction 
with security tokens (which may contain or imply key data) to ensure that 
messages are transmitted without modifications.  The integrity 
mechanisms are designed to support multiple signatures.  The message 
confidentiality is provided by leveraging XML Encryption in conjunction 
with security tokens to keep portions of SOAP messages confidential.  The 
encryption mechanisms are designed to support additional encryption 
technologies, processes, and operations by multiple actors.  WS-Security 
also describes a mechanism for encoding binary security tokens.  
Specifically, the specification describes how to encode X.509 certificates 
and Kerberos tickets, as well as how to include opaque encrypted keys.  
 WS-Policy (W3C, 2006
4
) describes how senders and receivers can specify 
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their requirements and capabilities.  It is fully extensible, which means it 
has no limits on the types of requirements and capabilities that may be 
described.  However, the specification identifies several basic service 
attributes, including privacy attributes, encoding formats, security token 
requirements, and supported algorithms.  It also define a generic SOAP 
policy format, which can support more than just security policies, and a 
mechanism for attaching service policies to SOAP messages. 
 WS-Trust (OASIS, 2006
13
) describes the model for establishing both direct 
and brokered trust relationships (including third parties and intermediaries).  
This specification describes how existing direct trust relationships may be 
used as the basis for brokering trust through the creation of security-token 
issuance services, which build on WS-Security, to transfer the requisite 
security tokens in a manner that ensures the integrity and confidentiality of 
those tokens.  It also describe how several existing trust mechanisms may 
be used in conjunction with this trust model 
 WS-Privacy describes a model for how a privacy language may be 
embedded into WS-Policy descriptions, and how WS-Security may be used 
to associate privacy claims with a message.  It also describes how 
WS-Trust mechanisms can be used to evaluate these privacy claims for both 
user preferences and organizational practice claims. 
 WS-SecureConversation (OASIS, 2006
3
) describes how a Web service 
can authenticate requester messages, how requesters can authenticate 
services, and how to establish mutually authenticated security contexts.  It 
describes how to establish session keys, derived keys, and per-message 
keys.  Finally, it describes how a service can securely exchange context 
(collections of claims about security attributes and related data).  In order 
to accomplish this, the specification describes, and builds upon, the 
concepts of security-token issuance and exchange mechanisms, defined in 
WS-Security and WS-Trust.  WS-SecureConversation is designed to 
operate at the SOAP-message layer so that the messages may traverse a 
variety of transports and intermediaries. 
 WS-Federation (Bajaj et al., 2003) defines how to construct federated trust 
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scenarios using the WS-Security, WS-Policy, WS-Trust, and 
WS-SecureConversation specifications.  For example, it will describe how 
to federate Kerberos and PKI infrastructures.  A trust policy is introduced 
to indicate, constrain and identify the type of trust that is being brokered.  
This specification will also define mechanisms for managing the trust 
relationships. 
 WS-Authorization describes how access policies for a Web service are 
specified and managed.  In particular, it describes how claims may be 
specified within security tokens, and how these claims will be interpreted at 
the endpoint.  It is designed to be flexible and extensible with respect to 
both authorization format and authorization language. 
5.5.4.2.  OGSA Security Model 
OGSA security services facilitate the enforcement of the security-related policy 
within a VO.  The nature of the Grid environment requires that the OGSA 
security-architecture components must support, integrate, and unify popular 
security models, mechanisms, protocols, platforms, and technologies in a way 
that enables a variety of systems to interoperate securely.  The components must 
be able to support integrating with existing security architectures and models 
across platforms and hosting environments.  This means that the architecture 
must be implementation-agnostic, extensible, and integratable.  These 
characteristics mean that the OGSA architecture can be instantiated in terms of 
any existing security mechanisms (e.g., Kerberos and PKI); incorporate new 
security services as they become available; and integrate with existing security 
services.  Also, services that traverse multiple domains and hosting 
environments need to be able to interact with each other, thus introducing the 
need for interoperability at multiple levels: protocol, policies and identity.  In 
addition, certain situations can make it impossible to establish trust relationships 
among sites prior to application execution.  Given that the participating domains 
may have different security infrastructures (e.g., Kerberos or PKI), it is necessary 
to realize the required trust relationships through some form of federation among 
the security mechanisms. 
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The security model described in OGSA (Foster et al., 2006) defines the security 
services as entities with interaction patterns that facilitate the administration, 
expression, publishing, discovery, communication, verification, enforcement 
and reconciliation of the security policy.  In other words, the security policy 
enforcement is the ultimate goal, and the security services are designed and 
deployed to support that goal.  This model identified a number of these 
entities, interaction mechanisms and contexts, and discussed some of their 
attributes and common relationships. 
Based on this model, the functional capabilities and corresponding security 
services are identified in the OGSA specification:  
 Authentication. Authentication is concerned with verifying proof of an 
asserted identity.  This functionality is part of the credential validation and 
trust Services.  One example is the evaluation of a user-id and password 
combination, in which a service requestor supplies the appropriate 
password for an asserted user-id.  
 Identity mapping.  The trust, attribute and bridge/translation services 
provide the capability of transforming an identity that exists in one identity 
domain into an identity within another identity domain.  Identity mapping 
service, via policy, maps the service requestor’s identity to an identity that 
has meaning, for instance, to the hosting environment’s local platform 
registry.  The identity-mapping service is not concerned with the 
authentication of the service requestor; rather it is strictly a policy-driven 
name-mapping service 
 Authorization.  The authorization service is concerned with resolving a 
policy-based access-control decision.  The authorization service consumes 
as input, a credential that embodies the identity of an authenticated service 
requestor and, for the resource that the service requestor requests, resolves, 
based on policy, whether or not the service requestor is authorized to access 
the resource.  It is expected that the hosting environment for 
OGSA-compliant services will provide access-control functions, and it is 
appropriate to further expose an abstract authorization service, depending 
on the granularity of the access-control policy that is being enforced. 
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 Credential conversion.  The trust, attribute and bridge/translation 
services provide credential conversion from one type of credential to 
another type or form of credential.  This may include such tasks as 
reconciling group membership, privileges, attributes and assertions 
associated with entities (service requestors and service providers).  For 
example, the credential conversion service may convert a Kerberos 
credential to a form that is required by the authorization service.  The 
policy-driven credential-conversion service facilitates the interoperability of 
differing credential types, which may be consumed by services.  It is 
expected that the credential-conversion service would use the identity 
mapping service. 
 Audit and secure logging. The audit service is responsible for producing 
records that track security-relevant events.  The resulting audit records 
may be reduced and examined so as to determine whether the desired 
security policy is being enforced.  Auditing and subsequent reduction 
tooling are used by the security administrators within a VO to determine the 
VO’s adherence to the stated access-control and authentication policies. 
 Privacy. The privacy service is primarily concerned with the policy-driven 
classification of personally identifiable information (PII).  Service 
providers and service requestors may store personally identifiable 
information using the privacy service. 
5.5.4.3.  GSI Security Model for OGSA  
OGSA introduces both new opportunities and new challenges for Grid security.  
Emerging Web-services security specifications address the expression of 
Web-service security policy (WS-Policy, XACML), standard formats for 
security token exchange (WS-Security, SAML), and standard methods for 
authentication and establishment of security contexts and trust relationships 
(WS-SecureConversation, WS-Trust).  These specifications can be exploited 
and extended to create standard, interoperable methods for addressing 
Grid-security issues.  
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GT3 provides the first implementation of OGSA mechanisms (Welch et al., 
2003).  Since GT3, the GSI security model intends to allow applications and 
users to operate on the Grid in as seamless and automated a manner as possible.  
It means the security mechanisms should not have to be instantiated in an 
application, but instead should be supplied by the surrounding Grid 
infrastructure, allowing the infrastructure to adapt on behalf of the application to 
meet the application's requirements. It allows for if the application should need 
to deal with only application-specific policy.  GSI uses the following powerful 
features of OGSA and Web-services security to work toward this goal: 
 OGSA security model casts security functions as OGSA services.  As 
introduced in previous section, OGSA defined numerous services, such as 
authorization, credential conversion services, delegation, etc.  This 
mechanism allows Grid applications to avoid embedding security 
mechanisms statically in order to adapt to changing requirements.  
 The OGSA security model uses a sophisticated container-based hosting 
environment (such as J2ME and .Net) to handle security for applications 
and to allow security to adapt without having to change the application.  In 
order to establish trust, two entities need to be able to find a common set of 
security mechanisms that both understand.  The use of hosting 
environments and OGSA security services enables OGSA applications and 
services to adapt dynamically and use different security mechanisms.  
 A Web service can publish its security policy, along with its interface 
specification, as part of a WSDL document.  This is defined by WS-Policy 
specification and its related specifications.  A published policy can express 
requirements for mechanisms, acceptable trust roots, token formats, and 
other security parameters.  When an application wishes to interact with the 
service, it can examine the published policy and gather the needed 
credentials and functionality by contacting appropriate OGSA security 
services. 
 The WS-Security, WS-SecureConversation, and WS-Trust specifications 
contain conventions and formats for the communication of various 
mechanism-specific tokens (e.g., Kerberos tickets and X.509 certificates) 
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inside SOAP envelopes.  The SOAP enveloping standardizes the protocol 
for security mechanisms and allows mechanisms to be independent of any 
application protocol.  Hosting environments can recognize security-related 
messages and route them to an appropriate service for handling, and entities 
in the network can recognize whether and how an interaction is secured. 
5.6.  Security Solutions 
From version 1 in 1998 to the 2 release in 2002 and now the 4 release, GSI has 
been developing rapidly.  In GT1, GSI mainly provided message protection and 
authentication.  In GT2, GSI introduced X.509 Proxy Certificates to support 
dynamic creation of computing entities and provided CAS to implement access 
control in dynamically created overlaid trust domains.  In GT3, the Grid 
technology worked with the emerging Web services technology. Security 
functionalities of GSI3 are defined as OGSA services.  In GSI4, which is the 
latest GSI version, additional Web-services security specifications are 
implemented.  
The security solution for the Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system is 
provided by GSI4.  GSI4 Web-services components can be divided into four 
distinct functions (Welch, 2005): message protection, authentication, delegation 
and authorization.  GSI4 contains both Web-services components and 
pre-Web-services components.  MyProxy is a pre-Web-services component 
that is used to provide an online credentials repository, and for delegating X.509 
Proxy Certificates to the Grid portal.  There exist several cross-domain 
authorization systems for use on the Grid. Authorization in the GT4 is by 
default, based on ACLs located at each resource.  The ACLs specify the 
identifiers of the users allowed to access the resource. Also, higher-level 
services (such as CAS) that provide richer authorization policies exist as 
optional configurations.  For the proposed Grid system, the authorization 
solution is provided by Shibboleth as well as GridShib, which integrate X.509 
certificates with SAML to provide cross-domain, attributed-based authorization.  
This section finally will introduce a security model combining all identified 
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components to address basic security issues in the Grid-enabled, distributed data 
warehouse system.  
5.6.1.  Message protection 
In an OGSA-based Grid system, resources are represented as services, 
specifically, as Grid services, which are Web services with well-defined 
interfaces.  Web services use SOAP message to communicate between 
services.  SOAP provides a means of messaging, using XML envelopes to 
encapsulate payloads, with HTTP, the most commonly used underlying protocol.  
In GSI4, message protection can be provided either by transporting SOAP 
messages over TLS, known as transport-level security, or by signing and/or 
encrypting portions of the SOAP message using the WS-Security standard, 
known as message-level security.  TLS only provides point-to-point secure to 
ensure privacy and data integrity.  GSI4 implements the WS-Security standard 
and the WS-SecureConversation specification to provide end-to-end message 
protection for SOAP messages.  Figure 5.5 shows the differences between 
point-to-point security and end-to-end security views.  
 
     Figure 5.5 Point-to-Point and End-to-End Security 
Transport-level security entails SOAP messages conveyed over a network 
connection protected by TLS.  It is normally used in conjunction with X.509 
credentials for authentication.  The WS-Security standard and the 
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WS-SecureConversation specification are implemented to provide message 
protection for SOAP messages.  The SOAP specification allows for the 
abstraction of the application-specific portion of the payload from any security 
(e.g., digital signature, integrity protection, or encryption) applied to that payload.  
The WS-Security standard defines a framework for applying security in 
individual SOAP messages.  GSI4 uses these mechanisms to provide security 
on a per-message basis.  WS-SecureConversation allows for an initial 
exchange of messages to establish a security context, which can then be used to 
protect subsequent messages in a manner that requires less computational 
overhead.  Both WS-Security and WS-SecureConversation are intentionally 
neutral to the specific types of credentials used to implement this security.  
WS-Security defines how to attach and include security tokens within SOAP 
messages.   It is designed to support multiple security-token formats (OASIS, 
2006
9
).  Specifically, for the Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system, 
WS-Security attaching a X.509 certificate token (OASIS, 2006
11
) will be used 
to provide single-message integrity and confidentiality.  Figure 5.6 shows a 
SOAP message structure, which is digitally signed and encrypted by using a 
X.509 certificate.  This example is a SOAP message signed before encryption.  
Likewise, if a producer wishes to sign a message after encryption, they should 
first prepend the encryption element (<xenc:EncryptedKey>) to the 
<wsse:Security> header, and then prepend the signature element 
(<ds:Signature>).  
WS-Security provides the means to secure only a single SOAP message.  
However, a client and a Web service interact by exchanging series of messages 
grouped in sessions.  While, in principle, WS-Security could secure each 
separate message in a session, this can become inefficient with regard to 
bandwidth and processing capacity if X.509 certificates are used in each 
message.  In addition, it is also desirable to guarantee integrity of a whole 
session, and not just a single message.  WS-SecureConversation describes the 
protocol that allows two or more endpoints exchange long-lived credentials only 
once, at the beginning of the conversation.  If the credentials are accepted, the 
requestor gets a Security Context Token (SCT) that acts as a lightweight 
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credential with a reference to a shared secret (symmetric key), only known by 
the participating nodes and valid for a predefined time period (e.g., duration of a 
user session or message sequence).  Subsequent messages in the conversation 
only have to carry this token.  The SCT, introduced by WS- 
SecureConversation, points to a secret key, shared between the participants.  
Its initial key data can be used to repeatedly derive new session keys during a 
conversation using fast crypto algorithms.  An SCT can be established in 
different ways (OASIS, 2006
3
).  For the Grid-enabled, distributed data 
warehouse system, the X.509 certificates are used to establish a session key. 
SOAP Message Implementing WS-Security
<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="..." xmlns:wsse="..."   xmlns:wsu="..."  
xmlns:ds="...">
<S11:Header>
<wsse:Security>
</wsse:Security>
</S11:Header>
<S11:Body wsu:Id="myBody">
……….
</S11:Body>
<wsse:BinarySecurityToken
ValueType="...#X509v3"
EncodingType="...#Base64Binary"
wsu:Id="X509Token">
MIIEZzCCA9CgAwIBAgIQEmtJZc0rqrKh5i...
</wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
<ds:Signature>
.
.
</ds:Signature>
<xenc:EncryptedKey>
.
.
</xenc:EncryptedKey>
<xenc:EncryptedData Id="bodyID">
.
.
</xenc:EncryptedData>
Attaching X.509 Token
Signed by X.509 Certificate
Encrypted Key
Encrypted Data
 
 
     Figure 5.6 SOAP Message Implementing WS-Security 
5.6.2. Authentication, delegation and SSO 
GSI4 uses X.509 end-entity certificates (EECs) to identify persistent entities, 
such as users and services.  X.509 EECs provide each entity with a unique 
identifier (i.e., a DN) and a method to assert that identifier to another party, 
through the use of an asymmetric key pair, bound to the identifier by the 
certificate.  Authentication with X.509 credentials can be accomplished either 
via TLS, in the case of transport-level security, or via signature, as specified by 
WS-Security, in the case of message-level security. 
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GSI4 supports delegation and SSO through the use of standard X.509 Proxy 
Certificates. Proxy Certificates allow bearers of X.509 EECs to delegate their 
privileges temporarily to another entity.  For the purposes of authentication and 
authorization, GSI4 treats EECs and Proxy Certificates equivalently.  GT4 
supports a delegation service that provides an interface to allow clients to 
delegate (and renew) X.509 Proxy Certificates to a service.  The interface to 
this service is based on the WS-Trust specification.  
WS-Trust specification defines extension to WS-Security.  It provides methods 
for issuing, renewing, and validating security tokens. For example, it defines 
Security Token Service (STS), which can be used to create an SCT.  It also 
provides ways to establish, assess the presence of, and broker trust relationships.  
As defined in WS-Trust, there are a few mechanisms where existing keys are 
transferred to other parties.  Delegation is one of these key transfer 
mechanisms (OASIS, 2006
13
).  It allows one-party transfers the right to use a 
key without actually transferring the key.  For example, a custom token is 
issued from party A to party B.  The token indicates that B (specifically B's 
key) has the right to submit purchase orders.  The token is signed using a secret 
key known to the target service T and party A (the key used to ultimately 
authorize the requests that B makes to T), and a new session key that is 
encrypted for T.  A proof-of-possession token is included that contains the 
session key encrypted for B.  As a result, B is effectively using A's key, but 
does not actually know the key.  
5.6.3.  MyProxy protocol 
MyProxy is an online credentials’ repository for Grid systems (Novotny, 
Tuecke & Welch, 2001) (Lorch, Basney & Kafura, 2004).  It is a pre-Web 
Services component in GSI4.  In the Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse 
system, a Grid portal, combining a Web server and Grid-enabled software, 
provides users an interface to access all applications using standard Web 
browsers.  Grid portal requires that the user delegates to the server the right for 
that server to act on the user’s behalf, in order to initiate and monitor operations 
for that user on Grid resources.  GSI supports such delegation, but the standard 
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Web-security protocols do not.  MyProxy bridges this incompatibility between 
Web- and Grid-security protocols, thus enabling Grid portal to use 
GSI-protected resources in a secure and scalable manner.  It allows long-lived 
keys to be secured on the remote server, while allowing convenient access to 
short-lived, proxy credentials as needed.  
The MyProxy credentials repository system consists of a repository server and a 
set of client tools for delegating to and retrieving credentials from the repository.  
In order to meet the goals of the MyProxy approach, there are two basic steps 
for using the repository: delegation of proxy credentials to the repository and 
retrieving the credentials from the repository (as illustrated in Figure 5.7). 
 
 
Figure 5.7 MyProxy Protocol 
a) A user starts by using the myproxy-init client program along with its 
permanent credentials to contact the repository and delegate a set of proxy 
credentials to the server, along with authentication information and retrieval 
restrictions.  Authentication information in this process consists of a user 
identity (ID) and a pass phrase.  It is used to authenticate any retrieval 
operations. This user ID is different from the user’s DN; it is actually 
hand-typed by the user at later times.  The user ID identifies the account 
storing the proxy credentials in repository server.  Both can be tested by 
the repository to ensure they comply with any local policy (for example, the 
pass phrase must meet a certain length).  The only available retrieval 
restriction that can be placed on delegations by the repository is the 
maximum lifetime of the proxy credentials. These restrictions are intended 
to be expanded in future versions.  
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b) A user, or service acting on behalf of the user, uses the 
myproxy-get-delegation client program to contact the repository server and 
request a delegation of the user’s credentials.  During this process, the user 
must provide the ID and pass phrase for verification.  After verifying this 
authentication information and checking the restrictions that the user 
presented with the delegation, the repository will delegate proxy credentials 
back to the user or service.  
c) The credentials delegated to the repository normally have a lifetime of a 
week.  This lifetime can be changed to any length of time desired.  The 
credentials delegated to the repository can be destroyed at any time by 
using the myproxy-destroy client program.  
The first step to using MyProxy in a Grid portal is to delegate proxy credentials 
to the repository by using the myproxy-init client program.  Then the user may 
connect to the Grid portal by using a Web browser and provide the 
authentication information (user ID and pass phrase) through a Web form at a 
different time and place.  The Grid portal then uses myproxy-get-delegation 
program to connect to the MyProxy repository and authenticates itself using its 
own Grid credentials.   The user’s authentication information (user ID and 
pass phrase) is also transferred to repository server at the same time for 
requesting a proxy credential for the user.  The repository would delegate a 
proxy credential for the user back to the portal after all necessary verification 
(portal’s Grid credentials, user’s authentication information).  The Grid portal 
then can securely access the Grid resources by using standard Grid applications.  
The operation of logging out of the Grid portal deletes the user’s delegated 
credentials on the portal; otherwise, the credentials will expire when the lifetime 
lapses. 
MyProxy has been extended to better integrate with existing site infrastructure, 
and to make it easier for users to bootstrap their X.509 security context.  It 
introduces new developments, including management of trust roots, 
standards-based integration with site authentication and the ability to act as a 
CA.  These new features enhance the MyProxy usage in the proposed Grid 
system.  They are introduced as follows: 
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 A user’s X.509 security context includes an end entity or proxy credential, 
one or more trusted CA certificates, and certificate revocation information 
in the form of CRLs or online certificate status protocol (OCSP) (Myers, 
Ankney, Malpani, Galperin & Adams, 1999) responses.  MyProxy Logon 
application is used to obtain a user’s complete security context from the 
MyProxy service.  The MyProxy administrator maintains a set of trusted 
CA certificates and configures the server to periodically fetch fresh CRLs.  
MyProxy Logon fetches the configured CA certificates and CRLs in 
addition to the user’s end entity or proxy certificate and installs them in the 
local user’s environment.  
 The MyProxy service can be configured to allow users to logon with 
existing site credentials, using Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAMs) 
and/or the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL).  Through 
these mechanisms, users are not required to remember another username 
and password for the MyProxy service. 
 For users that do not already have X.509 credentials to store in the 
MyProxy repository, the administrator can configure MyProxy to act as an 
online CA to issue certificates in realtime-based on-site authentication.  
The administrator must provide a mapping of authenticated usernames to 
certificate subjects, either in a configuration file or through LDAP 
(Lightweight Directory Access Protocol).  The user authenticates via 
MyProxy Logon to the MyProxy service, and MyProxy issues a certificate 
to the user with the subject provided in the mapping file.  MyProxy CA 
provides a lightweight mechanism for sites to distribute X.509 credentials. 
5.6.4.  Authorization 
Authentication addresses the question, “Is the user who he claims to be?”, which 
is typically a permanent attribute. Authorization addresses the question, “What is 
the user allowed to do?”, which can vary over time.  GSI is based on a PKI with 
CAs and X.509 certificates.  PKI provides credentials that can help to solve the 
first question.  Authorization, which is commonly based on a set of user 
attributes, identities, policies and environmental parameters to make 
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authorization decisions, however, is not usually solved by PKI: naturally, a 
X.509 certificate can contain a set of user attributes that are used by the 
application for determining the user’s authorization.  
There are a number of authorization systems currently available for use on the 
Grid as well as in other areas of computing, such as Akenti (Thompson et al., 
1999), CAS (Pearlman, Welch, Foster, Kesselman & Tuecke, 2002) (Pearlman, 
Welch, Foster, Kesselman & Tuecke, 2003), PERMIS (Chadwick & Otenko, 
2002), VOMS (“VOMS Architecture v1.1”, 2002), Cardea (Lepro, 2003), 
PRIMA (Lorch & Kafura, 2002) (Lorch et al., 2003), and Shibboleth 
(http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/).  Some of these systems are normally used in a 
push model - they act as services and issue these authorization decisions in the 
form of authorization assertions that are conveyed to the target resource by the 
requestor.  Others are used in a pull model - they are normally linked with an 
application or service and act as a policy decision-maker for that application.  
Akenti, PERMIS and Shibboleth use user attributes to make authorization 
decisions; VOMS provides user attributes that can be used for authorization.  
For the Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system, GSI4 provides the 
X.509 certificates to identify the Grid clients. An X.509 certificate is treated as 
input of authorization system, provided by Shibboleth, as well as GridShib 
plug-ins.   This approach can integrate X.509 certificates with SAML to 
provide cross-domain attributed-based authorization.  GT4 introduces an 
SAML/XACML authorization framework that supports multiple security 
policies (Lang, Foster, Siebenlist, Ananthakrishnan & Freeman, 2006).  A Grid 
system consists of multiple administrative domains, which have their own 
security policies, such as grid-mapfile, ACL, CAS, SAML authorization 
decision assertions, and XACML policy statements.  This framework tends to 
be flexible, so that it can be changed easily for different application 
environments.  This framework allows the authorization system for the 
proposed system to integrate into GT4 authorization framework as an 
authorization service, so it enables the proposed Grid system to seamlessly 
accommodate new participants, which use different authorization systems.  
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5.6.4.1.  SAML 
According to OASIS (OASIS, 2005
1
), the SAML standard defines an 
XML-based framework for describing and exchanging security information 
between on-line business partners.  This security information is expressed in the 
form of portable SAML assertions that applications, working across security 
domain boundaries can trust.  The OASIS SAML standard defines precise 
syntax and rules for requesting, creating, communicating, and using these SAML 
assertions.  It provides support for full federation and mapping of identifiers, 
session management, greater interoperability for attribute exchange and other 
features.  
SAML is defined in terms of assertions, protocols, bindings and profiles.  An 
assertion is a package of information that supplies one or more statements made 
by a SAML authority.  There are three different kinds of assertions: 
authentication statements, attributes statements, and authorization-decision 
statements.  Authentication statement is typically generated by a SAML 
authority, called an identity provider, which is in charge of authenticating users 
and keeping track of other information about them.  Attributes statements 
contain specific identifying attributes about the subject (for example, that user 
“John Doe” has “Gold” card status).  Authorization-decision statements define 
something that the subject is entitled to do (for example, whether “John Doe” is 
permitted to buy a specified item).  SAML defines a number of generalized 
request/response protocols, including Authentication Request, Single Logout 
Assertion Query and Request, Artifact Resolution, Name Identifier 
Management, and Name Identifier Mapping Protocols.  Assertion Query and 
Request Protocol defines a set of queries by which SAML assertions may be 
obtained.  Name Identifier Mapping Protocol provides a mechanism to 
programmatically map one SAML name identifier into another, subject to 
appropriate policy controls.  It permits, for example, one service provider to 
request from an identity provider an identifier for a user that the service 
provider can use at another service provider in an application integration 
scenario.  SAML bindings detail exactly how the various SAML protocol 
messages can be carried over underlying transport protocols.  For instance, the 
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SAML SOAP binding defines how SAML protocol messages can be 
communicated within SOAP messages, whilst the HTTP redirect binding 
defines how to pass protocol messages through HTTP redirection.  A profile of 
SAML defines constraints and/or extensions in support of the usage of SAML 
for a particular application. 
5.6.4.2.  Shibboleth 
Shibboleth is an attribute-based authorization system that asserts attributes 
about a user between organizations (Erdos & Cantor, 2001).  The current 
implementation of the specification is Shibboleth 1.3 (released July 2005).  
More precisely, Shibboleth asserts attributes between the user's home 
organization and organization’s hosting resources that may be accessible to the 
user.  Shibboleth can be conceptually regarded as comprising three 
components: Handle Service, Attribute Authority (AA) and Target Resource.  
The Handle Service authenticates users in conjunction with a local 
organizational authentication service and issues to the user a handle token.  
When a user requests access to a target resource, he presents his handle token.  
The resource then presents the user’s handle token to the attribute authority and 
requests attributes regarding the user.  The Shibboleth AA retrieves attributes 
from an organizational authority and provides them in the form of SAML 
assertions.  The target resource includes Shibboleth-specific code to determine 
the user’s home organization and hence, which Shibboleth attribute authority 
should be contacted for the user to retrieve attributes regarding the user, and to 
make authorization decisions, based on those attributes.  Shibboleth is based in 
large part on SAML.  SAML defines two functional components: an Identity 
Provider (IdP) and a Service Provider (SP).  The IdP creates, maintains, and 
manages user identity, while the SP controls access to services and resources.  
An IdP produces and issues SAML assertions to SPs upon request.  An SP 
consumes SAML assertions obtained from IdPs for the purpose of making 
access-control decisions.  Based on Shibboleth Attribute Exchange Profile 
(Cantor et al., 2005), on the IdP side, a Shibboleth AA produces and issues 
attribute assertions, while a subcomponent of the SP, called an Attribute 
Requester, consumes these assertions. 
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5.6.4.3.  GridShib 
The GSI4 uses X.509 certificates and X.509 Proxy Certificates for 
authentication.  In brief, these certificates allow a user to assert a globally 
unique identifier (i.e., a DN from the X.509 certificate).  SAML can use its 
attribute queries and assertions to support distributed authorization in support of 
X.509-based authentication (OASIS, 2005
4
).  GridShib is a software product 
that allows for interoperability between the GT and Shibboleth (Welch, Barton, 
Keahey & Siebenlist, 2005) (Barton et al., 2006).  The complete software 
package consists of two plug-ins: one for the GT4 and another for Shibboleth.  
The main purpose of GT4 plug-in is to obtain attributes about a requesting user 
from a Shibboleth AA and make an access control decision, based on those 
attributes. GridShib for Shibboleth is a name mapping plug-in for a Shibboleth 
1.3 identity provider.  Its main purpose is to allow the servicing of attribute 
queries from Grid SPs, based on the user’s X.509 subject DN. With both 
plug-ins installed and configured, a GT Grid service provider may securely 
request user attributes from a Shibboleth IdP.  
GridShib focuses on using Shibboleth as the AA.  It assumes the users have a 
valid X.509 certificate, containing at least the name of users’ institution (IdP).  
The X.509 certificate is offered to the application, verified, and the IdP 
information is extracted. Next, the application contacts the IdP, supplies the 
certificate’s ID, and receives in return a SAML assertion containing the user’s 
attributes.  The GridShib Profile is an extension of the Shibboleth Attribute 
Exchange Profile.  The primary difference is the use of X.500 DNs to identify 
principals.  The detailed GridShib protocol flow will be discussed with all 
identified security components in section 5.6.5.  
5.6.4.4.  XACML Authorization Framework 
The GT4 authorization framework uses the XACML model.  This section 
gives a brief overview of XACML authorization model.  
According to OASIS (OASIS, 2005
2
), XACML defines a core schema and 
corresponding namespace for the expression of authorization policies in XML 
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against objects that are themselves identified in XML, and enables the use of 
arbitrary attributes in policies, role-based access control, security labels, 
time/date-based policies, indexable policies, “deny” policies, and dynamic 
policies — all without requiring changes to the applications that use XACML.  
Figure 5.8 gives an overview of the XACML authorization model.  It mainly 
contains PEP (Policy Enforcement Point), PDP (Policy Decision Point), PIP 
(Policy Information Point), and PAP (Policy Administration Point).  The PEP 
intercepts the access requests from users and sends the requests to the PDP.  
The PDP makes access decisions according to the security policy or policy set 
written by PAP and, using attributes of the subjects, the resource, and the 
environment obtained by querying the PIP.  The access decision given by the 
PDP is sent to the PEP.  The PEP fulfills the obligations and either permits or 
denies the access request, according to the decision of PDP.  
 
 
        Figure 5.8 XACML Authorization Model 
5.6.4.5.  GT4 SAML/XACML Authorization Framework 
The GT4 authorization framework implements SAML and uses the XACML 
model.  As shown in Figure 5.9, it is composed of a PEP, PDPs, and PIPs.  
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For each existing authorization policy, the framework constructs a PDP for 
evaluating that kind of policy.  The Master PDP is responsible for coordinating 
the PDPs to render a final decision.  The Master PDP and the PEP are 
collectively called the authorization engine.  The framework provides different 
kind of PIPs.  A subset of PIP, referred to as Bootstrap PIPs, collect information 
only about the request, such as the peer subject, the requested action, and the 
resource.  An example of one such PIP is the X509BootstrapPIP, which extracts 
the subject DN of the peer from the X509 certificate.  
When a request of the Grid resource comes, the PEP intercepts it and sends a 
decision request to the Master PDP.  The Master PDP collects information 
needed by calling the Bootstrap PIPs and other PIPs and then invokes the 
corresponding PDPs with the request and the information collected.  The PIPs 
and the PDPs used are all specified in the security configuration file.  When the 
Master PDP receives the decisions returned by each PDP, it combines the 
decisions, using a policy combination algorithm, such as deny override or permit 
override, to render a final decision and returns the decision to the PEP.  The PEP 
then executes the decision, either denying or permitting the request.  
GT4 Authorization Model
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        Figure 5.9 GT4 Authorization Framework 
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The PDP is the core of the authorization framework.  In order to make the 
framework support different kind of policies and be scalable, it is necessary to 
encapsulate the policy into an independent PDP.  In Grid systems, there are 
several frequently used simple authorization policies or mechanisms such as the 
provided PDPs that implement these existing policies, such as the 
AccessControlList PDP and the GridMapAuthorizaion PDP.  There are also 
some authorization systems developed by others that can be used in a Grid 
system, such as Shibboleth, VOMS and PERMIS.  Therefore, a 
SAMLAuthorizationCallout PDP for integrating those authorization systems 
through the SAML assertions is established.  
5.6.5.  Putting it all together 
The Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system requires security 
functions, including authentication, SSO, delegation and authorization.  SOAP 
messages are conveyed over a network connection protected by TLS in order to 
ensure transport-level security.  Web services security standards and 
specifications are used to provide end-to-end SOAP message protection.  
Authentication with X.509 credentials can be accomplished either via TLS, in 
the case of transport-level security, or via signature, as specified by 
WS-Security, in the case of message-level security.  Delegation and SSO can 
be achieved through the use of standard X.509 Proxy Certificates.  X.509 EEC 
and X.509 Proxy Certificates represent long-term and short-term credentials 
respectively; they are treated equivalently for the purpose of authentication.  
MyProxy provides an online credential repository for X.509 proxy credentials 
encrypted by user-chosen pass phrases.  Shibboleth and GridShib provide 
authorization.  More specifically, a Shibboleth AA of IdP is responsible for 
name mapping, and GridShib plug-ins are responsible for formulating the 
attribute assertions.  
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         Figure 5.10 Security Model  
Figure 5.10 shows the security model that combines all the necessary 
components.  Before explaining the processes defined in this model, the 
following assumptions are made: 
 The Grid client and the Grid SP each possess an X.509 credential. 
 The Grid client has an account with a Shibboleth IdP. 
 The IdP and the Grid SP each have been assigned a globally unique 
identifier, called a provider-ID. 
 The Grid SP and the IdP rely on the same metadata format and exchange 
this metadata out-of-band.  Specifically, both the IdP and the Grid SP rely 
on SAML 2.0 metadata (OASIS, 2005
3
) for their trust configuration (i.e., 
the certificates and public keys of the other entity). 
The work flows depicted in Figure 5.10 are described as follows: 
Step 0). Delegate a X.509 Proxy Certificate to the MyProxy credentials 
repository server.  The client that stores the user’s X.509 EEC (long term 
user’s credentials) sends a “Put” request (Basney, 2005) to the repository server, 
along with a user ID, pass phrase and lifetime through the use of myproxy-init 
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client program.  The repository server accepts the request and generates a new 
public/private key pair and then sends a certificate request, containing the 
repository’s public key, to the client.  The client then sends a X.509 Proxy 
Certificate containing the public key from the certificate request, signed by its 
X.509 EEC’s private key, followed by the corresponding certificate chain, back 
to the repository server.  The repository then stores this X.509 Proxy 
Certificate for later retrieval from the Grid portal.  The user ID and pass phrase 
specify the account for storing the proxy certificate and are used to authenticate 
its retrieval operation.  The stored X.509 expires at the lifetime.  This process 
is authenticated via TLS.  This is the initialization step. 
Step 1). Users can log on the Grid portal at a different time and place by using a 
standard Web browser.  
Step 2). The Grid portal sends a “Get” request (Basney, 2005), along with the 
user ID and pass phrase generated in the initialization step, to the MyProxy 
repository server to retrieve the stored user’s X.509 Proxy Certificate through 
the use of the “myproxy-get-delegation” client program.  If the repository’s 
response indicates success, the Grid portal generates a new public/private key 
pair and then sends a certificate request, containing the Grid portal’s public key, 
to the repository server.  The repository server then sends a X.509 Proxy 
Certificate, containing the public key from the certificate request, signed by the 
private key of the stored user’s X.509 Proxy Certificate, followed by the 
corresponding certificate chain, back to the Grid portal.  This process is 
authenticated via TLS and also the user ID and pass phrase.  It enables the 
repository to delegate proxy credentials for the user back to the Grid portal, and 
then the Grid portal can act on the user’s behalf to securely access the Grid 
resources by using standard Grid applications. 
Step 3). The Grid portal holding the user’s X.509 Proxy Certificate can request 
the Grid service (or resources) on the user’s behalf.  It authenticates, using the 
retrieved X.509 Proxy Certificate to the Grid SP.  The Grid SP authenticates 
the request and extracts the client’s DN from the credentials. 
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Step 4). The Grid SP formulates a SAML attribute query, whose NameIdentifier 
element is the DN extracted from the X.509 Proxy Certificate.  The Grid SP 
uses its own X.509 EEC to authenticate to the AA. 
Step 5). The AA of the IdP authenticates the attribute request, maps the DN to a 
local principal name, using the GridShib plug-in, retrieves the requested 
attributes for the user (suitably filtered by normal Shibboleth-attribute release 
policies), formulates an SAML-attribute assertion, and sends the assertion to the 
Grid SP. 
Step 6). The Grid SP parses the SAML attribute assertion, caches the attributes, 
makes an access control decision, processes the client request (assuming access 
is granted) and returns a response to the Grid portal.  The Grid portal formats 
the result into standard Web pages and sends it to the Web browser.  
5.7.  Summary 
This chapter focuses on the security issues and corresponding solution for the 
Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system.  The proposed system is an 
OGSA-based Grid system, which consists of multiple, untrusted participants. 
The nature of VO introduces a number of security challenges that are far more 
complex compared to the traditional distributed diagram.  The primary security 
requirements include cross-domain authentication, global subject mapping to 
local subject, credential protection, dynamical delegation, SSO, and 
cross-domain access control.  The security policy within each institution might 
be changed frequently, so the security issues should be addressed at 
infrastructure-level in order to release the burden of changing applications.  
Additionally, the proposed Grid system uses a Grid portal, which provides a 
Web-based interface, allowing users to access Grid resources by using standard 
Web browsers at any time and place.  Therefore, it is necessary to find a way 
to bridge the incompatibility between Web and Grid-security protocols.   
The security solution is based on the GSI, which is a portion of GT.  GSI 
consists of a number of components focused on different issues.  It is based on 
a PKI with certificate authorities and X.509 certificates.  It provides a 
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public-key system; mutual authentication through digital certificates; credential 
delegation and SSO.  It acts as Grid security middleware to provide 
infrastructure-level security functionalities for addressing security issues in a 
Grid environment. The GSI4, which is the latest version of GSI, implements the 
OGSA security architecture, by combining OGSA and existing or emerging 
Web-services security standards and specifications.  This approach allows the 
basic security issues to be addressed by Grid infrastructure.  Therefore, the 
Grid applications only need to deal with application-specific security policy 
without considering the frequent changes of institutions’ policies.  
The solution is provided by GSI4.  The X.509 certificate is used with TLS to 
provide transport-level message protection.  The Web-services security 
standards and specifications are used to provide end-to-end message-level 
protection.  The X.509 Proxy Certificate is used to achieve dynamic delegation 
and SSO.  The MyProxy protocol acts as an online credentials repository that 
solves the incompatibility between Web- and Grid-security protocols. 
Authorization is provided by Shibboleth, as well as GridShib plug-ins, which 
integrate X.509 credentials with SAML.   These components are integrated 
into a security model, which can be implemented to ensure the proposed Grid 
system works in a secure way.  
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Chapter 6.  
Conclusion 
Grid computing, which has emerged as a state-of-the-art cross-domain 
approach, is concerned with heterogeneous, distributed resource-sharing for 
cross-institutional collaboration.  It uses standard, open, general-purpose 
protocols and interfaces to coordinate resource-sharing within a virtual 
organization (VO) for delivering various services.  Combining Grid 
technologies with appropriate database access and integration technology is 
essential in the Grid computing paradigm. 
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive introduction to current Grid technologies 
and database technologies.  Grid technology has evolved at a rapid rate. The 
emphasis of the Grid system has shifted from early meta-computing to 
distributed global collaboration, a service-oriented approach and 
information-layer issues. Currently, Grid computing is closely related to the 
evolution of Web technologies and standards.  Current database management 
technology has already addressed new challenges, like scale, heterogeneity and 
distribution.  However, the major limitations, such as cross-domain federated 
query and security, do exist.  The combination of Grid and database access and 
integration enables the transparent access of distributed data resources, made 
possible by using resource virtualization methods.  
This project proposes a Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system, which 
provides infrastructure-level services, such as is required to support HIV/AIDS 
collaborative research.  In this case, the Grid is primarily used to: control 
workflow of data-collection; to coordinate data-access and authorisation across 
multiple institutions; to integrate various types of data into a single format; and 
to manage the collaborative data-analysis operations.  In the HIV/AIDS 
example problem-context, patients’ data is collected and populated into the 
collector’s data warehouse, which provides the primary type of resource - data.  
A number of HIV/AIDS-related data-analysis services can be built over the 
established data warehouse for the purpose of research.  The data-analysis 
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services are considered as computing resources. Data and computing resources, 
resource providers, and resources consumers comprise a VO that consists of 
multiple, physically distributed institutions.  The proposed system is 
responsible for providing essential capabilities by defining a rich set of services 
with standard interfaces and protocols.  
This dissertation focuses on two main objectives.  
 The first objective involved defining a feasible framework for the 
Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system, according to existing 
standards, specification, and implementation.  The proposed system is 
designed as an OGSA-based Grid system.  There exists a number of 
standards and specifications (e.g., Web services family, WSRF, and 
WS-Notification) to support the realization of OGSA.  A system 
framework is proposed through a thorough study of all these standards, 
specifications and corresponding implementations.  Based on this 
framework, two sub-objectives were identified.  The first was to identify 
core services, providing fundamental capabilities required by the proposed 
system. The second was to define two component models for (a) 
data-collection for data warehousing among disparate data providers in a 
VO and for (b) data-access and data-integration in a VO.  
 The second objective involved addressing particular security issues, 
including authentication, SSO, dynamic delegation and authorization for the 
proposed system.  The security solution was derived based on a literature 
survey of GSI (Grid Security Infrastrucuture) and related standards and 
specifications.  GSI concerns general security aspect in Grid 
environments.  Based on the study of the security mechanisms of GSI, and 
supporting standards and specifications (such as PKI, Web service security, 
SAML, Shibboleth, etc.), the required components were selected to fulfil 
the security requirements of the proposed system.  One sub-objective in 
the security area was to define a model that integrates the relevant security 
components to illustrate how to establish cross-domain trust relationships 
and to provide secure conversation between VO entities. 
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Chapter 3 firstly describes the characteristics of a VO environment for the 
envisaged Grid system and then discusses the essential OGSA (Open Grid 
Services Architecture) functional capabilities, based on a pre-defined VO.  A 
set of capabilities, including resource virtualization, resource publication and 
discovery, data-collection, data operation, provenance, resource management, 
job-execution management, metadata, monitoring and security, are identified for 
the proposed system.  The combination of these capabilities can provide 
advanced capabilities, such as data-collection, data-sharing coordination and 
collaborative operations.  
Based on the discussion in chapter 3, chapter 4 focuses on the first main 
objective and its sub-objectives.  A layered system framework is defined in 
order to identify all supportive standards and specifications used to design and 
implement the proposed system.  OGSA is a de facto standard for building a 
Grid system. It is the core standard in this framework. WSRF, WS-Notification 
and Web service family are supportive standards and specification to realize 
OGSA.  OGSA introduces a service-oriented Grid architecture, which tailors a 
Web services approach to meet some Grid-specific requirements. It defines 
what is called Grid service to represent resources (either data or computational 
resources) in a VO by using stateful Web services with standard interfaces and 
protocol binding.  A Grid service is essentially a stateful Web service. Giving 
Web services the ability to keep state information, while still keeping them 
stateless, seems like a complex problem.  WS-Resource is an approach defined 
by WSRF to model stateful resources in a Web-services context.  The state 
information is kept in a stateful resource instead of Web service.  
WS-Notification specifications use standard approaches to notification, using a 
topic-based publish-and-subscribe pattern. Based on the OGSA, WSRF, Web 
services-standard, the infrastructure services and core services were defined to 
offer capabilities to the Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system. 
Infrastructure services provide the foundation for building core services.  They 
consist of a number of common components for naming, representing state, 
notification and security.  The core services were defined to meet the primary 
requirements of the proposed Grid system.  Core services contain a large set of 
services to provide a variety of capabilities, such as data-access, data integration, 
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resources management, system monitoring, job execution, etc.  These services 
are compliant with OGSA Grid services.  It means they can be implemented by 
using OGSA-based development toolkits, such as GT and OGSA-DAI.  Based 
on all identified services, two models were created to demonstrate how to 
integrate these services to achieve data collecting from distributed providers and 
data-sharing across multiple, distributed institutions. The models use a Grid 
portal as a Web-based brokerage point that allows authorized users to access 
Grid resources via Web browsers.  
Web services’ standards have evolved at a fast rate.  Today there are many 
specifications that provide Web-service capabilities for resources, events, and 
management.  Some examples are: WS-Transfer, WSRF, WS-Notification, 
WS-Eventing, WS-Management, WSDM specifications, etc.  In 2006, IBM, HP, 
Intel and Microsoft plan to develop a common set of specifications for resources, 
events and management that can be broadly supported across heterogeneous 
systems (Cline et al., 2006). For example, the new WS-EventNotification 
specification composes with WS-ResourceTransfer to support a state/resource 
model for managing subscriptions.  The existing functionality of 
WS-Notification, not explicitly defined in WS-EventNotification, can still be 
layered over its message model and functionality as an extension. The new Web 
services management specification comprises new WS-ResourceTransfer and 
new WS-EventNotification.  The differences between WS-Management and 
WSDM specifications are directly due to the differences between WS-Transfer 
and WSRF, and between WS-Notification and WS-Eventing.  The 
reconciliation of the resource management and event/notification specifications 
enable reconciliation of many of the functions of the management 
specifications.  This plan outlined the approach to build on existing 
specifications and defined a set of enhancements that enable this convergence. 
Future work is based on this convergence in order to allow the proposed system 
migrate smoothly to the new specifications as they emerge and move through to 
standardization. 
Chapter 5 focused on the second objective: a security solution for particular 
security issues in the Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system.  The 
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Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system consists of multiple untrusted 
institutions.  Each institution may have various security policies and use 
different mechanism to handle intra-domain security issues.  The main goals of 
the envisaged security solution are providing cross-domain mutual 
authentication, global subject mapping to local subject, credential protection, 
dynamical delegation, SSO, and cross-domain access control.  The security 
solution is based on GSI, which is a PKI-based infrastructure for addressing 
general security issues in a Grid environment.  For authentication, the X.509 
credentials are used either via TLS, in the case of transport-level security, or via 
digital signatures, as specified by WS-Security, in the case of message-level 
security. The X.509 Proxy Certificate is used to achieve dynamic delegation and 
SSO.  The MyProxy protocol acts as an online credentials repository that 
solves the incompatibility between Web- and Grid-security protocols.  
Shibboleth, as well as GridShib, are used to provide access control. The 
authorization decision is dependent on users’ X.509 credentials and attributes 
retrieved from an AA by using SAML attribute query and assertion.  All these 
components are finally integrated into a security model, which can be 
implemented to establish trust relationships and provide secure interaction 
between untrusted institutions. 
A major criticism against the authorization approach discussed in this 
dissertation is that the user still needs to obtain a valid certificate from a CA. 
SAML and XACML are two important authorization-related standards.  The 
authorization discussed in this dissertation does not use the full potential of 
SAML and XACML.  The combination of SAML and XACML can enable 
federated identity management, and federated access management.  This 
approach does not depend on the user have a PKI certificate and provide 
seamless access control.  In chapter 5, GT4 SAML/XACML authorization 
framework was such an example.  Future work in this security area will focus 
on the study on SAML/XACML framework, related standards and 
implementation toolkits in order to provide more seamless and scalable access 
control in the Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system.   
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In summary, this dissertation discussed a flexible framework and security 
solution for a Grid-enabled, distributed data warehouse system (exemplified in 
the context of HIV/AIDS collaborative research).  The main contribution of 
this work was exploring a feasible approach, which uses Grid technology to 
support data-sharing and collaboration over distributed data warehouses (or 
databases) for the purpose of data analysis (or data-mining) in a VO context.  
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